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PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE 



ON THE 



PASSIONS: 



THIRD EDITION, CORRECTED. 



B y T. C O G A N, M. D. 



Format enim Natura prins nos intus ad omnera 
Fortunarum habitum. Horatii de Arte Poetica, 






JLonOon: 

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, 

IN THE STRAND; 

By G. Sidney, Northumberland-street. 

1813. 



PREFACE. 



A MIDST the numerous Branches of 
Knowledge which claim the attention 
of the human mind, no one can be more 
important than that which constitutes the 
subject of the following Treatise. What- 
ever most intimately concerns ourselves 
must be of the first moment. The principle 
of self-love, which is inherent in our nature, 
immediately suggests that no other species 
of knowledge can stand in competition with 
it. Every thing is justly deemed interesting 
which has an immediate relation to our- 
selves ; and the degrees of its importance^ 
are measured by the degress of its influence 
upon our Well-being. Therefore, to attend 
to the workings of our own minds ; to trace 

a 2 



iv PREFACE. 

the power which external objects have over 
us ; — to discover the nature of our emotions 
and affections ; — to comprehend the reason 
of our being affected in a particular manner, 
must have a direct influence upon our pur- 
suits, our characters, and our happiness. 

It may with justice be advanced, that 
the history of ourselves in this department, 
is of much greater utility than abstruser 
speculations concerning the metaphysical 
nature of the human soul, or even the most 
accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers. 
For it is according as the passions and affec- 
tions are excited ; and directed towards the 
objects investigated by these intellectual 
powers, that we become useful to our- 
selves or others ; that we rise into respec- 
tability or sink into contempt ; that we dif- 
fuse or enjoy happiness, diffuse or suffer 
misery. 

An accurate Analysis of the passions 
and affections, is to the Moralist, what 



PREFACE. v 

the science of Anatomy is to the Sur- 
geon. It constitutes the first principles of 
rational practice. It is in a moral view, 
the anatomy of the heart. It discovers 
why it beats, and how it beats ; indi- 
cates appearances in a sound and healthy 
state ; detects diseases with their cause ; 
and it is infinitely more fortunate in the 
power it communicates of applying suitable 
remedies. 

Yet, notwithstanding the superior impor- 
tance of this Science, it has not engaged 
the attention of philosophers, to an equal 
degree with the intellectual powers of man. 
Those who are conscious of the acuteness 
of their own intellects, have loved to em- 
ploy them upon subjects the most difficult 
and abstruse. Their chief delight has been 
in the study of natures and essences ; and 
their ambition, to solve difficulties which 
have repeatedly occupied and embarrassed 
the strongest minds. Patient attention to 



vi PREFACE. 

facts appears to them an employment best 
adapted to plain and common understand- 
ings : it is the province of Genius to soar 
above the common level, and penetrate the 
mists which surround the regions of intel- 
lect. 

When it is asserted that the passions of 
the mind have not employed the attention 
of the philosophic world, equally with the 
other branches which relate to Man, the 
assertion implies that they have not been 
totally neglected. Philosophers, in their 
study of human nature, have not passed 
them over in silence. They have treated 
them occasionally, but generally speaking 
superficially ; chiefly as appendages to their 
other philosophical pursuits. This circum- 
stance, it is acknowledged, has been pro- 
ductive of a train of thought peculiar to 
each speculator; and thus has each been able 
to throw some light upon a subject, which 



PREFACE. vii 

it was not his sole or primary object to in- 
vestigate. 

Among the Authors who have paid the 
most attention to the subject, Professor 
Huteheson, Dr. Watts, Mr, Grove, the Wri- 
ter of the Article " on the Passions of Men," 
in the British Encyclopaedia, and Mr, Hume, 
may justly be placed in the first rank. The 
observations of Mr, Hutcheson chiefly re- 
spect the moral uses of the Passions, which 
it is not the professed object of the present 
Treatise to investigate. Objections to some 
of the principles advanced by Dr. Watts, and 
Mr. Grove, as well as other Writers of emi- 
nence, are stated in the Introductory Chapter, 
and will occasionally appear in different 
parts of this Work. It will therefore be 
sufficient to remark at present, that the very 
small degree of information obtained respect- 
ing many essential points ; the imperfection 
of every arrangement hitherto made ; the 
almost universal disagreement among philo- 



viii PREFACE. 

sophers, in their ideas concerning the precise 
nature of a Passion, Emotion, and Affection,, 
or in what respect they specifically differ 
from each other, &c. were the principal in- 
ducements to the Author of the following 
Treatise, to pay much greater attention to 
the workings of the human mind, than he 
would have done, had their remarks been 
more satisfactory. In order to find his way 
through perplexing labyrinths, he was deter- 
mined to extend the analytical method much 
farther than it has hitherto been pursued ; 
from a full conviction that, although it is 
not in general the most popular and accep- 
table mode, it is much the securest, and best 
adapted to procure a strength of evidence, 
in philosophical, moral, and religious sub- 
jects, which approaches to the nature of 
demonstration. 

The Treatise now submitted to public 
candour, contains the history and the result 
of this process ; in which, however slow 
and tedious the steps, the Author has been 



PREFACE. ix 

frequently relieved, and sometimes amply 
rewarded, by discoveries which appeared to 
him equally new and important. If they 
should appear so to others, he will feel him- 
self completely recompensed for his labour* 

As he is not without apprehensions that 
the analytical part w r ill appear much too 
tedious and prolix, thus he fears that the 
philosophical observations and inquiries will 
appear much too superficial ; but he would 
remind the Reader that his sole object in the 
present treatise, is to give an epitome of 
general and influential principles, and not to 
pursue the development of any to the extent 
of which it is susceptible. 

The natural consequences of this imme- 
diate application to the genuine sources of 
knowledge, without any pre-conceived hypo- 
thesis, are, that, in some instances, the author 
has traced a perfect coincidence of opinion 
between his own and those of preceding Wri- 
ters on the Passions ; in many, he has cor- 



x PREFACE. 

reded his own previous ideas ; in others, 
he thinks that he has not only discovered 
errors in preceding Writers, but also the 
causes of them. Wherever the subject has 
appeared peculiarly important, the discre- 
pancy great, and the Authorities opposed, 
respectable, he has stated the subject, and 
his reasons in the adjoined Notes ; that the 
concatenation of ideas, so necessary in the 
analytical method, might not suffer inter- 
ruption. 

Notwithstanding his utmost care, the Ana- 
lyzer cannot flatter himself that nothing of 
importance has escaped his attention. Both 
the extent and intricacy of the subject will, 
it is hoped, furnish an apology for many 
defects. Nor can he expect that of the nu- 
merous explanations and definitions propo- 
sed, they will all be equally acceptable and 
convincing. Some of them will probably 
be erroneous. Rut it may not be improper 
to remark, that the extraordinary versatility 



PREFACE. mi 

of language renders it extremely difficult to 
seize the precise signification of terms, in 
every connection ; and this will sometimes 
occasion a diversity of opinion, in cases 
where a criterion cannot always be found to 
which our judgments will uniformly submit 
If the Reader should not agree with him in 
the precise signification of particular terms, 
the utmost care has been taken that the sense 
in which the Author has used them shall not 
be misunderstood : so that the principles he 
advances must either enforce conviction, or 
lay themselves fully open to confutation. 

The copiousness of the subject has prin- 
cipally confined the Work before us to a 
philosophical investigation of the Passions. 
Yet in these abtruser investigations, many 
thoughts occasionally present themselves, 
properly belonging to the departments of 
Ethics, and requiring a larger amplification 
than would be consistent with the design of 



xii PREFACE. 

the present work. The Science of Ethics 
opens a field for contemplation still more 
extensive. Although it has so frequently en- 
gaged the attention of Moralists, it appears 
to be inexhaustible; nor ought we to de- 
spair of perpetual additions being added to our 
stock of knowledge, concerning the nature 
and importance of our duty. 

The degree of acceptance with which this 
Treatise has been received by the Philosophic 
World, encouraged the Author toprosecute his 
design, and he proceeded to consider the Pas- 
sions and Affections in a more practical, and 
perhaps still more interesting point of view. 
The apprehensions which naturally present 
themselves, lest public expectation should 
not be gratified, by much novelty, on a sub- 
ject which has been so frequently treated, 
are in some measure silenced by a con- 
viction that his attempts will be received with 



PREFACE. xiil 

an indulgence similar to that which he has 
alerady experienced. 

Although attention has been paid in these 
subsequent editions to several minuter cor- 
rections, yet the Author has been reluctant 
to make such alterations in them as might de* 
preciate the value of the preceding, in the 
opinion of the Purchasers. The most con- 
siderable change consists in the divisions of 
the first two Chapters : the new Arrange- 
ments, and introductory Emotions being 
placed at the commencement of the second 
Chapt er instead of terminating the first : by 
which he thinks that a more lucid order is 
preserved. Several additions might have 
been made, but as these could, with equal 
propriety, be inserted in a future Volume, 
that mode has been preferred. 



CONTENTS. 

PART I. 

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS, 

CHAPTER t 

General View of the Subject '. 

Sect. I. On Passions, Emotions, and Af- 
fections; the specific difference 

between them 1 

II. Plans of Arrangement examined 1 6 

III. Love and Hatred; their Nature 24 

IV. Desire and Aversion 34 
V. Objects of Love and Hatred 40 



CHAPTER II. 

f the Passions ac 
characteristic differences, 



Classification of the Passions according to their 



xvi CONTENTS, 

Page. 
Sect. I. Efficient Causes of the Passions, 

&c* examined 45 

Sect. II. Introductory Emotions 50 

Sect. III. Classification of the Passions and 
Affections, as they respect the 
Selfish or the Social Principle 63 

CLASS, I. 

Passions and Affections, which owe their Ori- 
gin to the Principle of S elf-Love ibid 
Order I. Passions and Affections, &c. 

excited by the Idea of Good 64 
Joy, Gladness, &c. ibid 

Contentment 68 

Satisfaction ibid 

Complacency 69 

Pride, &c. 74 

Desire 76 

Hope 90 

Order II. Passions and Affections excited 

by the Idea of Evil 94 

1. Sorrow. 95 

Grief, Melancholy, &c. 97 

Patience, Resignation, Humility 99 

2. Fear. 102 

Consternation, Terror, Dread, 

Despair, &c. &c. 104 

3. Anger, 112 



CONTENTS. xvii 

Page. 
Wrath, Resentment^ Indignation, 

&c. &c. 116 





CLASS. II. 




Passion: 


s and Affections derived from the 




Social Principle 


122 


Order 


I. Passions and Affections, in 
which Good is the predo- 






minant Idea 


129 


I. 


Benevolent Desires and Dispositions 


ibid 




1. Social Affections 


130 




2. Sympathetic Affections 


135 


II. 


Affections derived from Good Opi- 






nion 


148 




Gratitude 


149 




Admiration 


151 




Esteem, Respect 


157 




Veneration, &c. 


158 




Fondness, &c. 


161 


Order 


II. Passions and Affections in which 






Evil is the predominant Idea 


163 


I. 


Malevolent Desires and Disposi- 






tions 


1(54 




Malignancy, Envy, Rancour, Cru- 






elty, &c. 


165 




Rage, Revenge, &c. Suspicion, 






Jealousy 


173 




b 





xviii CONTENTS. 

Page, 
II. Displacency indicated by unfa- 
vourable opinions 178 
Horror, Indignation, Con- 
tempt, &c. ibid 

PART II. 

Philosophical Observations and Inquiries. 

CHAPTER I. 

Observations respecting the laws of Ex- 
citement 189 

Observ. I Surprise, the efficient Cause 

of Passion ibid 

II. Affections alone permanent 193 

III. Relations of Passions and 

Affections to each other 198 

IV. Seat of the Passions 212 

CHAPTER II. 

Causes which create a diversity in our Af- 
fections, enumerated 228 

5 1. Experience 229 

§ 2. Difference of Sex 230 

$ 3. Diversity of Temperament 271 







CONTENTS. 




sir 

Page. 


§ 


4. 


Progress from Infancy 


to Age 


239 


§ 


5. 


National Customs 




242 


§ 


6. 


Force of Habit 




246 


§ 


7. 


Self-Love 




248 


s 


8. 


Education 




250 


§ 


9. 


Novelty 




253 


§ 


10. 


Fashion 




255 


§ 


11. 


Love of Singularity 




258 


§ 


12. 


Popular Prejudices 




261 


§ 


13. 


Associated Affections 




263 


§ 


14. 


Manner in which information 





is conveyed 2&9 

§ 15. Imitative Tones and Represen- 



tations 


273 


§ 16. Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence 


276 


§ 17. The Drama 


281 


§ 18. Pre-disposing Causes 


282 


CHAPTER III. 




Influence of the Passions, 




Sect. I. Medical Influence 


290 


H. Influence on Thought and Lan- 




guage 


311 


III. Influence on Character 


321 


IV. Influence on Happiness 


331 



PART I. 

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS, 

CHAP. I. 

General Viexv of the Subject. 

SECTION I. 

On Passions, Emotions, and Affections ; the 
specific difference between them. 

By Passions, emotions, and affections, we un- 
derstand those stronger or weaker feelings, with 
their correspondent effects upon the system, 
which are excited within us, by the perception 
or contemplation of certain qualities, which be- 
long, or are supposed to belong, to the objects 
of our attention ; and which, in some respect or 
other 3 appear interesting to us. hi all cases, 
when the violence of the emotion is not too 
powerful for the animal ceconomy, the feelings 
or sensations excited, are pleasant or unpleasant, 
according to the nature of the exciting cause, 
the ideas entertained of it, or the intenseness 
with which the mind is struck by it. These 
feelings differ in degrees of strength, according 

B 



2 PASSIONS. 

to the apparent importance of their cause; accord- 
ing to certain peculiarities of temperament ; and 
also according to the manner in which the in- 
fluential qualities are presented to the mind. 

One or other of the three terms, Passion, 
Emotion, Affection, is always employed to ex- 
press the sensible effects which objects, or ideas 
concerning them, have upon the mind ; but they 
are so frequently employed in a vague and inde- 
terminate manner, that some difficulty attends 
the attempt to restore them to their precise and 
discriminating significations. 

The word Passion, is thus rendered subject 
to several peculiarities, in the application of it. 
Sometimes it is used in a generic sense, as ex- 
pressive of every impression made upon the 
mind. When we speak of the passions in gene- 
ral, or of a treatise on the passions, we mean 
not to express the stronger impressions alone, the 
mildest affections are also included ; and if we 
denominate any one to be a person of strong 
passions, we mean that he is subject to violent 
transports of joy, or grief, or anger, &c. indis- 
criminately. In one instance the word is em- 
phatically employed to express suffering ; as our 
Saviour s passion : in another it indicates anger 
exclusively; thus when it is said of any one that 
lie is in a passion , it is universally understood that 



PASSIONS. 3 

lie is Very angry. The term passion, and its ad- 
verb passionately, often express a very strong 
predilection for any pursuit, or object of taste ; 
a kind of enthusiastic fondness for any thing. 
Thus we remark that a person has a passion for 
musick, or that he is passionately fond of paint- 
ing, &c. &c. In a sense similar to this, is the 
word also applied to every propensity, which 
operates strongly and permanently upon the 
mind ; as the selfish passions, the generous pas- 
sions. Yet when we mean to particularize any 
of these, a different law of phraseology is ob- 
served. The word passion is appropriated by the 
evil propensities which are uniformly operative. 
Thus we do not say the affection of pride, or of 
avarice, but the passion. The term affection, on 
the other hand, is appropriated by the virtuous 
propensities ; as the social, friendly, parental, 
filial, affections, Sec. though philosophically 
considered, the relation they bear to the state 
and workings of the mind, is perfectly analogous. 
Nor is this capricious latitude of expression 
confined to common language, where accuracy is 
not always to be expected ; it is also obvious 
among philosophers themselves, so that scarcely 
two authors, who have written upon the subject 
of the passions, are agreed in their ideas of the 
terms they employ. While some consider the 

B 2 



i PASSIONS. 

Emotions as highly turbulent, others assert that 
they are in their own nature quiescent :* — Some 
suppose a Passion to constitute the strength of an 
emotion; others confine the idea of a passion to 
the desire which follows an emotion -.--Others again 
represent the Passions as the calmest things in 
nature, deeming them to be the steady uniform 
principles of action, to which reason itself is 
always subservient, f Hence it becomes highly 
necessary to seek after some ruies, which may 
render our ideas more consistent and uniform. 

In most of these applications, no attention has 
been paid to the primitive signification of the 
word Passion ; although this appears to be the 
safest method to recall us from those aberrations 
to which we are perpetually exposed. Few ex- 
pressions wander so far from their original im- 
port, as to convey a sense which is totally foreign. 
The primary idea annexed to the word is that 
of passiveness, or being impulsively acted upon. 
In this sense the term properly signifies the 
sensible effect, the feeling to which the mind is 
become subjected, when an object of impor- 
tance, suddenly and imperiously, demands its at- 
tention. If our imaginations be lively, our 
temperaments susceptible, the object interesting 
to us, wc cannot avoid being affected, or suffer- 

* Lord Kaims. f Mr. Hume. 



PASSIONS. 5 

ing some powerful change in our dispositions. 
by its recent appearance, or by the suggestion of 
a something we deem of importance. In all 
such cases we are obviously passive ; we are act- 
ed upon without any previous determination of 
the will, or without any consent of our own. 

As several of our passions are of a disagreeable 
and painful nature, and as this passive or helpless 
state is so frequently connected with suffering, 
the transition from one signification to the other, 
is not only natural but almost inevitable; and 
Passion will often be considered as synonymous 
with Suffering. In medical language, a person 
oppressed with disease is called a Patient, an in- 
voluntary sufferer, and the calmness with which 
he submits is termed patience ; that is, the 
mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and 
indispositions of the body, The word Pathology, 
has also the same derivation : it is the history 
of the sufferings incident to the human frame. 
The Greeks expressed passions in general by 
7rfc0o?, which signifies suffering; and the Latin 
word Passio, from which we have adopted the 
tevm passion, has the same signification. The 
Stoics also gave the name of not®* to all extraor- 
dinary emotions of the soul, because they con- 
sidered them as mental diseases, by which the 
soul, while under their influence, was reduced to 



6 PASSIONS. 

a state of suffering. But this secondary sense, 
as far as it conveys the idea of an unpleasant or 
painful sensation, is alone applicable to the 
effects produced by passions of a certain class ; 
for others are in their own nature pleasing ; as 
joy and hope: whereas the primitive import of 
the word, that of pas she n ess 9 equally belongs to 
them all. The mind is equally passive in every 
effect suddenly and unexpectedly produced 
upon it, whether its influence be of a pleasant, 
or unpleasant nature. See Note A.) 

The term Passion therefore, may with strict 
propriety be used, and used exclusively, to 
represent the first feeling, the percussion as it 
were, of which the mind is conscious from 
some impulsive cause ; by which it is wholly 
acted upon, without any efforts of its own, 
either to solicit or escape the impression. 

Probably it is in allusion to this passive state 
of the mind, that the terms passion and passion- 
ately, are employed to express the powerful 
attachment to particular objects mentioned 
above. They insinuate that the influence of 
these beloved objects, is irresistible; and that 
the mind is completely under their dominion. 

The state of absolute passiveness, in conse- 
quence of any sudden percussion of mind, is of 
short duration. The strong impression, or vivid 



EMOTIONS. ; 

sensation, immediately produces a reaction cor- 
respondent to its nature, either to appropriate and 
enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cause. 
This reaction is very properly distinguished by 
the term Emotion. The sensible effect produced 
at the first instant, by the cause of the passion, 
greatly agitates the frame; its influence is im- 
mediately communicated to the whole nervous 
system, and the commotions excited in that, 
indicate themselves by attitudes and motions 
of the body, and by particular expressions of 
countenance. These effects are such universal 
concomitants, that no very important change in 
the state of the mind can take place, without 
some visible change, of a correspondent nature, 
in the animal oeconomy. 

Emotions therefore, according to the genuine 
signification of the word, are principally and 
primitively applicable to the sensible changes 
and visible effects, which particular passions 
produce upon the frame, in consequence of this 
reaction, or particular agitation of mind. It is 
alone by these visible effects that the subject 
is discovered to be under the influence of any 
passion ; and it is alone by the particular 
changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we 
are enabled to judge of the nature of the passion. 
Thus, although the passion exists prior to the 



8 EMOTIONS. 

emotions, yet as these are its external signs, they 
must indicate its continued influence, as long as 
they continue to agitate the system. In conse- 
quence of this immediate connection, the words 
passions and emotions, are, in familiar discourse, 
where no philosophical precision is requisite, 
used synonymously; though, in reality, the latter 
are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, 
as in innumerable other instances, figurative 
modes of expression are adopted. The Synec- 
doche is perpetually employed, by which, cause 
and effect are confounded, or substituted the one 
for the other. Since emotions are faithful indi- 
cations of their correspondent passions, and 
strong passions are always productive of emo- 
tions, we should deem it a pedantic precision to 
select, at all times, the appropriate word, when 
we mean simply to express the general effect. 
However, the term Emotion is sometimes 
expressive of lively sensations which do not 
produce visible effects, in any degree propor- 
tionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind 
is not so completely, or necessarily passive. In 
general it possesses some power over the exter- 
nal signs ; and in many cases, where the feelings 
would be too strong to remain concealed, were 
they totally void of controul, some other influen- 
tial affection, either of fear, respect, humanity, 



AFFECTIONS. 9 

&c. may serve to repress or moderate their 
effects, and confine them to inward emotions. 

Again, the term is frequently employed to 
mark the first impression, which particular ob- 
jects make upon susceptible minds, whether they 
remain concealed or not Thus in the fine Arts, 
the charms of musical compositions which are 
novel to us ; — the first view of a gallery of 
paintings possessing distinguished merit; — 
the surprise of a beautiful or elevated senti- 
ment, or poetic description, will generally 
make a more vivid impression upon us, than 
that which is felt in a continued, or renew- 
ed contemplation of the same subjects ; and yet 
these impressions may not be so forcible as to 
produce the transports accompanying emotions 
from other causes. But the difference is simply 
in degree^ not in kind. This species of enjoy- 
ment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, 
whose repeated enjoyments of a similar nature 
have gradually moderated transports, and whose 
emotions have gradually subsided into gentler 
undulations, if I may thus express myself, in 
place of those agitations which the Inexperienced 
would inevitably betray upon similar occasions. 

The third term Affection, has, in itself, a dif- 
ferent signification from either of the above. It 
always represents a less violent, and generally 
a more durable influence, which things have 



10 AFFECTIONS. 

upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner 
in which we are affected by them for a continu- 
ance. It supposes a more deliberate predilection 
and aversion, in consequence of the continued 
influence of some prevailing quality. This dis- 
tinguishes it from the transient impulse of 
Passion. Nor is it intimately connected with 
any external signs; which distinguishes it from 
Emotions. The affections sometimes succeed to 
passions and emotions, because these may have 
been excited by something which becomes per- 
manently interesting; or they may be gradually 
inspired, by a deliberate attention to the good or 
bad qualities of their objects. 

In this philosophic sense of the word, Affection 
is applicable to an unpleasant as well as a pleasant 
state of the mind, when impressed by any object 
or quality. It may be produced by what- 
ever torments or corrodes the heart, as well as 
that which charms and delights it. Usage, 
however, chiefly applies the word to the kindly 
and beneficent affections. When we remark 
that a person has an affectionate heart, we mean 
to applaud his being under the influence of the 
best affections, of a social and relative nature. 
With other Writers on the Passions, we shall 
always use the term in the philosophical sense ; 
and apply it equally to whatever produces 
more permanent feelings in the mind, whether 



AFFECTIONS. 11 

they be pleasing or painful, of a benevolent or 
malevolent character. 

As in Passions and Emotions, thus in the 
Affections, several gradations of influence are 
observable. Some affections indicate themselves 
so strongly, that they approach to emotions; some 
may require a penetrating eye to discover them ; 
—some may be powerfully indulged with such 
self command, that they shall elude the most 
critical observation; — and some have such an 
equal and uniform influence, as to blend, as it 
were, with the temper, and almost lose the 
name of affection ; as generosity, fortitude, hu- 
mility, patience, resignation. 

When there is a propensity to indulge one 
particular affection, or class of affections more 
than another, arising from peculiarity of tem- 
perament, education, connections, habits, &c. 
we consider this propensity as an indication of 
Temper or habitual Disposition. Thus we speak 
of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, 
revengeful temper. These characters do not im- 
ply, that the subject is perpetually under the 
influence of the particular affection, but they 
mark his propensity towards it. The Affections 
therefore refer to the actual impression made 
upon the mind by certain qualities, real or sup- 
posed ; and the Temper or Disposition is that 



12 PASSIONS, &c. 

particular cast of mind, which renders the per- 
ception of certain qualities capahle of making a 
more prompt, or a more durable impression upon 
one person than upon another. We deem that 
man to be irascible, who is disposed to be angry 
at trifles ; and him we praise as humane, who is 
always disposed to commiserate sufferings. 

It is hoped that the above explanations of the 
terms, Passions, Emotions, and Affections, will 
obtain the approbation of philosophic Readers, 
since they were suggested to the Author by an 
attention to the workings of the human mind. 
If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, 
as they will serve to indicate both mutual rela- 
tions and characteristic differences, in the im- 
pressions which surrounding objects, or ideas 
concerning them, make upon us; and although 
an attention to these minute distinctions, may 
not always be necessary in common language, 
and would sometimes be absurd, yet the want 
of precision has always been severely felt in philo- 
sophical investigations, and is a principal cause 
of the obscurities in which they are too fre- 
quently involved. It will be allowed by every 
attentive observer, that the process which we 
have characterized by the above terms, does take 
place in the human mind, when exposed to the 



PASSIONS, &c. 13 

sudden and powerful influence of particularly 
interesting objects. Such objects are irresistibly 
forced upon his attention, independent of a will 
or determination of his own; they often produce 
great agitations both of mind and body ; and 
when these agitations have subsided, the mind 
retains some degree of predilection or aversion 
for them. As these distinctions are clearly and 
satisfactorily expressed, by the particular terms 
we have given to each, this is a full indication 
that they are the most appropriate. (See Note B. 

The above observations are not confined to a 
simple process, which takes place from more 
simple causes. After we have supposed a pas- 
sion, indicated by an emotion, to be succeeded 
by some correspondent affection, we may still 
consider this affection as the parent of new pas- 
sions, emotions, and affections,, according to the 
variety of circumstances connected with it. It 
may inspire fear, as when the object of our af- 
fection is in a perilous state ; it may excite 
earnest desire, or sanguine hope. Some of these 
new passions and affections will arouse to action; 
as when the strong sense of an injury excites to 
revenge: others chill and depress the spirits, as 
sorrow and despair. Yet in the midst of all 
these diversities, the characteristic differences 



14 APPETITES. 

between Passions, Emotions, and Affections, 
are equally obvious. 

Confining ourselves, therefore, to what we 
deem the genuine import of the words, in oppo- 
sition to the irregularities of custom, we shall, 
as often as it may be necessary to observe dis- 
tinctions, uniformly apply the term Passion, to 
the violent impression made upon our minds, 
by the perception of something very striking 
and apparently interesting ; Emotion, to the 
external marks, or visible changes produced by 
the impetus of the passion upon the corporeal 
system ; and Affections, to the less violent, 
more deliberate, and more permanent impres- 
sions, by causes which appear sufficiently in- 
teresting. The range of affection, may be from 
those stronger feelings which are proximate to 
emotions, to the mildest sensations of pleasure or 
displeasure we can possibly perceive. 

Most Writers on the Pathology of the mind, 
agree to distinguish between Appetites and Pas- 
sions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, 
each of which creates its correspondent desire; 
and the indulgence of this desire is termed Gra- 
tification. The latter they ascribe immediately 
to the Mind. In this the Moderns differ from 
the Ancients. The word Appctitus, from which 



APPETITES. 15 

that of Appetite is derived, is applied by the 
Romans and Latinists, to desires in general, 
whether they primarily related to the body or 
not: and with obvious propriety; for the 
primitive signification is, the seeking after 
whatever may conduce either to Gratification or 
Happiness. Thus Cicero observes, " motus 
M animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; 
** alteri Appetitus. Cogitatio inveroexquirendo 
" maxime versatur ; Appetitus impellit ad agen- 
" dum." By two powers of action being thus 
placed in contrast to each other, and the one 
applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the 
other comprehends every species of desire, whe- 
ther of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysi- 
cians also, who have written in the Latin lan- 
guage, use the word Appetitus in the same lati- 
tude. 

The modern distinction has the advantage 
of immediately pointing out a difference in the 
nature and character of the objects which interest 
us, according as they relate to the body or to 
the mind. But although we shall consider the 
appetites as confined to corporeal wants and 
cravings, we must still observe that they are as 
frequently the occasions of passions and emotions, 
as other objects which are peculiarly adapted to 
the mind. Eager hope, joy, fear, anger, are 



16 ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 

daily manifested by the Infant, whose desires 
are wholly confined to animal wants: and the 
keenest sensations of anger, jealousy, envy, &c. 
are intimately connected with the carnal Appe- 
tites of maturer age. Whatever is therefore be- 
yond the mere instinctive appetite, becomes the 
province of the mind ; and the influence which 
various cravings of nature have upon its ideas 
and conceptions, give rise to mental affections 
and passions. The subject of the present dis- 
cussion obviously relates to these, without re- 
quiring particular attention to the existing 
cause. 



SECTION II. 

Plans of Arrangement examined. 

So numerous and multifarious are the Passions. 
Affections, and Emotions, in their connections 
and ramifactions, that it is difficult to propose 
apian of Arrangement, which shall be, in every 
respect, unexceptionable. By preferring one 
method, we may be deprived of some advantages 
attending another; and in all, it may be necessary 



ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 17 

to anticipate many things, which a rigid attention 
to order could not possibly permit. Some 
Writers on the Passions, have placed them in 
contrast to each other, as hope and fear, joy 
and sorrow: — Some have considered them as 
they are personal, relative, social : — Some accord- 
ing to their influence at different periods of life: 
—Others according as they relate to past, present, 
or future time; as sorrow principally refers to 
things past, joy and anger to present scenes, 
hope and fear respect futurity. 

The Academicians advanced that the principal 
passions were jea?\ hope, joy, and grief. Thus 
Virgil : 

Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentque. 

They included aversion and despair under the 
fourth; and hope, fortitude, and anger, under 
desire. But not to observe that this arrange- 
ment is much too general in some respects, and 
defective in others ; — that the characters of 
hope, and of anger are too opposite to each 
other, to be placed under the same head ;— 
that anger has no particular claim to be classed 
with desire, excepting when it excites a desire 
of revenge, which is not always the ease;— 
and that desire is so comprehensive a term as to 
embrace numberless other affections ; — not to 

c 



18 ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 

insist upon these objections, it is manifest that 
the passions enumerated cannot be primitive or 
cardinal, since some other affections or passions 
must be prior to them : We must love, or hate, 
before we can either desire, rejoice, or fear, or 
grieve. 

Dr. Hartley has arranged the Passions under 
five grateful and five ungrateful ones. The 
grateful ones, are love, desire, hope, joy, and pleas- 
ing recollection ; the ungrateful are hatred, aver- 
sion, fear, grief, displeasing recollection. The 
objections to this order are, that all these cannot 
be considered as cardinal passions. Love must 
precede desire, hope, and joy \ and hatred must 
precede fear. Nor do the distinctions themselves 
appear sufficiently accurate. Hope is certainly 
a species of desire ; pleasing recollection is a 
modification of love ; aversion is only a parti- 
cular manner of testifying hatred ; and dis- 
pleasing recollections are sometimes the renewal 
of grief, sometimes of anger. 

Dr. JVatts divides the Passions into primitive 
and derivative. The primitive he subdivides into 
two ranks: 1. Admiration, love, and hatred; 2. 
The diverse kinds of love and hatred, as esteem, 
contempt, benevolence, malevolence, compla- 
cency, (lisplaceuey. The derivatives are desire,, 
rsioa a hope, fear, gratitude, anger, &c. 



ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 19 

But the title of Admiration to be considered 
as a primitive passion, does not appear to be so 
valid as that of the other two associated with 
it. Love and hatred are in universal exercise; 
Admiration is merely occasional. The former 
indicate themselves from the instant we have 
any powers of discernment, or the smallest 
degree of experience, respecting the nature of 
objects ; the latter is the result of some degree 
of knowledge : it implies a spirit of inquiry ; 
and demands some portion of taste for particular 
qualities, adapted toexcite this emotion. Minds 
the most infantile, and uncultivated, will mani- 
fest that they love and hate, long before they 
have an opportunity of testifying their admi- 
ration. We might also observe, that a subdi- 
vision of the primitive passions into two ranks 
creates a suspicion, if it do not fully indicate, 
that they cannot all be equally primitive; and 
the instances given under the second rank, may 
justly be considered as different modifications Oi 
the two grand principles, and not as primitives 
of a distinct character. It is farther obvious, 
that the Doctor's plan makes no distinction 
between the Passions and Affections, which the 
nature of the subject not only admits but re- 
quires. 

Mr. Grove, adopting in part, the arrangement 
c 2 



2u ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 

of Dr. Watts, reduces all the passions to the 
three heads of admiration, love, and hatred; 
which he styles accordingly, the primitive pas- 
sions. The others he denominates mixed pas- 
sions; which he describes to be those which have 
admiration blended with them, and those com- 
pounded of the passions that fall under love and 
hatred. As the above remarks are no less ap- 
plicable to this arrangement, I shall only observe, 
that since Mr. Grove has defined admiration to 
be " that sudden surprise at the novelty of an 
lC object, by which the soul is fastened down to 
A the contemplation of it," there seems to be a 
peculiar impropriety in his placing it among the 
primitive passions : and this impropriety is in- 
creased by another observation which he makes, 
viz. that " Admiration seems to be a more spe- 
tt culative passion, as being employed chiefly 
° about the novelty or grandeur of objects." 
For which reason he places the chief energy of 
this passion u in the brain" which he denomi- 
nates " the grand instrument, or condition 
6i rather, of thought and contemplation." He 
adds, " in the other passions, which respecting 
" the good or evil of objects, proceed from a prin- 
" cipal of self-preservation, the spiritsagitated are 
11 in the htart, the fountain of life, and fittest 
u residence of those motions of the animal 



ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 21 

" spirits, which are intended for the benefit and 
P preservation of life."* 

These observations certainly increase the dif- 
ficulty of admitting admiration among the 
primitive passions. It may also be justly 
doubled whether the author's ideas of the na- 
ture of admiration be always admissible. But 
this is not the place to discuss that point. 

The above comments upon the most material 
arrangements which have hitherto been followed, 
render some other classification desirable, which 
may be exempt from similar objections. Per- 
haps the securest method to obtain this end, 
will be previously to recollect, what is the first 
and leading principle of our nature; and then 
enquire what are the necessary consequences of 
this principle, in Beings formed as we are, 
placed in various situations, and surrounded by 
an infinite variety of circumstances. By thus 
attending to the history of the human mind, 
and tracing the manner in which it is affected 
by various causes, a proper arrangement may 
present itself. We shall, at least, avoid those 
mistakes and embarrassments, into which men of 



* See System of Moral Philosophy $ Chap. VII. of the 
Passions* 



22 ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 

eminence have been betrayed, by pursuing other 
methods. 

It will be universally acknowledged, that it 
is essential to the nature of every sensitive and 
intelligent being, to be gratified with, or delight 
in Well-being. This is so evident a principle, 
that the contrary cannot be supposed for a 
moment. Both reason and feeling unite to es- 
tablish this axiom. We all feel the inestimable 
value of happiness, and we all know that to 
delight in misery, is a contradiction : it would 
be to annihilate misery. (See Note C). 

This Well-being, or grateful state of existence, 
we unite to denominate an essential Good ; and 
its opposite an essential Evil, Whatever pro- 
motes this state, we deem to be productive of 
good ; whatever is an impediment to it, or oc- 
casions a state of uneasy sensation, we consider 
as productive of evil. 

These ideas naturally lead us to esteem that as 
a Good also, which is productive of this desirable 
state ; and to characterize as an Evil, whatever 
is inimical to it. Cause and effect are so inti- 
mately connected in our imagination, that we not 
only substitute the one for the other, by a 
figurative mode of speaking, but we quickly 
learn to consider that as a good in itself, which 
appears uniformly to be the means or instrument 



ARRANGEMENTS EXAMINED. 23 

of good ; and to contemplate as an Evil, what- 
ever we suspect to have a pernicious tendency. 
Under the impression of this sentiment, we in- 
dulge a predilection for the one, and feel an 
abhorrence of the other. 

It is impossible for the attentive and con- 
siderate mind, to view or contemplate objects 
so diametrically opposite as apparent Good, or 
apparent Evil, either with total indifference, or 
with the same kind of sensation. We inevitably 
look upon what we deem to be a Good, or con- 
ducive to happiness, with a pleasant sensation. 
We deem it desirable, and it inspires the affec- 
tion of Love. Whatever occasions, or threatens 
a privation of happiness, or inflicts positive 
misery, we view with displeasure, we consider 
it as injurious, or as an absolute evil, and it 
inspires the affection of Hatred : that is, we 
feel a strong attachment of the heart to what- 
e verm ay con tribute to Well-beings and we contem- 
plate the reverse with feelings of displeasure, 
detestation, and abhorrence. 

Although it may be said, without impropriety, 
that we all love to be happy, and hate to be 
miserable ; yet this is such a self-evident truth, 
that it is very seldom uttered. The two expres- 
sions therefore, Love and Hatred, are almost 



24 LOVE AND HATRED. 

entirely applied to the cause, means, or instriu 
ments of well-being or wretchedness; and we 
are habituated to love whatever is instrumental 
to our existing in a desirable state, and to hate 
its opposite. 



SECTION III. 

Love and Hatred ; their Nature, 

These two affections arise, immediately and 
inevitably, from our perpetual solicitude to enjoy 
the existence we possess. They are coeval with 
our ideas of Good and Evil. They are exper 
rienced by every one, in every situation, and in 
every period of life. They are inspired by every 
object which possesses some peculiarity, or is 
apparently endowed with some quality, of a 
beneficial or a pernicious tendency ; that is, by 
whatever is able, according to our conceptions, 
to promote or impede enjoyment or happiness : 
from the smallest gratification up to the most 
exalted felicity ; from the smallest discomfiture, 
to the depth of misery. They are also the 
parents of every other passion and affection ; 



LOVE AND HATRED. 25 

and the history of the human mind is no other 
that a development of their operations, in that 
diversity of situations and circumstances, in 
which it may be occasionally placed. These 
characters will undoubtedly entitle them to the 
denomination of primary or cardinal affections. 
As no others are in the same predicament, they 
cannot deserve the same appellations ; for they 
can only be considered as derived from these. 

We cannot therefore, commence our minute 
inquiry into the passions, with greater probability 
of success, than by paying previous attention 
to these two affections. 



I. LOVE. 

Love may be considered either as a Principle 
or as an Affection. As a Principle, it may be 
defined an invariable preference of Good ; an 
" universal and permanent attachment to Well- 
" being or Happiness." In this point of view 
it has already been considered. It has also 
been remarked, that the love of good, and 
solicitude to procure it, is not only the ruling 
principle of every sentient being, but it meets 
with the full approbation of every rational being. 
For nothing can excel that which is Good, and 



26 LOVE. 

nothing can be valuable, but as it has a ten- 
dency to promote it. Hence when we speak 
of love abstractedly, we call it the Principle 
of love : for it is the principle by which the 
whole tenour of our conduct is directed; and 
it retains that appellation, as long as we speak 
of it as a general principle of action. 

When this principle is directed towards any 
particular object it becomes an Affection ; that 
is, the mind becomes well disposed, or pleas- 
ingly affected towards that object; and when- 
ever this love is more violent in its effects upon 
the system, it is even deemed a Passion. 

The Affection will be diversified, and ac- 
quire various characters, according to the nature 
of the object, or the peculiar qualities it may 
seem to possess ; and also according to its various 
relations. This affection may relate to ourselves ; 
to those with whom we are connected, by the 
closest bonds of nature or intimacy; to the 
whole of our species ; to those beings of inferior 
order in the creation, which are rendered capa- 
ble of possessing any portion of enjoyment; 
and even to things inanimate. 

When the affection of Love immediately re- 
lates to ourselves personally, it is called Self-love ; 
and it marks the peculiar concern and solicitude 
we entertain for our own interest, prosperity, or 



LOVE. $7 

enjoyment. The principle of Self-love gene- 
rally operates with the greatest force upon 
the mind ; for every circumstance which affects 
our own happiness, makes the most vivid in> 
pressions. This is naturally* the source of 
many abuses, which have brought the term 
itself into disrepute. But Self-affection, when 
it does not interfere with the claims of others, 
is not only an innocent affection, but it mani- 
fests the wisdom and benevolence of the great 
Source of good. By rendering every Being 
active in the pursuit of his own happiness, 
the greatest quantum of general good is most 
effectually secured. As the largest communi- 
ties consist of Individuals, were each individual 
to seek his own welfare, without prejudice to 
his neighbour, the individual stock of each 
would render happiness universal. (See Note D.) 
When our love or desire of Good goes forth 
to others, it is termed Good will, or Benevolence. 
This usually operates with various degrees of 
force, according to our various connections 
and degrees of intimacy. It may possibly 
render the interest and happiness of those with 
whom we are more immediately connected, by 
the bonds of nature or friendship, equally dear 
to us as our own. It has, in some instances, 
been known to exert a more powerful influence. 



28 LOVE. 

Of this truth, the love of Parents towards 
their own offspring frequently presents us with 
striking instances, Admiration of personal 
excellencies, habits of intimacy, gratitude for 
benefits received, &c. may also increase our 
attachment to individuals, until it rival the 
natural influence of self-love. 

All these powerful ties are usually charac- 
terized by the term Affection; as the conjugal, 
parental, filial affections ; and those who possess 
these attachments, in an exemplary degree, arc 
termed affectionate parents, children, relatives, 
friends. 

When love extends to the whole human race, 
it is termed Philanthropy ; a principle which 
comprehends the whole circle of social and 
moral virtues. Considering every man as his 
neighbour, and loving his neighbour as truly 
and invariably as he loves himself, the Philan- 
thropist cannot be unjust or ungenerous. 

In its utmost extent, the love of Benevolence 
embraces all beings capable of enjoying any 
portion of good ; and thus it becomes universal 
Benevolence: which manifests itself by being 
pleased with the share of good every creature 
enjoys; — in a disposition to increase it; — in 



LOVE. 29 

feeling an uneasiness at their sufferings ; — and 
in the abhorrence of cruelty, under every dis- 
guise, or pretext. 

When these dispositions are acting powerfully ? 
towards every being capable of enjoyment, 
they are called the benevolent affections; and 
as these become, in those who indulge them, 
operative rules of conduct, or principles of 
action, we speak of the benevolent principle. 

It has been remarked that predilection for 
Good, as the end en stamps a value upon the 
means productive of this end. This creates an 
affection for various qualities and propensities, 
which we pronounce to be Good, when they 
possess the power, or indicate the disposition 
to promote happiness or enjoyment. If these 
be eminently good qualities, we call them 
Excellencies; and if they be connected with the 
characters and conduct of moral agents, they 
are moral excellencies. 

From the habitual pleasure which the con- 
templation of Excellence inspires, without our 
adverting perpetually to the benefits which may 
accrue from it, we may be induced to imagine 
that we love things deemed excellent, for their 
own sakes, abstracted from their power of be- 
coming useful. But this is impossible. Every 



30 HATRED. 

excellence contains a capability to possess or to 
communicate good. Nothing which deserves the 
name, can be in its own nature inert. An useless 
excellence is a contradiction. 

The propensity to love what is productive of 
good, extends itself much farther than to the 
powers and properties of moral agents. We 
naturally acquire an attachment to every object, 
animate or inanimate, which has been the habi- 
tual instrument of good to us, or is capable of 
contributing to our gratification or advantage. 
Their latent powers first induce us *o value them 
as treasures in reserve; our opinion of their ca- 
pacity to become serviceable, inclines us to place 
our affections upon them ; and in process of 
time, they will, by the association of ideas, 
excite pleasing emotions, although their powers 
of utility are not always in our recollection. 
(See Note E.) 

II. HATRED. 

Hatred expresses the manner in which we are 
affected, by our perception of whatever we sup- 
pose to bean Evil. It is not confined to absolute 
suffering; it marks also our abhorrence of what- 
ever exposes to the danger of absolute suffering, 
or the diminution of that portion of good we 
enjoy, or wish to possess. 



HATRED. 3i 

Hatred of misery and its causes, is a natural 
and necessary consequence of our solicitude to 
possess Good ; and the affection of Hatred is as 
naturally inspired by that state, conduct, dispo- 
sition, which is productive of, or threatens to 
induce pernicious or disagreeable consequences, 
as the affection of Love is attached to their 
contraries. Nor is our hatred at all times 
confined to that particular quality, or peculiarity 
of circumstance, which is * immediately un- 
friendly to us. It is apt ta raise unpleasant 
ideas, and to create prejudices against many 
things, which in themselves are far from being 
the objects of hatred, and which may be highly 
advantageous, merely because they have been 
displeasing or injurious to us in particular in- 
stances. As our predilection for whatever proves 
acceptable, will often prevent our discerning its 
pernicious qualities, thus do we frequently ex- 
tend our hatred far beyond the just limits, until 
w r e betray our ignorance, or manifest that we 
are under the dominion of invincible prejudice. 

Personal Hatred, or Malevolence towards an 
individual, commences with some circumstance, 
quality, or disposition which is displeasing to us ; 
or with some species of injury committed or in- 
tended. It has these for its professed objects. 



32 HATRED* 

But here also a quick and powerful transition is 
instantaneously made, in our imaginations, f'ruin 
an incidental blemish, to the whole of character; 
— from a single act, we are prone to form unfa- 
vourable sentiments of general conduct ; — and 
the lively sense of an injury annihilates too fre- 
quently every species of merit in the offender. 
This is obviously the source of hatreds, long 
and inveterate. 

But notwithstanding these excesses and exag- 
gerations of Hatred and Malevolence, yet they 
cannot possibly be so extensive in their opera- 
tions as the principle of Love, The affection of 
Hatred has particular and partial evils alone for 
its objects, while the principle of Love may em- 
brace the universe. As nutritious aliments are 
infinitely more numerous than the substances 
which are of a poisonous quality, thus does the 
number of those things which are pleasing, be- 
neficial, important in their nature, infinitely ex- 
ceed those which are either in themselves com- 
fortless, or detrimental, or calculated to foster 
a malevolent dispositon. The true object of 
Hatred is alone some particular and partial evil, 
which we experience or dread ; — some incidental 
interruption to the usual tenourof our tcclmgs; 
—or some pernicious quality which may threaten 



HATRED. 33 

this interruption. The objects of our fears, our 
anger, or our grief, are considered in the light 
of robberies, or painful privations, and not as 
permanent causes of the malevolent affections. 
They are not looked upon as streams perpetually 
flowing from one inexhaustible source, but as in- 
terruptions to an usual or desirable state, by ad- 
ventitious causes. Happiness appears to be our 
birth-right, of which all the painful sensations 
raised by hatred, are the professed guardians. 
The wish for happiness is perpetual and un- 
limited, while our evil affections expire with the 
causes which gave them existence. Nor can 
malevolence extend itself to every individual 
in the creation, in a manner similar to the con- 
trary virtue. That happy cultivation of our 
nature, which inspires a benevolence towards all 
animated beings, cannot possibly have a perfect 
contrast, or complete parallel, in the most un- 
cultivated and brutalized. This would consti- 
tute a ferocity of character which can scarcely 
be found in the most insane. When tyrants, 
cruel and ferocious, are diffusing misery, in the 
wantonness of their power, their conduct does 
not proceed from an abstract principle of uni- 
versal hatred ; — but from some low policy of self- 
defence; — from an infernal spirit of revenge 
for supposed injuries ;— from inordinate self- 

D 



34 DESIRE AND AVERSION. 

love, which creates an insensibility to human 
woes; — from pride, vanity, and excessive igno- 
rance, which induce men to imagine that they 
shall be revered as deities, because they imitate 
the destructive thunder of heaven ; and to dream 
that their favorite idol Pozver, can only be made 
known and established, by deeds which excite 
consternation and horror ! 

Indeed the affection of Hatred is of so unplea- 
sant a nature, that the Being who could hate 
every thing, would be his own tormentor. The 
sole pleasure of which malevolence is capable, 
proceeds from the gratification of revenge; 
which can only be directed against particular 
objects. Nor is it merely bounded ; it is irritating, 
unsatisfactory, and purchased by the sacrifice of 
all the enjoyments which flow from the contrary 
disposition. 



SECTION IV. 

Desire and Aversion. 



With the affections of Love and Hatred, are 
intimately connected the affections of Desire 
and Aversion. That is, we constantly desire, 



DESIRE AND AVERSION. 35 

and are solicitous to possess or accomplish, what- 
ever is pleasing or beneficial ; and we are averse 
from, and endeavour to shun, whatever is dis- 
pleasing, or threatens to be pernicious. These two 
affections are therefore the necessary consequences 
of the preceding. They are accompanied with a 
certain eagerness of mind, either to obtain or 
escape, which is not so essential to the former. 
Love and Hatred may be inspired by a calmer 
contemplation of excellence or demerit, or any 
of the causes of happiness or misery, without 
our having an immediate interest in them ; — as 
when we reflect upon beneficial discoveries or 
destructive errors. The principle of Love may 
approve of worthy conduct or respectable cha- 
racters, from which we can expect no benefit 
to ourselves ; and that of hatred may despise 
villanies by which we cannot be injured. De- 
sire and Aversion refer to particular objects, 
which have some relation to ourselves; and they 
are indicated by some effort of mind, either to 
possess the promised good, or to repel the im- 
pending evil. Desire and Aversion are to be 
considered therefore as manifestations of love 
and hatred; and the earnest application of these 
principles, in each particular instance of their 
excitement. 

As Love and Hatred may be resolved into that 
i) % 



36 DESIRE AND AVERSION. 

one principle, the love of Well-being, thus may 
the affections of Desire and Aversion be re- 
solved into Desire: although theuse of both terms 
is, in common language, necessary, in order to 
distinguish the objects of our pursuit, from 
those we wish to shun. Strictly speaking, 
Aversion is no other than a particular modifica- 
tion of Desire ; a desire of being liberated from 
whatever appears injurious to well-being. The 
objects in our possession, productive of this 
good, we desire to retain. We are conscious of 
this desire every time we appreciate the worth 
of the object, and it is necessarily excited when 
we are under the apprehensions of privation. If 
the Good, or the means of good, be not in our 
possession, we desire to obtain them : if a pri- 
vation be unjustly attempted by any one, and the 
passion of anger be excited, the desire of pre- 
serving or recovering the object, is connected 
with a desire to chastise the aggressor: if it be 
in danger from any other cause, the fear of loss 
is excited by the desire of securing; and if we 
be actually deprived, the hopeless desire of re- 
gaining, is an essential ingredient in our grief 
for the loss. 

But although, in this philosophical sense, 
Desire may seem to be equally extensive with 



DESIRE AND AVERSION. 3? 

the affection of Love, yet it is necessarily more 
confined in its application. Love relates to all 
things which appear good and beneficial in 
themselves, or to Beings capable of receiving 
good.- It comprehends the things enjoyed, and 
the state of pleasing existence, in which those 
beings are actually placed, as Avell as the desir- 
ableness of such a state, and all the means and 
instruments of good. Desire mostly refers to 
the state in w x hich we are not. It solicits some 
favourable change, and exerts itself to obtain it. 
Hatred also is universally applicable to what- 
ever appears pernicious or displeasing in itself: 
Aversion more immediately concerns whatever 
appears pernicious or displeasing to us. These 
Affections may be considered as the satellites of 
Love and Hatred, perpetually accompanying 
them, and prompt to execute their orders. 
Wherever love or hatred direct their immediate 
attention, desire and aversion seek to appropriate 
or repel. 



Thus it appears that the love of good and 
hatred of evil; the desire of possessing good 
and escaping evil ; are the leading principles of 
our nature. The love of good commences with 
our existence, and the desire of good is coeval 



38 RECAPITULATION. 

with our powers of discernment. Neither of 
them will leave us, until we cease to exist, or 
lose the consciousness of our own sensations 
and perceptions. Whatever diversity there 
may be in our situations, however various and 
opposite the objects engaging our attention, 
however versatile our humours, these remain the 
immutable principles of action. They pervade 
the animal system, as the electric fluid pervades 
the material; and though, like that, they may 
sometimes be latent, yet, like that, they may be 
instantaneously roused into vivid action, and 
manifest both their existence and their power 
by the effects they produce. 

Human nature possesses various sensitive and 
mental powers, to each of which an infinite 
diversity of objects is adapted : and as the gra- 
tification of each communicates pleasure, wc are 
prone to estimate every thing as a Good, which 
is capable of contributing to these gratifications; 
and every thing as an Evil which opposes them. 
However a contrariety or opposition, frequently 
takes place between the higher and inferior 
pursuits of our nature ; in consequence $f which 
the interests or gratifications of the one, must 
yield to those of the other. As sensual objects, 
and things which administer to our immediate 



RECAPITULATION. 39 

desires, are apt to make the strongest impressions 
and captivate our attention, in preference to 
things less sensual and more remote, though of 
superior importance, thus do we frequently deem 
that to be a Good, which is virtually an Evil. 
We may also deem that to be an Evil which is 
virtually a Good, as being productive of ex- 
tensive, exalted, or permanent advantage. 
But notwithstanding these facts, we still pursue 
every thing as an apparent Good ; and we avoid 
every thing under the idea of its being an Evil, 
of greater or less magnitude. Our appetites, 
our particular propensities, our imaginations, 
our passions may spread deceitful charms over 
some objects ; and our want of attention, our 
ignorance, our impatience of present restraints 
and inconveniences, or the perverseness of our 
affections, may render objects inimical in their 
appearance, which are beneficial in their ten- 
dency : yet our Desires are alone excited by the 
idea of some enjoyment or advantage ; and 
things are rendered objects of our aversion, alone 
because they are disagreeable to our feelings, or 
threaten to endanger, some way or other, our 
Well-being. (See Note F.) 



40 OBJECTS OF 



SECTION V. 

Objects of Love and Hatred ; their 
Characteristics. 

Should it be asked, " in what do this Good 
and Evil consist?" it would be difficult to give 
a satisfactory answer. To say that they con- 
sist in a certain consciousness of well being, or 
of a comfortless existence, would be little more 
than to assert that happiness consists in being 
happy, and misery in being miserable. The 
following observations however, will discover to 
us what we expect in the means of good, and 
what we deem to be the causes of unhappiness ; 
and they will indicate where these are princi- 
pally to be found. 

Creatures formed like ourselves, with diffe- 
rent organs of sense, witli various powers of 
mind, accompanied with quick perceptions and 
high sensibility ; creatures endowed with great 
diversities of dispositions, tastes, propensities, 
must be variously affected by every thing 
around them. We are, as it were, plunged into 



LOVE AND HATRED. 4i 

the universe " tremblingly alive all o'er," and we 
are rendered capable of receiving impressions, 
pleasant or unpleasant, from every object which 
addresses our senses, from every thing we per- 
ceive, and from every thing of which we can 
form an idea. Nothing in this vast universe can, 
at all seasons, be totally indifferent to every per- 
son in it ; nothing is so inert as to be incapable 
of exerting some influence, in one connection 
or other, and of calling forth a correspondent 
passion or affection. 

These effects are produced by our Perception 
or Supposition of certain powers, properties, or 
qualities, in the different objects, by which 
ideas of an agreeable or disagreeable nature, are 
excited within us. The diverse influences of 
these are to be ascribed to an apparent Apti- 
tude or Correspondence, in some objects, with 
the frame and constitution of our nature, and to 
an inaptitude or want of correspondence in 
others ; — to a certain coincidence between pro- 
perties and relations in objects and circum- 
stances, with the appetites, powers, propensities 
of our nature, the gratification of which seems 
to promote our well-being ; or to the want of 
this coincidence, or the exertion of a contrary 
power which consitutes our misery. 

The diversity of attributes, seated indifferent 



42 OBJECTS OF 

objects, and the no less diversity in our situa- 
tions, and in circumstances surrounding us, 
render it difficult to make choice of such terms 
as may be universally appropriate. It may there- 
fore be necessary to observe, that by attribute, 
property, quality, fyc. is meant to express that 
peculiarity, whatever it may be, which exerts an 
influence upon us ; and these terms are used to 
indicate the distinguishing characteristics of 
various objects, as they are connected with some 
singularity in state, circumstance, or con- 
duct, without the real or supposed existence of 
which, the passions and affections could not 
have been excited. (See Note G.) 

The subjects possessing this real or apparent 
aptitude and coincidence, or inaptitude, relate to 
our animal wants, to the various powers and 
employments of our minds; to our state and 
connections as social beings ; and also to the 
opinions entertained respecting our relation to 
a superior Being, or to a future state of exist- 
ence. 

The various objects soliciting our attention 
under these heads ; — the degrees of their suita- 
bility, excellence, importance, or the contrary; 
— our ideas and mistakes concerning them ; — 
the facility or difficulty, with which some 
things arc pursued, obtained, preserved, lost, dis- 



LOVE AND HATRED. 43 

missed; — the uncertainty, dangers, contrarieties 
to which we are constantly exposed, respecting 
whatever may appear interesting, are perpetually 
engaging our affections, or exciting our passions, 
during the whole of our passage through life, 
from the cradle to the grave ! 

Thus is that love of Well-being which is one 
and simple in its principle, most wonderfully 
diversified in its operations ! Every object, 
every circumstance, every idea which can enter 
the mind, makes some impression upon us, of a 
pleasant or unpleasant nature ; it contributes a 
something towards, or deducts from, the Good 
we seek. They all contain powers and pro- 
perties, by which we are attracted towards the 
grand desideratum, Happiness, or are repelled 
to various distances from it ! 



CHAP. IL 

Classification of the Passions according to 
their characteristic differences. 

SECT. I. 

The efficient Causes of the Passions, Emotions •, 
and Affections examined. 

The Affections and Passions, to which the circum- 
stances stated in the preceding chapter, give 
rise, are not only extremely numerous, but like 
their exciting causes, they are so connected and 
intermixed, that to arrange them in a lucid order, 
would be almost as impracticable as to form a 
regular path through the Hercynian Wood. 
Very few of the passions or affections are per- 
fectly simple ; some are extremely complex. 
Their complexities are so various, that it is 
almost impossible to restore each to its appro- 
priate place; and the most opposite affections 
are so intermixed, that it is very difficult to 
assign to each its due share of influence. 

In this labyrinth, an attention to the follow- 



46 EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE 

ing facts may perhaps furnish us with some" 
thing of a clue. 

Some of our passions and affections are in- 
spired by circumstances which more imme- 
diately relate to ourselves, and to our own 
personal interests; that is, they belong to the 
principle of Self-love: Some of them belong to 
the social principle, and refer to our con- 
nections with our own species, or to all animated 
natures. 

In some of our Passions and Affections, the 
ideas of good are obviously predominant, in 
others the ideas of evil. 

The Passions and Affections, which relate to 
Self-love, and are excited by the idea of a Good, 
may either refer to the good which is actually 
in our possession, and communicate various de- 
grees of enjoyment, from simple gratification to 
ecstasies ; or 

The good we love may not be in our possession ; 
but it may appear attainable, and become the 
object of our Desire ; or 

Though it be not in our possession, circum- 
stances may appear highly favourable to our 
attaining it, and it may thus inspire Hope, 

The state in which Evil is the predominant 
idea, referring to ourselves, may relate; 



PASSIONS, EXAMINED. 47 

To the loss of that good which we possessed, 
or to disappointments respecting the good we 
desired, and hoped to obtain ; inspiring Sorrow , 
with its various modifications ; or 

We may be apprehensive concerning the loss 
of what we possess ; concerning the approach 
of some positive evil ; or concerning the ac- 
complishment of our desires, which introduces 
the family of Fear. 

The cause of both sorrow and fear may be 
some Agent, whose designed conduct, or even 
whose inadvertency, may threaten or produce 
injuries, and thus excite Anger, in various 
degrees. 

The causes and excitements of our passions 
and affections respecting Others, may also be 
arranged under the predominancy of Good, or 
Evil in our ideas. 

Under the former head may Benevolence 
be placed, which will indicate itself either by 
good Wishes, or good Opinions ; each productive 
of a large diversity of affections and passions, 
according to contingent circumstances. 

The predominance of Evil in our ideas will 
shew itself in actual Malevolence of dispo- 
sition concerning another; or in a Displacencv 
and disapprobation of their conduct. 



48 EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE 

The above sketch seems to indicate a plan 
of investigation which, upon the whole, is the 
least confused and embarrassing. It is founded 
upon the remarks which have been made, con- 
cerning the grand propensity of human beings 
to seek felicity ; upon the ideas of Good and 
Evil, either relating to themselves or others; 
and it seems to comprehend most of those con- 
tingent circumstances which surround us. 

That the idea of Good, is most prevalent in 
the diverse kinds of gratification ; in the 
pursuit of various objects of desire; in the 
indulgence of hope ; and in benevolent dispo- 
sitions, no one will dispute : and that the idea of 
Evil, is prevalent in malevolence and displacency, 
is no less evident. It will also be obvious, 
upon a moment's consideration, that as the 
love of good may produce Hatred to what is 
inimical to it, thus in the affections and 
passions correspondent with this principle, 
the primary and influential idea is that of suffer- 
ing. In sorroxv, when we grieve for the loss 
of what we love, it is the privation which im- 
mediately presents itself to the mind, and the 
hatred of this privation is the efficient cause 
of sorrow. In fear the apprehension of impending 
evil takes the lead in our minds, though thi| 
evil may virtually consist in being deprived of 



PASSIONS, EXAMINED. 49 

some good. In anger , the evil intended or 
perpetrated, is the direct incitement to wrath, 
and we expatiate, with so much eagerness upon 
all the circumstances of aggravation, that we 
cannot allow ourselves, at the first instant, to 
dwell upon the attributes or qualities of the 
good thus endangered or destroyed. These 
instances manifest that the perception of an 
Evil from privation, is stronger in every instance, 
than our estimation of the intrinsic value of 
that which occasions the painful emotion. 

But although these observations may suffice 
to justify the Order proposed, yet it is ac- 
knowledged that they are not comprehensive 
enough to embrace every thing relative to the 
passions. There is a class of emotions, in 
which distinct ideas of good or evil are not 
present to the mind, and which in fact may, 
with equal propriety, enlist themselves under 
each division. They are vivid impressions, 
productive of effects which, strictly speaking, 
neither belong to the passions nor affections ; 
and yet their presence frequently constitutes 
the difference between an affection and a 
passion. 

This enigma will be best explained, by our 
attention to the manner in which our ideas of 
those influential and operative qualities, excit- 

E 



50 INTRODUCTORY. 

ing passions and inspiring affections, are ob- 
tained. 



SECTION II. 

Introductory Emotions. 



When the attention is stedfastly fixed upon 
any quality, or number of qualities, apparent 
in an object, whether they be good or bad, 
some impression is made, or certain sensations 
are produced. These may dispose the mind 
to dwell yet longer upon the subject; and the 
qualities they exhibit may be attentively con- 
templated, with all their relations and con- 
nections. Their former and their present influ- 
ence, future consequences, &c. may thus be 
placed before us. Numberless correspondent 
ideas will present themselves, each producing 
its particular effect, until strong affections, 
either of love or hatred, desire or aversion, 
will be excited; and these may gradually arise 
to the most violent passions and emotions. In 
this manner have persons been known to work 
themselves up into ec.btacies, or into phrensies; 



EMOTIONS. 51' 

and the mind has been so completely occupied 
by its subject, that it has totally lost the 
power of self-command ; nothing foreign being 
able to gain admission, and divide the attention. 

But on the other hand, whatever presents 
itself in a sudden and unexpected manner, has, 
in most cases, a much greater effect upon us, 
than subjects of very superior importance, for 
which we have been gradually prepared. The 
more sudden, that is, the greater the improba- 
bility of its appearing at that instant ; and the 
more unexpected, that is, the greater distance the 
train of thought was from the expectancy, the 
more violent will be the first percussion ; and 
this circumstance will give peculiar energy to 
the exciting cause, whatever its peculiar com- 
plexion may be. A strong impulse is given, by 
the very mode of its appearance, previous to 
our being able to acquire a distinct knowledge 
of its nature. This impulse is the emotion, we 
term Surprise. 

Another circumstance which frequently at- 
tends the cause of any specific emotion, and 
produces its own characteristic effects, in sub- 
jects of seeming importance, is that of Intricacy ; 
in which the mind is thrown into an embarrassed 
state concerning the particular object, or some- 
thing material relative to it. This embarrassment 



52 INTRODUCTORY 

also gives an additional impetus to the charac- 
teristic passion, whether it be of a pleasing or 
a displeasing nature, and is distinguished by 
the name of Wonder. 

A third adventitious effect is produced by an 
instantaneous perception of the extreme magni- 
tude or extent, of the subject which calls forth 
any of the Passions and Affections. It seems 
to possess something immeasurable, unfathom- 
able, beyond the utmost stretch of comprehen- 
sion. This we call Astonishment. 

It now appears that some of our emotions 
may be excited, before the good or evil, seated 
in the exciting cause, can have arrested the at- 
tention. Yet even in these cases, Good or Evil 
are not excluded. For these emotions are most 
intimately connected with the idea of some- 
thing peculiarly important; but we can deem 
nothing important unless it possess a power of 
producing Good or Evil. Their peculiar strength 
is even occasioned by the vivid idea of Impor- 
tance, while the emotions themselves manifest 
our ignorance of its specific nature. 

These emotions, therefore, are excited by the 
confused idea of something peculiarly interest- 
iu the cause : and they are manifestly in- 
tended to awaken and direct the attention to 



EMOTIONS. 53 

this cause, that its nature and character may be 
ascertained. Surprise, like a watchful centinel, 
is equally alarmed at a sudden approach, whether 
it be of a friend or an enemy. Wonder is ex- 
cited by a curiosity which induces us to inves- 
tigate the character of the intruder, with pecu- 
liar keenness : and although Astonishment is 
almost overwhelmed with the subject, yet it is 
irresistibly attracted towards it, with a force 
proportioned to its magnitude. At the instant 
in which we feel our imbecility the most, we 
are the most eager to investigate those qualities 
which we acknowledge to exceed our compre- 
hension ! 

The above characters ascribed to them, plainly 
indicate that these emotions cannot be con- 
sidered, strictly speaking, either as passions or 
Affections ; which are always inspired by the 
idea or perception of some specific Good or 
Evil, but merely as introductory to these : and 
it is very singular, that common language, 
without the suspicion of its being founded on 
philosophical investigation, uniformly charac- 
terizes them by the term Emotions* We never 
speak either of the Passion or Affection of sur- 
prise, or of wonder, or of astonishment; but con- 
sent with one voice todenominate them Emotions. 

It is also agreed that they are very distinct 



54 INTRODUCTORY 

from the permanent calmness of an affection, 
and that they are common to the most opposite 
passions. 

The most violent passions, of every kind, are 
well known to proceed more frequently from 
the impulse of the moment, than from delibe- 
rate thought. They are equally excited also, 
by subjects of a pleasing or displeasing nature ; 
they are the precursors of many passions, and 
are able to communicate an energy to all. 

Thus we perceive that the passions,— using 
this term in a generic sense, may proceed both 
from our Ignorance, and from our real or sup- 
posed knowledge of the nature and qualities of 
objects. As the excess of cold operates upon 
the corporeal system, with a stimulating power 
like the excess of heat; thus the opposites of 
expectancy, of knowledge, of comprehension, 
become powerful stimulants to tbe awakened 
mind, and communicate a painful energy, which 
is peculiarly instrumental in removing their 
cause. This effect is manifestly produced by 
the power of the Imagination which immedi- 
ately creates alarms, forms numberless conjec- 
tures, and expands itself to the utmost, that it 
may equal if possible the vastness of the ob- 
ject. 



EMOTIONS. 55 

Surprise, Astonishment, Wonder, being excited 
by something novel, something embarrassing, or 
something vast and incomprehensible in the ob- 
jects, without any reference to its peculiar 
nature, and exerting their influence, indis- 
criminately, in passions of the most opposite 
characters, they may, with strict propriety, be 
contemplated as introductory to those subjects, 
which, upon a minute investigation, seem cal- 
culated to exert their own specific influence. 
We shall therefore term them Introductory 
Emotions. 



When the nature of the exciting cause is more 
accurately ascertained, it will be found to re- 
spect either the Selfish or the Social Principle. 
Hence arise two important distinctions, forming 
two different Classes. 

In each Class the predominant idea of a 
Good, and the predominant idea of an Evil, 
w r ill constitute two different Orders. 

The leading passions and affections, under' 
each order, point out the Genera. 

The complicated nature of some of the pas- 
sions, and other contingent circumstances, may 
be considered as constituting iSJteci&Fand Varieties, 
under each characteristic Genus. 



56 SURPRISE. 

These distinctions were suggested to the 
Author, by an attention to the natural progress 
of our passions and affections, from the first ex- 
citing cause, to all the ramifications and diver- 
sities of which they are susceptible. The Rea- 
der will doubtless perceive a striking coinci- 
dence with the classification, which Nosological 
and Botanical Writers have found it expedient 
to adopt. 

The Introduttory Emotions, from their nature 
and influence, demand a prior investigation. 



I. SURPRISE. 

We have described Surprise to be the strong 
emotion, excited by something which presents 
itself in a sudden and unexpected manner, when 
the mind was totally unprepared for it; some- 
thing we presume to be highly important, and 
yet the kind or extent of this importance has not 
been ascertained. It is the apparent novelty of 
the subject, or of some peculiarity 1 dative to it ; 
or the unexpectedness of its introduction, at a par- 
ticular time, or in a particular manner, contrary to 
probability or expectancy, which produces the 
effect; and whenever these circumstances take 



SURPRISE. 5? 

place, Surprise may be equally excited by things 
agreeable or disagreeable ; by objects of our love 
or hatred, admiration or horror. 

The primary or natural effects of Surprise, 
are to rouse the mind, to force it out of that 
train of ideas with which it was occupied, and 
compel it to advert to the novel object ; which 
is afterwards to exert a characteristic influence, 
according to its nature. The secondary effect 
of Surprise, is to add an impetus to the existing 
cause, whatever that may be. It renders pleasing 
sensations more ^delightful; and it gives an ad- 
ditional keenness to the unpleasing ones. This 
effect is evidently produced by the force of an 
awakened and active imagination ; which pre- 
ceding either deliberate attention, or the exer- 
cise of judgment, magnifies the apparent good 
or the apparent ill, as soon as their specific na- 
tures are obscurely perceived. In Surprise, the 
mind is totally passive. The Emotion can nei- 
ther be produced nor prevented by any exertions 
of the will. Nor is it its immediate province, 
either to reflect or investigate. Its pathological ef- 
fect is that of a simple stimulus, whose sole object 
is to arouse the attention. Sudden startings, 
earnest looks, extension of arms and hands, 
strong exclamations, are the characteristic signs 
of the emotion ; and when the violence of Sur- 



58 WONDER. 

prise excites an alarm, which is oft-times the 
case without trie-actual presence of clanger, the 
whole body is instantly placed in an attitude 
of defence. 



II. WONDER. 

Wonder expresses an embarrassment of the 
mind, after it is somewhat recovered from the 
first percussion of surprise. It is the effect pro- 
duced by an interesting subject, which has been 
suddenly presented to the mind, but concern- 
ing which there may be many intricacies respect- 
ing the subject itself, or the cause and manner 
of its introduction. 

In Wonder the mind begins to re-act, but its 
ideas are in a state of confusion. It attempts to 
examine and investigate, but it seems engaged 
in a fruitless inquiry. It rapidly collects to- 
gether various circumstances, from which to 
form conjectures, but rejects them as unsatisfac- 
tory, as soon as they are formed. Whenever the 
desired discovery is made, Wonder ceases, and 
gives way to the impression which is corres- 
pondent to the nature of the discovery, and to 
those circumstances which arc perceived to be- 
long to the exciting cause; whether they be 



WONDER. 59 

productive of joy or grief, admiration or ab- 
horrence, hope or fearful apprehension. As in 
this emotion, the mind begins to exert its active 
and discriminating powers, so is it able to pro- 
long or to shorten the effects of the emotion, 
either by dwelling upon the subject, and deli- 
berately following its intricacies, or by divert- 
ing its attention to other objects. Being intro- 
duced by surprise, and partaking of its indefinite 
nature, the pathological indications of Wonder 
are very similar. They are, however, less vio- 
lent; and they are intermixed with stronger 
marks of mental embarrassment. The eyes are 
sometimes fastened upon the author or narrator 
of something wonderful ; sometimes they are 
directed upwards, to be more detached from 
every surrounding object, w r hich might distract 
the attention; sometimes they roll about, as if 
they were in search of an object that may be 
equal to the explanation ; and the half-opened 
mouth seems eager to receive the desired infor- 
mation. In very intricate and important con- 
cerns, total abstraction from every thing exter- 
nal, and depth of thought marked by counte- 
nance and posture, indicate how busily the mind 
is employed in searching out the mystery. 



60 ASTONISHMENT. 



III. ASTONISHMENT. 

Astonishment is the kind and degree of wonder 
introduced by surprise, which as it were, over- 
whelms or petrifies the soul. The mental pow- 
ers are in a stupor, in a state of stagnation. 
High astonishment is the incubus of the mind, 
which feels nothing at the instant, so much as 
its inability to act. This emotion always relates 
to things of the highest importance, to things 
which appear too vast and extensive for the 
grasp of intellect, rather than to intricacies. 
When it relates to human conduct, Astonish- 
ment is excited by great undertakings, or exten- 
sive projects; by the accomplishment of plans 
which appeared more than human, whether 
beneficial or destructive; or by some excess 
either of virtue or of vice. The body marks, in 
a striking manner, the singular state of the 
mind. That also becomes immoveable; petrified 
as it were, or thunder-struck ; which are the fa- 
vourite expressions, in almost every language. 
The eyes are firmly fixed, without being directed 
to any particular object ; the character of coun- 
tenance, which was formed by the habitual in- 
fluence of some predominant affection, is for a 



ASTONISHMENT. 61 

time effaced ; and a suspension of every other 
expression, a certain vacuity, strongly notes 
this singular suspension of mind. 

Wonder and astonishment are expressions 
which in many cases, may be used synonymous- 
ly ; as both causes and effects are very analo- 
gous : for the intricacy attending an important 
subject, may be connected with its vastness; and 
sometimes occasioned by it. When these are 
introduced by Surprise, that is, when subjects of 
the kind are suddenly and unexpectedly forced 
upon the attention, their united effects are ex- 
tremely powerful ; and they give an infinite 
momentum to their causes, whether they be of 
a pleasing or displeasing nature. 

According to the above view of the emotion, 
it may obviously be connected with the causes 
either of happiness or misery ; causes which 
inspire those pleasing sensations, which so often 
accompany the perception of things sublime 
and stupendous, or which excite painful sensa- 
tions from things we deem horrible. It may 
introduce the excess of joy, or the excess of 
fearful apprehension ; call forth the most exalted 
admiration, or inspire the deepest indignation 
and contempt. 

The term Amazement, which is sometimes 
employed, seems to express a medium between 



62 ASTONISHMENT. 

wonder and astonishment. It is manifestly 
borrowed from the extensive and complicated 
intricacies of a labyrinth ; in which there are 
endless mazes, without the discovery of a clue. 
Hence an idea is conveyed of more than simple 
wonder ; the mind is lost in wonder. 

Though all these emotions have, generally 
speaking, the greatest power in things which 
unexpectedly arrest the attention ; yet they may 
also proceed from contemplation. When the 
subject is complicated, the more we discern 
concerning it, the more will unexpected novel- 
ties present themselves, and successively become 
the causes of surprise. These novelties may be 
of such a nature, as to amaze and confound the 
understanding. We may also be the more 
deeply penetrated with a conviction of the vast- 
ness, and incomprehensibility of the subject, so 
as to be worked up into, astonishment. The 
powers of the soul may become petrified as it 
were, or paralized by their fruitless attempts to 
comprehend what is far beyond their reach, and 
to fathom that which is unfathomable ! 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS, &c. 63 



SECTION III. 

Classification of the Passions and Affections, as 
they respect the Selfish or the Social Princi- 
ple. 

We are now prepared to contemplate the im- 
mediate effects of those particular qualities, sup- 
posed to be seated in the subjects themselves ; 
which the emotions of Surprise, Wonder, and 
Astonishment, may have forced upon our atten- 
tion, or which may have been discovered by 
calmer observation. 

According to the order proposed we shall 
first attend to those which are the most inter- 
esting to Ourselves, or which relate to the prin- 
ciple of Self-Love. 



CLASS I. 

On the Passions and Affections, which awe their 
Origin to the Principle of Self-love. 

These may be divided into two distinct Orders; 
that in which Love, and the Idea of Good, that 



64 PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 

is, of something either beneficial or pleasing, 
are more immediately present to the mind; and 
that in which hatred, and the Idea of Evil are 
most impressive. 



ORDER I. 

The Passions and Affectionsfounded onSzh f- Lo ve, 
which are excited by the Idea of Good. 

These are of two Kinds : the one relates to 
Good in Possession, the other to that in Expec- 
tancy. 

That in Possession inspires the following pas- 
sions and affections, Joy, Contentment, Satis- 
faction, Complacency. 



JOY. 

Joy is the vivid pleasure or delight, inspired 
by the immediate reception of something pecu- 
liarly grateful ; of something obviously pro- 
ductive of an essential advantage; or of some- 
thing whicK promises to contribute to our 



JOY. 65 

present or future well-being. This delight may 
be communicated, by our liberation from fearful 
apprehensions, or from a state of actual distress ; 
■ — by obtaining some new acquisition, some 
addition to our stock of enjoyment • — or by the 
full assurance of this, without any mixture of 
doubt. v 

The various degrees of Impetus produced by 
this passion, will depend upon the sensibility of 
the subject, his supposed ignorance of the object, 
the sudden and unexpected manner in which it 
has been communicated, and the contrast formed 
between the preceding and the present state. 
A sudden and instantaneous translation from 
extreme anxiety or the depth of distress, to an 
exalted pinnacle of happiness, constitutes the 
highest possible degree. In this case, Surp?ise, 
Wonder, Astonishment, take possession of the 
soul ; and though they may at first confound, 
they afterwards are productive of unutterable 
transports. 

On the first impulse of Joy, we are perfectly 
passive. No effort of the will can check the 
sensation itself; and where the Joy is excessive, 
it is not in the power of resolution to suppress 
every external sign. The state of passive 
impression is succeeded by the exertions of a 



m JOY. 

vigorousimagination, which, withrapidconfusion, 
runs over the many supposed advantages to be 
derived from the welcome treasure: and these 
it is disposed to multiply and aggrandize, far 
beyond the bounds of reason or probability. 
This pleasing, I had almost said, intoxicated state 
of mind, produces correspondent effects upon 
the system. A brisk and delectable flow of the 
animal spirits, diffuses a pleasurable sensation 
over the whole frame. Every species of torpor 
is subdued ; an exhilaration succeeds, indicating 
itself by emotions, which not only manifest 
the influence of the passion to spectators, but 
solicit their participation. The subject feels 
himself too much animated to remain in a tran- 
quil state. Unusual vivacity in the eyes, and 
smiles upon the countenance, are accompanied 
by joyful acclamations, clapping of hands, and 
various other lively gestures. Where the mind 
is strongly agitated, and under no restraint from 
a sense of decorum, or solicitude for character, 
loud laughter, jumping, dancing, and the most 
wild and extravagant gestures, indicate the 
frolicksomeness of the heart. 

Intense meditation upon some supposed good, 
the contemplation of its intrinsic worth, and of 
the happy consequences which are expected to 
flow from it, have sometimes raised the mind to 



GLADNESS, CHEERFULNESS. 6? 

transports, over which reason has lost its con- 
troul. But these instances seldom occur; as 
they require the union of strong conviction, 
lively imagination, and a warm heart. The 
transports of Joy usually proceed from sudden 
impulse ; and of consequence, ecstasies will 
sometimes be great, from very trivial causes. 

Gladness is an inferior degree of Joy; it may 
be excited by incidents agreeable or desirable in 
themselves, which are not of sufficient moment 
to raise the ecstasies of joy ; or it may consist 
in that lively flow of spirits, which immediately 
succeeds to the transports of Joy. 

Cheerfulness is an emotion of still gentler in- 
fluence. It is often inspired by very trivial 
circumstances, in persons of a lively disposition, 
and free from anxious care. 

Mirth is a higher degree of cheerful ness^ 
generally excited by things facetious, or ludi- 
crous ; and greatly augmented by the power of 
social sympathy. Thus it frequently becomes 
noisy and boisterous, from causes not able to 
communicate the smallest emotion to an indi- 
vidual, in a solitary state. 

When the mind is more composed^ and we 
are able to reflect, with a degree of calmness, 
upon the good received or anticipated, we be- 
come variously affected, — according to the 

V 2 



68 CONTENTMENT, SATISFACTION. 

value we place upon the object, — according 
to its apparent suitableness to our state and 
situation, — and according to its correspondence 
with our previous desires and expectations : 
and if the good be not transitory or evanescent, 
we remain under the influence of Contentment, 
Satisfaction, or Complacency. 

Contentment expresses the acquiescence of the 
mind in the portion of good we possess. It 
implies a perception that our lot might have 
been better, or that it is inferior to what others 
enjoy, or that it does not fully answer the 
expectations we had formed. An effort of 
reason or of prudence is necessary to produce 
it. We compare our present with our former 
situation, or with the inferior lot of others ; 
and thus learn to acquiesce in the degree of 
advantage obtained. 

Satisfaction denotes a pleasing state of mind, 
exceeding that communicated by simple Con- 
tentment. The good obtained is duly appre- 
ciated; it is found to be correspondent to our 
desires, and adequate to our wishes. The word 
Satisfaction is frequently employed to express 
the full accomplishment of some particular 
desire ; which always communicates a temporary 
pleasure, whatever may be the nature of that 
re. This affection by no means implies, 



COMPLACENCY. 69 

that felicity is complete, as it chiefly refers to 
particular objects ; and when it respects our 
state and situation, it admits that greater good 
might have been our portion, though we are 
more than contented, we are well-pleased with 
what we possess. 

Complacency is full and continued satisfaction, 
connected with a considerable degree of Appro- 
bation. It has intrinsic value, or some species of 
worth for its object; — some mental excellencies, 
or advantages accruing from them ; — some sen- 
timent, disposition, acquirement, conduct, per- 
formance, either of ourselves, or of others with 
whom we are immediately connected, which 
upon close examination, we deem deserving 
of esteem or applause. Complacency may be 
enjoyed as the reward of our own conduct, or 
of the purity and benevolence of our motives : 
it may be inspired by a review of conduct, ac- 
quirement, disposition, on which we can pro- 
nounce that it was well done^ or well intended. 
Complacency may also relate to the approved 
conduct, sentiments, attainments, dispositions 
of others, for whom we are deeply concerned. 
In this case, the affection may be inspired, by 
their conduct and dispositions towards ourselves, 
or by the interest we take in whatever con- 



70 COMPLACENCY. 

tributes to the promotion of their own honour 
and happiness. 

The Satisfaction produced by complacency, 
indicates that we have, in some respect or other, 
a personal interest in the object of it; which 
distinguishes the affection from that high gra- 
tification we may enjoy, when we contemplate 
and applaud the sentiments, dispositions, and 
actions of great and respectable characters, with 
which we can have no immediate concern. 

The Approbation which accompanies compla- 
cency, distinguishes its object from the more 
common causes of satisfaction. These causes 
may arise from whatever quadrates with our 
wishes and desires, without paying attention 
to their intrinsic merit. A suitableness to the 
occasion is the only requisite to inspire satisfac- 
tion ; but the Approbation implied in com- 
placency, conveys the idea of some kind of 
Excellency. The term has never been profaned 
by the application of it to guilty pursuits, dis- 
honourable success, or unworthy sentiments ; 
however they may flatter our vanity, or be the 
completion of our wishes. Nor are tilings of 
a trivial or transient nature, deemed worthy 
of this affection. It is not said of a mere spec- 
tator, that he takes Complacence in a ball, a 
concert, or at a theatrical exhibition : however 



COMPLACENCY. 71 

highly he may be delighted and satisfied with 
the performance. 

Nor can the term be applied with propriety 
to any beneficial acquisition, which has been 
purely accidental. The highest prize which 
the wheel of fortune m^y have thrown into 
our laps, may be received with joy, delight, 
and satisfaction ; but the terms Approbation 
and Complacency would be improperly em- 
ployed to express our feelings. 

Complacency may be inspired by some 
parts of the inanimate creation, in which we 
have an immediate concern, and which commu- 
nicate pleasure on the review. Works of art 
well executed, may be contemplated with Com- 
placency ; certainly by the Artist, if he has suc- 
ceeded to his wishes; and the Possessor will 
enjoy something of a similar pleasure, if the 
performance be calculated to recall pleasing 
ideas, or if he should have manifested either 
taste or address in the purchase of it. (See 
Note H.) 

The above instances will evince that, in 
strict propriety of language, Complacency is 
alone applicable to that species of Good, which 
originates frpm some mental or moral excellence ; 
where there is an indication of propriety, in- 
genuity, wisdom, address, or dignity in senti- 



72 COMPLACENCY. 

ment, design, execution ; or of rectitude and 
benevolence in the motive. 

It is obvious that the affection of Com- 
placency, will possess different degrees of 
strength, according to the various kinds and 
degrees of excellence discernible in the excit- 
ing cause. Tne highest degree of Complacency 
can alone be inspired, by the obvious use of 
wise and pertinent measures, from beneficent 
motives, which are, or promised to be, pro- 
ductive of the most desirable ends: or by lau- 
dable dispositions, and powerful exertions, 
crowned with the success we most ardently 
ties i red. When the means have been as wise 
as the nature of the thing would admit, the 
motives the most noble and generous ; when 
the execution indicates skill, and the result 
proves as successful as could have been wished, 
Complacency, respecting that object, is com- 
plete. 

High Complacency is the most grateful of all 
the Affections. It possesses an elevation and a 
suavity peculiar to itself. It is permanent satis- 
faction, enjo) ing the full approbation of reason; 
and consequently it suffers no alloy from the 
Struggle of contending passions, or opposite de- 
sires. When it is inspired by our own conduct, it 
is accompanied by self-approbation, or the testi- 



COMPLACENCY. 73 

mony of an applauding conscience, enlivened 
perhaps by the voice of gratitude, and enriched 
by the esteem of the worthy. If it proceed 
from the conduct of others, it augments the 
pleasures of affection, friendship, and gratitude. 
According to the above view of the affection, 
may a virtuous and comprehensive mind, con- 
template things in themselves of a displeasing 
nature, with Complacency ; such as difficulties, 
which are introductory to benefits ; and suffer- 
ings, which may be requisite for the production 
of the most essential good 

But the affection of Complacency has its 
counterfeit. Being more complicate than either 
of the preceding, and the approbation of the 
mind forming a constituent part of it, an erro- 
neous opinion of ourselves may change the 
nature of this sublime affection, and render it 
the parent of vice and folly. Thus false con- 
ceptions of our own talents, acquirement, con- 
duct, may inspire Pride, Vanity, Haughtiness , 
and Arrogance. 

Notwithstanding these affections are evil in 
their nature and tendency, yet as they are the 
illegitimate offspring of Complacency, vio- 
lated by Self-love, and have the appearance 
of great good for their object, they demand a 
place in this arrangement. 



74 PRIDE. 

Pride is that exalted idea of our state, quali- 
fications, or attainments, which exceeds the 
boundaries of justice, and induces us to look 
down upon supposed inferiors, with some degree 
of unmerited contempt. 

When this elevated idea of ourselves becomes 
a motive to avoid and despise any thing mean 
and unworthy, its impropriety is overlooked ; 
and as it leads to worthy conduct, it is honoured 
with the appellation of laudable Pride. 

It sometimes consists in exaggerated ideas of 
the superiority of our own country ; of merit in 
our relatives or intimate connections, whose cha- 
racter and conduct reflect some rays of honour 
upon ourselves ; — such as the pride of family 
descent, — that of children whose parents may 
have acquired celebrity, — or of parents in the 
accomplishments of their children, or particular 
honours conferred upon them. This proceeding 
from the excess of affection, where affection is 
natural, is called a pardonable Pride. 

When Pride is manifested by an ostentatious 
display of wealth, station, or accomplishments, 
it is deemed a vain Pride. 

When it is indulged to such an excess, that 
it looks down with disdain upon others, but 
little inferior, perhaps equal, possibly much su- 
perior in real merit, it is branded with the title 
of insufferable Pride. (See Note I.) 



VANITY, HAUGHTINESS. 7? 

Vanity is that species of Pride, which, while 
it presumes upon a degree of superiority in some 
particular articles, fondly courts the applause of 
every one within its sphere of action ; seeking 
every occasion to display some talent, or some 
supposed excellency. Generally speaking, it is 
the foible of superficial and frivolous minds, that 
think much more of their attainments, than of 
their remaining deficiencies. Yet it may be 
founded on the excessive love of praise, in 
those who possess no inconsiderable share of 
merit. 

Haughtiness is an overt act of Pride, mani- 
fested by some conduct or expression, indica- 
tive of an unmerited contempt of others. It 
may be deemed in this case, the swelling of 
Pride into an emotion. 

Arrogance indicates itself by some particular 
claims to precedency, or marks of distinction 
and respect, from those whom Pride considers 
its inferiors in station and character; or by im- 
pertinent pretensions to an equality with supe- 
riors. 

These indications of false complacency in 
their mildest influence, may be placed with 
strict propriety among the affections. Upon 
sudden occasions they rise into emotions ; and 



76 DESIRE. 

some times, particularly when connected with 
anger, from a supposed insult or neglect, they 
possess every characteristic of passion. 



Having considered the Passions and Affections 
immediately connected with the Possession of 
Good, we shall proceed to the Passions and 
Affections which are excited by the contempla- 
tion of Good, when it is not in our possession, 
but of which the attainment is deemed possible. 
Which constitutes our second division under the 
present Order. These are Desire and Hope. 

DESIRE. 

The general nature of Desire has already en- 
gaged our attention. It has been described as that 
influential effect which the perception of Good 
or Evil produces within us, in consequence 
of which we seek to obtain the one and avoid 
the other. Our plan demands that we now 
contemplate Desire as it is excited by particular 
objects, conducive of some apparent good, either 
of benefit or pleasure, which we have not yet 
obtained. 

According to the common acceptation of the 
term, Desire may be considered as an eager long- 



DESIRE. 77 

ing for some Good, centered, or apparently cen- 
tered, in particular objects, situations, or circum- 
stances. 

This description is made as general as possible, 
in order to comprehend two different acts of 
the mind concerning such objects ; which are 
signified by the terms Wish and Desire. 

Lord Kaims expresses this difference in the 
following manner . " Desire, taken in its proper 
" sense, is that internal act which by influ- 
" encing the will, makes us to proceed to action. 
" Desire, in a lax sense, respects also actions 
" and events that depend not on us ; as when 
il I desire that my friend may have a son to 
" represent him ; or that my country may 
*' flourish in arts and sciences ; but such internal 
u act is more properly termed a wish than de- 
" sire."* Though this observation does not 
fully mark the difference, it plainly indicates 
there is one. 

We will therefore first consider the Desire 
which is influential to action ; and then advert 
more particularly to the characteristic distinc- 
tions between that and a Wish. 

In the first sense, Desire may be defined, that 
uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the 
view, or by the contemplation of any desirable 

* Elements of Criticism, vol. i. p. 42. 



78 DESIRE. 

good, which is not in our possession, which wc 
are solicitous to abtain, and of which the attain- 
ment appears at least possible. 

Desire is in its nature restless. Mr. Locke 
justly remarks that " it is the uneasiness it oc- 
? casions, which excites the mind to pursue its 
6i object, and rouses it from its natural state of 
" apathy and inactivity." Thus it is founded 
on some species of discontent ; for were we 
perfectly contented and satisfied with all our 
sensations, and with every circumstance sur- 
rounding us, all desire must cease. It relates 
to something which is not immediately in our 
power, and which requires either our own exer- 
tions, or the agency of others over whom we 
possess some influence. It implies, therefore, 
that something is to be done, before the end 
can be obtained ; and this necessarily implies 
also that there is a possibility of success attend- 
ing the attempt. It is not always discouraged 
by difficulties; but our most active desires are 
never so ardent as to attempt known impossi* 
bilities. 

Desires are either excited by the wretchedness 
of our present situation, — by periodical wauts, 
which demand gratification, — by comparing the 
delects and imperfections of our own state, with 
the preferable state of others, — or by the recent 



DESIRE. 79 

perception of some pleasing and useful quality 
in objects, which we wish to appropriate. 

When Desire is excited by wretchedness itself, 
it looks forwards towards Good ; towards libe- 
ration from this state, and the enjoyment of a 
better. Relief, and the means of relief, are the 
predominant ideas accompanying Desire. In 
this case, the idea of a good is immediately 
engrafted on the stock of evil. The desires 
excited by periodical wants belong to the appe- 
tites exclusively. When the comparison of our 
own state with that of others, implants desires, 
they proceed from the discovery of new. sources 
of enjoyment, to which we were strangers, 
united with a conviction that there is a possi- 
bility of attaining them. The recent perception 
of pleasing qualities in objects, has a similiat 
influence. Our natural love of good inspires a 
wish to possess whatever promises an augmen- 
tation of our welfare. 

Hence it appears, that our Ignorance is often 
the parent of contentment. We must acquire 
some knowledge of stations and qualities before 
we can desire them. The enlargement of our 
ideas becomes a copious source of discontent 
with our present possessions, and inspires ardent 
desires after new objects. Nothing can injure 
the good we possess, so much as the idea of a 



80 DESIRE. 

something better : and the superlative is equally 
injurious to the comparative. 



The objects of desire are infinite, and infi- 
nitely diversified. They relate to whatever is 
essential to our existence and welfare, and to 
every thing which may strike the fancy ; that 
is, to all our natural, and all our artificial wants. 
They refer also to all our social connections, 
and to all our mental pursuits. These desires 
acquire such a diversity of character, according 
to their origin, the degrees of their strength, 
and other circumstances, as to render a minute 
analysis impossible. We shall therefore con- 
fine ourselves to a few remarks. 

It is observable that many of those Desires 
which are common to all men, and without 
which the usual offices of life could not be dis- 
charged, are of the mildest and most permanent 
natures ; such as the desire of preserving health, 
a desire of procuring a competency suitable to 
our station, to provide for our families, &c. 
Desires of this class are not distinguished by 
any particular epithet ; nor are they denominated 
either Affections or Passions, though they ob- 
viously belong to the former. But when any 
extraordinary and unusual desire presents itself, 



DESIRE. 81 

whichexceeds the common ten our of disposition; 
or when the object of desire is something pecu- 
liarly striking and important, it is distinguished 
by some discriminating epithet, and frequently 
assumes the character of an affection, emotion, or 
passion. 

Thus, the moderate and legitimate gratifi- 
cation of the sensual appetites, is not marked 
by any particular appellation; but inordinate 
desires, which transgress the bounds of sobriety 
and decency, are stigmatized by the names of 
Gluttony, Drunkenness, Debauchery, Lust, 8$c. 
When we expatiate upon such a character, we 
remark that the person to whom it belongs, is 
passionately fond of good eating, or of his bottle ; 
that he is led by his passions, &c. An exemplary 
command over such excesses is honoured with 
the title of Temperance, and Chastity. These 
virtues, consisting in the love of moderation, 
and in purity of mind, deserve a place among 
the affections ; although, from the mildness of 
their perpetual influence, they are simply termed 
virtuous dispositions. The moderate desire of 
wealth has no particular name ; but when the 
desire becomes excessive, when it consists in 
amassing riches, without applying them either 
to utility or enjoyment, it is termed Avarice. 
This also is denominated a passion; not from 

G 



gg DESIRE. 

the violence of any emotion, but from its per- 
manent effects, and from the passive and abject 
state of the person who is under its influence. 
When riches are eagerly pursued, in defiance of 
justice and humanity, the conduct is termed 
Rapaciousness. The wish to improve in any 
valuable qualification or to acquire esteem, when 
moderate, has no distinguishing character; but 
an eager desire to equal or excel others in any 
particular accomplishment, is called Emulation ; 
and to seek pre-eminence in office, title, or 
station, is Ambition. These desires are fre- 
quently so inordinate, as to require the name of 
Passions : thus the ambitious passions is a familiar 
expression. (See Note K.) The exemplary 
desire of regulating our thoughts and pursuits, 
bv right principles, constitutes Virtue; and all 
the duties which are performed with warmth 
and feeling are deemed the result of virtuous 
affections: the opposite propensities and conduct 
constitute Vice, whose characteristic consists in 
depraved affections, and ungovcrncd passions. 
The desire of yielding obedience to the divine 
command, and habitual solicitude to obtain the 
divine favour, is lleligioru This, under its mild- 
est influence, is termed, a disposition or character. 
When a religious temper is indicated by prayer 
aud meditation, which warmly interest the affec- 



DESIRE. 83 

tlofis, it is called devotion. If any one imagines 
that the divine favour is to be obtained, by a 
scrupulous attention to frivolous ceremonies, he 
is considered as superstitious. Superstition is 
deemed a principle of action rather than an 
affection. It is, in tact, consecrated frivolity^ 
devoid of love or regard to the supposed duties 
it enjoins, or to its object. A tenacious, reve- 
rence for unimportant sentiments, with a cen- 
sorious disposition towards those whose opinions 
are opposite, is the province of bigotry ; which, 
if it deserve the title of an affection, certainly 
does not belong to the benevolent class. An 
earnest desire, and unremitted endeavours, to pro- 
pagate any particular sentiment, or to enforce a 
particular rule of conduct, either out of love of 
truth, or of those we wish to become proselytes, 
or in order to recommend ourselves to some 
Principal, by our assiduity, is denominated^^/; 
which is deemed an affection. When some 
particular object gains the ascendancy over 
every other, and occupies the greater portion of 
our attention, it is occasionally termed & passion; 
as a passion for music, &c. in what sense, and 
with what propriety has already been considered. 
Such an invincible predilection fcr any subject 
as shall occupy the. choicest of our thoughts, and 
incite to the most vigorous exertions, with such 

Q 2 



$4 DESIRE. 

an ardour and constancy as to brave difficulties 
and danger, is termed enthusiasm ; which has a 
place among the Passions. 



The very Motives by which we are actuated, 
and the choice of means in order to effectuate 
our purpose, form various species of desire., 
sufficient to characterize the prevailing dispo- 
sition. These constitute integrity, honesty, in- 
dustry, honour, &c. or artifice, deceit, cruelty, 
&c. according as the prevailing desire is under 
the influence of worthy, or base and unworthy 
principles and dispositions. 

It should also be recollected, that a particular 
desire may, in certain circumstances, become 
the parent of various other affections and pas- 
sions. Of this the Passion of Love presents 
us with striking instances; which, in its pro- 
gress, is so frequently productive of hope, fear, 
joy, grief, and torment aloiuies. In short, 

every pursuit, which primarily respected the 
gratification of our senses, may become the 
occasion of hope, joy, fear, anger, sorrow, envy, 
&c. according to the impediments or aids re- 
ceiv<.il from other , or according to our success 
or disappointments. 



DESIRE. 85 

The Novelty of an object will frequently 
elevate desire into a passion. This doubtless 
proceeds from the force of imagination, which 
greatly enhances the value of those qualities 
which the object may possess, and is very prone 
to supply defects. Love at first sight illustrates 
and confirms this idea. Those charms which 
had seized the mind by surprise, become both 
unrivalled and irresistible to an heated imagi- 
nation. 

Impediments to our desires, if they be not 
sufficiently powerful to subjugate them, redouble 
their ardour. The affections being once en- 
gaged, desires being once enkindled, we are 
placed in a very different state of mind, from 
that we experienced previous to the excitement. 
"^Ve know that the disappointment of our wishes 
will not leave us in the former state of tranquil- 
lity, but will become a source of unhappiness; 
we therefore redouble our energy not to suffer 
a disappointment. This also is strongly exem- 
plified in the passion of Love. Pride, anger, 
&c. are sometimes called in as powerful auxi- 
liaries ; and they exert all their impetuosity 
in support of our pretensions. Inordinate Am- 
bition abundantly illustrates this fact. It en- 
genders a thousand evil passions, which like 



3(5 DESIRE. 

the Imps of Sin in Milton, yelp around it. Where 
it meets with obstacles, it is not scrupulous about 
the means of opposing them. Success increases 
its powers; and contrary to every other monster, 
it is rendered more insatiable and ravenous by 
being fed. In either state, therefore, it becomes 
the terror and the scourge of the earth. 

Mental pursuits seem to be the most remote 
from every thing passionate and turbulent. An 
affection for science is, in general, the most 
productive of a pleasing serenity of mind. 
Yet even here no small diversity is observable, 
according as the memory, the reasoning powers, 
or the imagination are employed. The know- 
ledge of interesting facts, and the examination 
of the relation of things to each other, are 
generally of the calmest nature; though the 
latter may justly be deemed of a more elevated 
character than the former. It is sometimes 
also rewarded with the transports of joy, in- 
spired by the surprise of some new and impor- 
tant discovery. The creative powers of the 
mind are as various in their effects, as they 
are unlimited in their operations. They are 
the sources of lively amusement, and they 
may excite ecstacies. Where the imagination 
is the most vivid, its pleasures are the strongest; 
but they are of short duration : whereas the 



DESIBE. 8? 

pursuits of knowledge famish a temperate 
perpetuity of gratification, sufficient to comfort 
and support the indefatigable student, in his 
most arduous researches. 

The Motives to study are accompanied with 
Various effects upon the mind. When science is 
pursued simply from the pleasure which know- 
ledge affords, that pleasure is placid and mild. 
When the primary motive is to benefit mankind 
by useful communications, the pursuit itself 
has self- complacency for its companion. When 
the object is personal advantage, either of for- 
tune or of reputation, adventitious passions 
will arise according to the prospect of success, 
or the actual accomplishment of our desires; 
according to apprehensions entertained, or to 
disappointments experienced. When high am- 
bition is the primary object, the passions proceed- 
ing from success, renown, disappointment, uncer- 
tainty, rivalship, disgrace; such as joy, sorrow, 
vexation, hope, fear, jealousy, &c. &c. will agi- 
tate the mind. 

The desires respecting our social connections, 
are for the reasons given above, and according 
to the plan proposed, referred to a distinct class. 

Desires, inspired by religious principles, are 
of all others the most diversified, both in kind 
and degree ; they are according to the notions 



88 DESIRE. 

we entertain of religion, and the stronger or 
\\ eaker eliect of these notions upon our feelings. 
The most extensive signification of the term 
Religion, that which comprehends the greatest 
diversity of opinions, and meets the ideas of 
most philosophers, seems to be the following; 
An impressive sense of the irresistible influence of 
one or more supet ior Beings, over the concerns 
of mortals, which may become beneficial or ini- 
mical to our welfare. It is evident, that a great 
diversity of the most opposite principles may 
be included under this general definition ; and 
it is no less evident, that these principles, as often 
as they become influential, will be productive of 
effects correspondent with their natures; will form 
the temper and implant desires, most congenial 
with themselves, but the most opposite to each 
other. Zeal and enthusiasm are common to 
them all ; but their indications will be corres- 
pondent with the supposed characters of the 
Powers they revere, and the methods supposed 
to be necessary to conciliate their favour, and 
avert their displeasure. Fear, terror, bigotry, 
superstition, cruelty, may thus be engendered; 
every evil propensity and atrocious vice may 
tuns be consecrated, however inconsistent with 
the genuine dictates of religion, or the feelings 
of humanity. (See Note L.) 



WISH. 89 

When, on the contrary, the mind is inspired 
with the most exalted conceptions of Deity, 
and with correspondent sentiments of moral 
obligation, religion may cherish the purest dis- 
positions and affections. It may moderate and 
restrain inordinate desires, — elevate the mind 
by the contemplation of perfection in character, 
and by a warm desire to imitate. It may in- 
spire love, joy, hope, gratitude; — correct im- 
patience and discontent ; — foster the principles 
of universal benevolence, and of every social 
virtue. Thus may Religion, according to the 
ideas formed of its object and duties, be ren- 
dered capable of exciting the most despicable^ or 
the most noble affections ; and of forming the 
most abject, or the mos televated of characters ! 

Mr. Hume has remarked, that Religion is the 
fulcrum, which Archimedes required, to enable 
him to move the world. He might have added, 
that according to the manner and address exer- 
cised, in applying the lever of Opinion to this 
fulcrum, will the world be raised up to the hea- 
vens, or depressed down to the abyss. 

A Wish is an inactive desire. It is the result 
of that longing after happiness so natural to 
man, in cases where no expectations can be 
formed, no efforts can be made. It is the breath- 



90 HOPE. 

ing after something desirable, where the means 
to obtain it are not in our power; or where the 
opportunity may be for ever lost. It is excited by 
the contemplation of a something, which if it 
could possibly be obtained, might augment our 
portion of good; or by reflecting upon some- 
thing, which, had it been possessed, performed, 
or avoided, might have proved peculiarly ad- 
vantageous. Thus we may w 7 ish for impossibi- 
lities, which cannot be the objects of our active 
desires. The beggar may wish to be a King, 
who cannot seriously desire it. We may wish 
that we could fly, even without wings, and pay 
a visit to some of the planets ; though we know 
that the wish will be in vain. 

A Wish may refer to past scenes, where De- 
sire is totally inapplicable. The essence of repen- 
tance consists in wishing that we had conduct- 
ed ourselves in a different manner. 

These instances abundantly confirm the re- 
mark of Lord Kaims, that we may wish for 
things not in our power; and they shew that 
the range of our wishes is of an infinite extent, 
comprehending impossibilities, that have a re- 
;\ .cuce to tiie past, present, or future. (See 
Note M.) 

Hope i> the encouragement eiven to desire; 



HOPE. m 

the pleasing expectancy that its object shall be 
obtained. Without this affection, desire would 
sink into despondency; like a simple wish it 
would remain inactive, and prey upon itself; 
producing perpetual uneasiness, destitute of 
any advantage. Hope is so pleasing, and so in- 
vigorating an affection, that it is emphatically 
styled the Balm of Life. It preserves the mind 
from stagnating in its present possessions, cor- 
rects the uneasiness of desire, and animates it 
to struggle with the difficulties it may have to 
encounter. . Hope possesses the happy secret of 
anticipating the good we desire. By the pleasing- 
sensation it communicates, we already taste the 
pleasures we seek. Where the object has not 
been of the first importance, the pleasures of 
Hope have frequently been experienced to sur- 
pass those of actual possession; for the imagina- 
tion is, in this affection, solely occupied by the 
supposed advantages and eligible qualities of its 
object, without attending to any of its imper- 
fections. In its general operation, the indul- 
gence of Hope is mixed with certain portions of 
doubt and solicitude ; but when doubt is re- 
moved, and the expectation becomes sanguine, 
hope rises into joy, and it has been known to 
produce transports and ecstasies, equally with 
the full accomplishment of ardent desires. Thus. 



02 HOPE. 

according to the degrees of force with which it 
affects the mind, it may be considered either as 
an affection or a passion. 

It also appears that Joy and Hope are very 
similar in their natures ; and that the pleas- 
ing sensations they inspire, are very corres- 
pondent. The difference consists in the de- 
gree of uncertainty which intervenes before 
possession, and checks the ardour of hope; and 
as the object was in expectancy, the pleasure is 
not so powerfully quickened by the influence of 
Surprise. Yet where the object has been highly 
valued, and the anxiety great concerning its 
attainment, •'a release from this anxiety has com- 
municated a delectable elasticity to the mind, 
and rendered its sensations as vivid as those ex- 
cited by more unexpected causes. 



As the above Passions and Affections are in- 
spired by the contemplation of Good, thus arc 
most of them of a pleasant nature. This is ob- 
viously the case with Joy, and all the affections 
connected with it. Hope is also, uniformly, a 
pleasant affection. Desire will vary according 
to its object, degrees of strengtb, and the 
different passions and affections so frequently 
arising from it. Although in its mildest state, 



HOPE. 93 

it possesses a degree of restlessness, which serves 
as a stimulus to exertions, yet its immediate at- 
tendants give a preponderancy in its favour. 
Desire, as defined above, has always some 
species of Good for its object, which is always 
a pleasant object; and it is encouraged in its 
attempts^ by the possibility or probability of 
attainment These two circumstances united, 
more than compensate for the degree of restless- 
ness it in general occasions. The sportsman, 
who delights in the chase, who endures cold, 
hunger, and fatigue, with more than patience, 
inspired by the hopes of exercising his 
skill, and carrying home the triumphant, though 
trifling, reward of his assiduity, is a just em- 
blem of the state of our minds, in the pursuit 
of objects we deem of superior importance. 
Desires are not only comfortless, but approach to 
misery, — when they are impetuous and ungo- 
vernable, — when hopes are frequently checked 
by disappointments— when patience is wearied 
out by procrastinations,— and when desires arc 
borne away by the whirlwind of turbulent pas- 
sions, which they have excited. 

The Wish, which characterizes the benevo- 
lent heart, is of a pleasing nature. When 
it refers simply to the melioration of our state, 
not being supported by hope, it subsides almost 



m HOPE, 

as soon as it is formed. It is most painful, 
when it is excited by our own improper conduct, 
or by the neglect of advantages which are 
never to return. 



ORDER II. 



We proceed to consider those Passions and 
Affections operating upon the Principle of 
Self- love , in which the idea of Evil is imme- 
diately present to the mind. 

These are distinguished into three Kinds: 
the Jlrst relates to actual losses and disappoint- 
ments; the second, to evils of which we are 
apprehensive; and the third, to the conduct 
which seems to deserve reprehension. They 
inspire the passions of Sorrow, Fear, and Anger, 
with their different modifications and combina- 
tions. 

It is obvious from this general description of 
each, that they must be frequently blended 
together. Partial evils inspiring Sorrow, are 
frequently the harbingers of others which 
alarm our Fears ; and both the evils we lament, 



SORROW. 05 

and those we dread, may be occasioned by a 
conduct calculated to excite our Anger. In 
consequence of such combinations, many of 
the affections under this class become so com- 
plicated, as to render it difficult to give them 
a specific arrangement. 

Those which are the least complex demand 
our first attention. 

I. SORROW. 

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that 
Sorrow is the direct opposite of Joy. It ex- 
presses a mental suffering, under the privation 
of some good which we actually possessed, 
or concerning which we entertained a pleasing 
expectation. The one we term Loss, the other 
a Disappointment. When the loss or disappoint* 
ment has been very great, and we feel it as 
a privation of something upon which our affec- 
tions were strongly placed; when the event ar- 
rived in a sudden and unexpected manner, so 
that the mind was not able to collect itself or 
prepare for it, this passion produces extreme 
anguish. Surprise, Wonder, and Astonishments 
exert their powerful influence, and greatly 
augment the pangs of sorrow. The senses 
are troubled; the soul is overwhelmed, and 



9C SORROW. 

sometimes sinks into a painful stupefaction. 
This state marks the Passion of Sorrow, accord- 
ing to the distinctions noticed in the preceding 
pages ; for it is here that the mind is perfectly 
passive. As soon as it is able to collect its 
powers, it wanders over, and exaggerates, 
every distressing circumstance, every possible 
disadvantage that may be consequent upon the 
loss, until tumultuous emotions are excited, 
bordering upon phrens} 7 . Violent agitations, 
and restless positions of the body, extension 
of the arms, clapping of the hands, beating 
the breast, tearing the hair, loud sobs and 
sighs, manifest to the spectator the inward 
agony of the soul. Such are the Emotions, 
which indicate the nature and strength of the 
Passion. Sometimes a flood of tears relieves 
these pathognomonic symptoms. Universal 
lassitude and a sense of debility succeed, with 
deep dejection of countenance, and languor in 
the eyes, which seem to look around, and 
solicit in vain for assistance and relief. Every 
th ng, which used to communicate pleasure 
and inspire vivacity, appears frivolous, or be- 
comes indifferent to the mind. The only de- 
light Which js i)' wr enjoy < I, is to contemplate 
the cause of its affliction j o enumerate all 
the excellencies and advantage.* of that which 



SORROW. 97 

Was once possessed, or might have been pos- 
sessed ; and fondly to dwell upon each. Thus 
the Emotions gradually sink into permanent 
Affections. 

Grief is sometimes considered as synonymous 
with Sorrow ; and in this case we speak of the 
transports of grief. At other times it expresses 
more silent, deep, and painful affections \ such 
as are inspired by domestic calamities; parti- 
cularly by the loss of friends and relatives ; or 
by the distress, either of body or mind, expe- 
rienced by those whom we love and value. 

When the mind is very deeply impressed with 
a sense of calamity, for a continuance, and the 
attention cannot by any means be diverted from 
it, the subject is in a state of Melancholy. 

This affection manifests itself by dejection of 
spirits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and 
insuperable love of solitude, universal apathy, 
and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the 
corporeal system, and not unfrequently trouble 
the brain. 

It is a striking characteristic of deep Sorrow 
that it is of a tacit and uncommunicative 
nature. In this also it is the opposite to Joy. 
After the violent effusions of the mind, in the 
first emotions, it subsides into a pensive and 

H 



98 SORROW. 

reserved state. It attempts concealment, evert 
from the bosom of a friend ; like Viola in 

Shakespear, 

Who never told her love : 
But let concealment, like a worm in the bud, 
Feed on her damask cheek. 

This disposition may proceed from some pecu- 
liar delicacy in the cause of grief, — from that 
indolence, which is the reverse both of the 
vivacity and loquacity of joy, — from the appre- 
hension that the many will not sympathize with 
the sufferer, — and from a reluctance to afflict 
the few that will. 

The above remarks refer to Sorrow, when it is 
excited by more simple causes, and is uncon- 
nected with any other affection ; but it is very fre- 
quently blended with other affections, by means of 
which it is greatly diversified. Sometimes it 
assumes the appearance of discontent and dis- 
satisfaction. The first is mostly inspired by a 
comparison of our situation with that of others, 
and the discovery of an humiliating inferiority. 
The other principally refers to the disappoint- 
ment of our desires, or to a partial and imperfect 
accomplishment of our ardent wishes. In dis- 
appointments, where the affections have been 
strongly placed, and the expectations sanguine, 



SORROW. 99 

particularly where the agency of others is con- 
cerned, sorrow may degenerate into Vexation 
and Chagrin ; which are still higher degrees of 
dissatisfaction. They all imply an irritated, as 
well as sorrowful state of mind. 

Impatience, is also a mixture of Sorrow and 
Anger, under the immediate sensation of some- 
thing irksome ; or at the causes of delay, where 
any desirable object is in expectancy. 

Repining, is Sorrow united with a degree of 
resentment against some superior agent, where 
the mind dares not to break forth into strong 
expressions of anger. 

Sympathetic Sorrow, is that species of sorrow 
we participate with others, in consequence of 
our social connections, or the general benevo- 
lence of our natures. This will be more amply 
considered hereafter. 

Of the virtuous affections inspired by Sorrow, 
which are personal, the most conspicuous are, 
Patience, Resignation, and Humility. These by 
their habitual influence often form the disposition 
and character 

In the exercise of Patience, the mind has 
wisely determined to render the evil as light as 
possible, by counteracting the usual effects of 
sorrow or vexation. It endures actual suffer- 

H S 



100 SORROW. 

ings with composure, or waits for expected 
blessings, without a culpable restlessness. In 
short, patience is a calm acquiescence in a state 
of which we perceive the evils and discomfiture ; 
by this it is sufficiently distinguished from 
insensibility. 

Resignation, superadds to patience a submis- 
missive disposition, respecting the intelligent 
cause of our uneasiness. It acknowledges both 
the power and the right of a Superior to afflict. 
It is usually connected with a confidence in his 
justice; and it indulges a hope also in some future 
exemption. Thus k opposes a fretful repining 
temper of mind. 

Humility, is a degree of habitual sorrow, or 
of painful apprehension, — by which it is con- 
nected with fear, — concerning our deficiencies in 
intellectual or moral attainments. It is inspired 
either by comparing ourselves with others, who 
appear to be our superior in these excellencies ; 
or by the contemplation of their intrinsic value, 
importance, extent, and the obstacles which we 
have suffered to impede our progress. (See 
Note N.) 

We have considered the principal cause of 
Sorrow to he privation •> because the loss of some 
good is, in most instances, the prevalent idea. 



SORROW. 101 

Pecuniary losses, the loss of relatives and 
friends, of their good-will and affection, are 
obvious privations. Sickness is the privation 
of health ; imprisonment the privation of liberty ; 
and the hardships endured in prison, the pri- 
vation of accustomed indigencies; calumny 
and disgrace are the privations of a good cha- 
racter. Yet it is acknowledged, that being in 
the habit of considering these things as essen- 
tial to comfort and happiness, we view this 
privation in a positive light; and if we attend 
simply to the effects, the idea is doubtless perti- 
nent ; for all misery, whatever be the cause, is 
a positive sensation. In bodily pains or cor- 
poral sufferings, the evil endured is uniformly 
considered as of a positive nature ; nor does the 
idea of a Loss present itself to the mind. It 
would be an affectation of philosophic precision, 
to consider the agonies of the torture as a priva- 
tion of former ease. Perhaps the reason of this 
distinction is founded in our claiming an ex- 
emption from pain, as our natural and only inhe- 
ritance. Every thing besides is an acquisition, 
either as a gift, or the purchase of our own 
labour. The following peculiarity confirms this 
idea ; the term Sorrow cannot with any pro- 
priety be applied to our bodily sufferings. We 
should smile at any one, who asserted that he 



102 FEAR. 

was sorry because he had a fit of the gout, or 
suffered a public flagellation ; though, in fact, 
the body cannot suffer without the participation 
of the mind. Hence it appears that the preva- 
lent cause of Sorrow is privation, though the 
effects are positive misery. 



II. FEAR. 

The second effect produced by the hatred of 
Evil, that we shall mention, is Fear. 

Fear is a painful sensation, produced by the 
immediate apprehension of some impending Evil. 
This evil may consist in being deprived of what 
we at present enjoy, in being disappointed in 
what we had expected, or in the infliction of a 
positive misery. 

The passion of Fear is still more painful than 
that of Sorrow, which notwithstanding its seve- 
rity has, when calmed into an affection, some- 
thing soothing in its nature. Fear produces an 
agony and anxiety about the heart, not to be 
described ; and it may be said to paralyze the 
soul in such a manner, as to render it insensible 
to every thing but to its own misery. Inert- 
ness and torpor pervade the whole system, 
united with a constriction of the integuments 



FEAR. 103 

of the body, and also a certain sense of being 
fettered, or of being rendered incapable of mo- 
tion. The eyes are pallid, wild, and sunk in 
their sockets ; the countenance is contracted 
and wan ; the hair stands erect, or at least this 
sensation is excited, which every child experi- 
ences, as often as he is terrified by stones of 
ghosts, witches, &c. ; the bowels are strongly 
affected, the heart palpitates, respiration la- 
bours, the lips tremble, the tongue falters, 
the limbs are unable to obey the will, or sup- 
port the frame. Dreadful shrieks denote the 
inward anguish. These are often succeeded by 
syncopies, which, while they manifest that the 
sufferings are greater than nature can sustain, 
afford a temporary relief. 

Such are the external signs which indicate 
the wretched state of mind, under this horrid 
passion. Since torpor, debility, and painful 
constrictions, frequently accompany fear more 
than any other passion, the Emotions will of 
consequence be less vivid. Instead of violent 
transports, a deep depression and numbness, as 
it were, both of body and mind, characterize 
the passion. These may be visible to the 
attentive spectator, and are not less expressive 
of inward anguish. 

When the effects of fear operate powerfully, 



104 FEAR. 

without any mixture of hope, these passive im* 
pressions are predominant: but when there is a 
possibility of escape, the mind re-acts with 
wonderful energy. Abject depression is changed 
into violent agitations; collected force takes 
place of debility ; and tremendous exertions 
succeed to a state of torpor and immobility. 
When a personal attack is apprehended, momen- 
tary and trembling strength is thrown into the 
muscles; — the body instinctively places itself in 
the attitude of defence; — a mixture of fierceness 
and wild horror is expressed in the countenance, 
well adapted to alarm and terrify the enemy. 
If escape be attempted, an unusual energy is 
thrown into the limbs, enabling the sufferer to 
precipitate his flight, by exertions that would 
have been impracticable in a more composed 
state of mind. 

Consternation* This species of fear is a strong 
foreboding of tremendous evils, which are like- 
ly to follow misfortunes that have already taken 
place. It may seize an Individual, when sur- 
prised by the arrival of some deadful disaster; 
or at the instant of his being made acquainted 
with the event. But it chiefly refers to alarms 
of a more extensive nature ; to those excited by 
some general calamity, which threatens evils 
beyond the power of calculation. Earthquakes, 



FEAR. 105 

volcanic eruptions, inundations, conflagrations, 
the sudden approach of an incensed and pow- 
erful enemy, are of this kind. Here the dan- 
ger is widely diffused. Fear is rendered conta- 
gious ; and by the influence of social sympathy, 
the Consternation becomes universal, without 
having any particular tendency, or being di- 
rected to any particular object. When calami- 
ties of this nature arrive in a sudden and unex- 
pected manner; particularly where the ideas of 
perfect security had been indulged, and perhaps 
were triumphant and insulting; Surprise, Won- 
der, Astonishment, manifest their powers, by 
the augmentation of misery ; while a troubled 
imagination aggravates every possibility of hor- 
ror. In all these cases, the expressions of fear 
are wild and frantic. Beating the breast, tearing 
the hair, loud lamentations indicate the agony 
of the soul. 

Perhaps the panic which has sometimes seized 
a whole army, flushed with victory, will illus- 
trate the preceding observations. Rapid success 
had inspired the arrogant idea of invincibility. 
An unexpected defeat, has not only subdued 
this delusion, but given an opposite direction 
to the active imagination, and has transferred 
the idea of invincibility to the Enemy. The 
troops now think that it ,will be in vain, any 



106 FEAR. 

longer to resist a power which has shewn itself 
superior to their own wonted prowess; and 
where resistance is supposed to be absolutely in 
vain, it never will be attempted. The force of 
superstition, either in depressing or animating 
courage, is well known. This has made the 
most Valiant tremble at shadows; and conse- 
crated banners have secured victory over an host 
of enemies. Even the warlike Achilles, who 
was the bulwark of the Grecian cause, and 
whose sole delight was in the tumults of war, 
trembled at the sudden appearance of Minerva. '* 

Abject Fear, which is accompanied by the 
more silent symptoms of depressed spirits, seems 
to be inspired chiefly by the idea of an irresis- 
tible power in its cause. This also is the faith- 
ful companion of Superstition. It is easily ex- 
cited in feeble minds by every tale of horror. 
It is very observable in those who are led into 
captivity, or to prison; in those detected in the 
commission of a crime, which exposes them to the 
severity of the law; in those who are under the 
expectation of immediate punishment: that is, 
in cases which admit of no escape or redress. 

Terrcrr is that species of fear, which rouses 
to defend or escape; producing the violent agi- 
tations which have been already noticed. 

* Quixftrvrtv ^ Ax^if?. See Homer. Iliad. A. 1. 199. 



FEAR. 107 

So painful is the passion of Fear, that the evil 
can scarcely exist which induces anguish equal 
to its feelings. Innumerable are the instances 
in which the fear of a calamity of the greatest 
magnitude, has greatly exceeded the miseries 
inflicted by the calamity itself; and the mind 
has resumed a tranquillity under misfortunes, 
which, in the prospect, appeared unsupport- 
able. Busy imagination always magnifies the 
evil, and casts the darkest shades over every 
possible concomitant. It cannot indulge the 
supposition, that any circumstances of allevia- 
tion can be attached to a state so much dreaded. 
But when the dreaded evil is arrived, an imme- 
diate release from the agonies of fear, is of 
itself a species of consolation. In the worst of 
circumstances, fear yields its place to sorrow ; 
which is certainly some mitigation of suffering : 
— habit reconciles to many things, which were 
at first repugnant to our nature : — experience in 
a short time points out many comforts, where 
they were least expected : — in most cases, as 
soon as we cease to fear, we begin to hope ; for 
there are fe<v situations so completely dark and 
gloomy, as to exclude every ray of consolatory 
hope. 

The union of such causes sufficiently explains 
the reason why, in numberless instances, the 



108 FEAR. 

agony of actual sufferings, is not so great as 
the dread of their arrival. (See Note O.) 



The Affections, that is, the more permanent 
impressions of fear, unaccompanied with exter- 
nal signs to characterize emotions, are principally 
the following: 

Dread. This is a degree of permanent fear; 
an habitual and painful apprehension of some 
tremendous event, which may. be too remote 
to excite any of the preceding passions. It 
keeps the mind in a perpetual alarm ; in an 
eager watchfulness of every circumstance which 
bears any relation to the evil apprehended. 

It is obvious, that this strong and painful 
affection cannot be the result, or the residue 
of fear, in the same manner as satisfaction may 
be the result of joy, and melancholy of the 
transports of sorrow ; because it is not suscep- 
tible of a retrospect. When the evil is arrived, 
the dread of that evil is removed ; though the 
affection may become attached to some perni- 
cious consequences, which may possibly follow. 
(See Note P.) 

Despair. This is a permanent fear of losing 
some valuable good, of suffering some dread- 
ful evil, or of remaining in a state of actual 



FEAR. 109 

misery, without any mixture of hope. It gene- 
rally succeeds to ineffectual efforts, which have 
been repeatedly made ; and of consequence it 
is excited where no means can be devised, 
equal to the magnitude of the supposed evil. 

Remorse has already been placed under Sorrow ; 
but whenever it is connected with a fear of 
punishment, it deserves a place under this pas- 
sion also, which greatly increases its agonies. 
When Remorse is blended with the fear of 
punishment, and arises to despair, it constitutes 
the supreme wretchedness of the mind. 

Cowardice, considered as distinct from the 
occasional panic mentioned above, is that ha- 
bitual temper and disposition, which disquali- 
fies from opposing the dangers and difficulties, 
which it is our duty or interest to combat. Every 
indication of cowardice, is an indication of 
culpable and unmanly fear. 

Pusillanimity is a feebleness of mind, still 
more disgraceful ; by which it is terrified at 
mere trifles, or imaginary dangers, unautho* 
rized by the most distant probability. 

Timidity, though similar, is not so reproach- 
ful. The term is chiefly used, where there is 
some apology, from sex, tender years, or feeble- 
ness of frame. 

Doubt, considered as an affection, and 



110 FEAR. 

distinguished from simple deliberation of the 
mind, is a comfortless state, occasioned by the 
uncertainty of an event, and the predominancy 
of fearful apprehension concerning it, though 
a degree of hope is still indulged. (See Note. Q.) 

Irresolution represents the mind as fluctuating 
between hope and fear; between fits of courage 
and painful apprehensions, in cases where it 
ought to determine. It is suspended between 
probabilities of success, and apparent dangers 
of disappointment. 

Shame is a painful sensation, occasioned by 
the quick apprehension, that reputation and 
character are in danger; or by the perception 
that they are lost. It may arise from the im- 
mediate detection, or the fear of detection, 
in something ignominious. It may also arise 
from native diffidence in young ingenious minds, 
when surprised into situations where they at- 
tract the peculiar attention of their superiors. 
In the first instance, the glow of Shame indi- 
cates, that the mind is not totally abandoned ; 
in the last, it manifests a nice sense of honour, 
and delicate feelings, united with inexperience 
and ignorance of the world. 

Modesty may be deemed an habitual solici- 
tude not to offend against any species of deco- 
rum; either by unsuitable behaviour, in which 



FEAR. Ill 

it is opposed to indelicacy ; or by too exalted 
an opinion of our own good qualities, in which 
it is opposed to vanity. It sometimes manifests 
itself by resenting indecencies in speech or 
conduct; in this case it is united with anger. 

Fortitude, Courage^ Intrepidity, are affections 
and dispositions opposed to fear. They are 
virtuous affections, excited alone by exposure 
to those evils, which are usually productive of 
that emotion, and therefore they deserve to 
be mentioned in this connection. 

Fortitude expresses that firmness of mind, 
which resists dangers and sufferings. It is 
founded on a resolution of the will to counte- 
ract, or to surmount those cowardly impressions, 
which terrific objects will infallibly make upon 
inferior minds. It is secretly supported by hope, 
and greatly invigorated by some portion of the 
angry affections. 

Courage is active fortitude. It meets dan- 
gers, and attempts to repel them. 

Intrepidity, according to its etymology, 
proceeds yet farther; it expresses a courage 
perfectly undaunted, a superiority to the very 
sensation of fear ; boldly impelling the mind 
forwards to meet the greatest dangers to which 
a sense of obligation may expose it. 



112 ANGER. 



III. ANGER. 

This is the third strong effect produced by 
the immediate perception of evil. 

Anger has been considered as a Passion, 
directed against the real, or supposed cause, of 
our danger or our sufferings. In the first trans- 
port of the passion, a sense of personal evil, 
unjustly inflicted, is the primary idea; and thus 
from the effect, the mind makes an instantaneous 
and powerful transition to its cause. The pri- 
mary idea entitles it to a place among the 
passions excited by Self-love; but many of the 
effects derived from it properly belong to the 
social affections, and constitute no small portion 
of Malevolence and Displacency. The passions 
of Sorrow or of Fear, do not immediately or 
necessarily, direct the attention to their cause, 
so as to have an influence upon their specific 
characters ; that of Anger does. Thus it 
becomes, as it were, the connecting medium 
between ourselves and others; exciting painful 
and irritating sensations, which relate to both. 
We shall therefore consider, in this place, the 
general nature of the passion, as excited in con- 
sequence of a keen sense of personal injuries, 



ANGER. 113 

without paying particular attention to its object- 
ive cause ; and refer its influence over the social 
affections to the Order assigned to them. 

Anger is the strong passion or emotion, 
impressed or excited, by a sense of injury re- 
ceived, or in contemplation; that is, by the idea 
of something of a pernicious nature and ten- 
dency, being done or intended, in violation of 
some supposed obligation to a contrary conduct. 
It is enkindled by the perception of an undue 
privation of that to which we thought ourselves, 
in some degree or other, entitled ; or of a 
positive suffering, from which we claimed an 
exemption. These are obviously the exciting- 
causes; though our ignorance, or inordinate 
Self-Love, may suggest erroneous ideas respect- 
ing our claims, or render the resentful emotion 
very disproportionate to the offence. The pain we 
suffer from the injury, the unexpectedness of the 
offence, our wounded pride, &c. are so apt to dis- 
turb our reasoningand discriminating powers, that 
we are, at the first instant, prompted to consider 
every injury received, as an injury intended. Nor 
are there wanting numerous instances, in which 
an heated and irritated imagination attributes 
design to the irrational and inanimate creation, 
in order to gratify the passion of resentment. 

Anger viewed as a Passion, that is, as refer- 
i 



114 ANfGER. 

ing to the first impression in which we are pas- 
sive, — or the impression preceding the external 
signs, which constitute the Emotion, — may be 
considered as a painful sensation of a heating 
and irritating nature. It is an irksome stimulus, 
by which the animal spirits are troubled and 
violent!}' agitated. Yet the sensation is not so 
painful as in the excesses of Sorrow or of Fear. 
When the injury appears great, totally unpro- 
voked, too recent or sudden for the mind to call 
up motives of restraint, — when surprise at re- 
ceiving an offence from a quarter the most 
remote from expectation, — or astonishment at 
base and ungrateful returns for benefits conferred, 
accompany the first impulse of passion, an ardent 
desire of revenge is immediately excited. The 
imagination runs over every circumstance of 
aggravation ; depicts the offence as a crime of 
the most atrocious nature ; and vengeance is 
denounced against the aggressor, as an indis- 
pensable obligation of justice, and as a retri- 
bution due to the violated laws of morals, of 
honour, or of gratitude. The emotions strike- 
ingly correspond with this state of mind. The 
corporeal system immediately assumes attitudes 
and appearances, calculated to inspire the 
offender with terror, and preparatory to the in- 
fcliction of the chastisement, he is supposed to 



ANGER. 115 

have deserved. The countenance reddens, the 
eyes flash indignant fire, and the aspect speaks 
horror; muscular strength is abundantly in- 
creased ; and powers of exertion are acquired, 
unknown to cooler moments. This new appetite 
for revenge gains the ascendancy, not only over 
every consideration of compassion, but of per- 
sonal safety, and impels to dangerous encounters, 
totally regardless of the danger. In some in- 
stances, an apprehension of dreadful consequen- 
ces, a kind of presage of the mischief which may 
possibly ensue, and become the subject of future 
regret, intermixes fear with the paroxysms of 
anger; and a pallid tremour unites with symp- 
toms peculiar to wrath, or accompanies the first 
tokens of revenge. 

Anger is deservedly placed among the most 
violent emotions. From its ungovernable ex- 
cesses, it has almost appropriated to itself the 
term passion. When the paroxysms of anger 
are excessive, the subject is deaf to the most 
cogent reasons, or to the most pathetic repre- 
sentations of the mischief it may occasion ; and 
being worked up to a degree of phrensv, he 
fully vindicates the adage, Ira breiis Juror. 
While he is under the influence of this turbu- 
lent emotion, the incensed person often ima- 
gines that he is solely actuated by the purest 

i & 



116 ANGER. 

love of equity, and an ardent desire to administer 
justice; though, at the instant, lie may be 
violating the dictates of compassion, in the 
perpetration of the most atrocious deeds. 

It is observable, that Sorrow and Fear, though 
they may be the result of culpable conduct, or 
even of criminality, are calculated to excite our 
compassion. The anguish manifested by the sub- 
ject, calls aloud for our sympathy. But Anger, 
though it is a painful emotion, seldom excites 
our sympathy, with the object himself, unless 
we suppose him to be insane. In most cases our 
sympathy is chiefly transferred to the Object of 
resentment; prompting us to act as mediators, 
and to exert all our influence in order to mitigate 
or avert the punishment to which he is exposed. 

Anger, in the excess of its violence, when it 
is excited to a degree of phrensy, so that the 
mind has totally lost self-command ; when it 
prompts to threats and actions extravagant and 
atrocious, is termed Rage. 

Wrath is violent and permanent anger; and as 

: it may be deemed an affection. This may 

ated in a breast possessing too much self* 

command to will the infliction of punishment, 

though it notices and dwells upon every circuin- 

ce of aggravation; and though it should 

[gsoive to punish, it is capable of being appeased 



ANGER. 11? 

i 

by the concessions and penitence of the offen^ 
der. 

Resentment is a lesser degree of wrath, excited 
by smaller offences, or by offences committed 
against less irritable minds. It is a deep reflec- 
tive displeasure against the conduct of the 
offender. 

Indignation is a resentment against a conduct 
which appears peculiarly unworthy; some atro- 
cious violation of the principles of gratitude, or 
something which appears peculiarly despicable 
and base. 

But we are now trespassing upon the affections 
which properly belong to another Class, and 
which will demand our attention under the ar- 
ticle of Displacency. 

Anger, and its principal ramifications are ge- 
nerally directed against the conduct of others, 
and almost universally with superior degrees 
of violence ; however they are sometimes di- 
rected against ourselves, when our conduct has 
been either negligent or criminal. In Repen- 
tance, Contrition, and Remorse, Self-reproach, 
and even Indignation are largely intermixed with 
the affection of Sorrow. 

Vexation, Chagrin, Impatience, do not relate 
to Persons so much as to particular circum- 



11& ANGER. 

tances of a teazing nature. They are chiefly ex- 
cited by disappointments, and tedious delays 
to the accomplishment of our wishes* 

Peevishness may be considered as a slighter 
degree of anger, perpetually recurring to irri- 
table persons, from trifling causes. It is such a 
soreness of temper, that it can scarcely suffer 
the touch of the gentlest hand ; and it resents 
upon the most Innocent, the vexations that have 
been excited by causes with which they had no 
concern. 

Although Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity, have 
been considered under the article of Fear, as 
they are virtuous resolutions which oppose 
themselves to the objects of our fear, or to the 
dangers which threaten us ; yet they might 
with no great impropriety have been placed 
under the passion of Anger. If we advert to 
the physiological, or rather pathological effects 
of anger, we shall perceive that it rouses the 
mind, increases ^muscular strength, braces the 
system for action, and renders the subject heed- 
less of danger ; and these are the effects pro- 
duced by Fortidude and Courage. Though 
that strong irritation of mind peculiar to anger, 
may not be sensibly felt by generous spirits, and 
self command may calm the agitations natural 
to this passion, as well as those peculiar to terror, 



ANGER. 119 

yet some modifications of it obviously remain. 
Where courage is merely instinctive, it is mani- 
festly quickened by anger; although cultivation 
and noble principles may suppress the appear- 
ance, and almost the sensations, in minds en- 
dowed with the virtues of fortitude and mag- 
nanimity. 

It may perhaps be asserted with justice, that 
some degree of anger is naturally excited by 
every object of hatred. Though Privation or 
Danger be the predominant ideas in Sorrow or 
Fear, yet these are mostly, it may be said always 
accompanied with a sense of injury, in minds 
not influenced by moral restraints. In sorrows 
inflicted by a Power, against which we dare not 
to murmur, the irritations natural to a wounded 
mind, may be subjugated by motives of virtue 
and piety; but without these, it would be 
strongly disposed to burst forth into frantic 
and impotent rage. This may be explained by 
the strength and quickness of our painful feel- 
ings, which, at the first instant, dispose us to 
impute blame where no blame can be attached. 
History makes us acquainted with many curious 
instances in the heathen world, where the images 
of the deities worshipped have been very roughly 
treated, and even suffered public flagellation, 



120 ANGER. 

for not having averted the calamities which had 
been deprecated ; and the repinings of those 
who have been better instructed, manifest a 
similar temper, though it may be checked by 
reverential awe. 

It is an indication of no inconsiderable pro- 
gress in reason and in resolution, always to dis- 
tinguish, with accuracy, between an evil en- 
dured and its inculpable cause; and to support 
the calamity without the least mixture of Re- 
sentment. Nor are these observations confined 
to the occasions of Sorrow ; in the passion of 
Fear, the first object being safety, every other 
consideration may be suppressed for the instant: 
but in the emotion of Terror, not only some 
degree of courage, but a very considerable 
portion of Anger is perceptible; the rage of a 
coward despairing of escape by flight is pro- 
verbial. 

The most accurate distinctions, therefore, 
which we have been capable of making in the 
above Analysis of the Passions, have been to 
mark the leading characteristics of each. The 
primary idea exciting Sorrow is that of loss, or 
painful privation; that of Tear is danger; and 
the genuine idea appropriate to Anger is that of 
injury, or some species of injustice. These are 



ANGER. 121 

very distinct in themselves, though inordinate 
self-love so frequently confounds them together. 



We have thus endeavoured to trace the various 
Passions and Affections, which are of a personal 
nature; and which are more immediately ex- 
cited in consequence of the principle of Self- 
Love. — -A principle seated in the breast of 
every individual of our species, from the most 
ignorant to the most intelligent ; from the ca- 
pricious infant, to the sublimest philosopher. 
All who are able to discern, or who think that 
they discern, things conducive to their hap- 
piness or enjoyment, are occasionally placed in 
situations which expose them to the influence of 
one or other of the above Passions, Emotions, 
and Affections, in their individual capacities. 

The Passions and Affections, which belong 
to the social Principle, next demand our atten- 
tion. 



CLASS II. 



On the Passions and Affections, derived from the 
Social Principle. 

If our connections with the inanimate creation, 
expose us to be differently influenced by various 
powers and properties, discernible in every part 
of it ; if many things around us call forth our 
passions and affections, by sustaining certain 
relations with our corporeal and intellectual 
natures, it is to be expected that a still more 
intimate connection with the animated creation, 
should implant within us various dispositions, 
correspondent to those higher qualities and pro- 
perties belonging to it. The animated beings 
around us, not only excite certain Passions and 
Affections, arising from the principle of Self- 
love, in common with other parts of nature, 
but they also are rendered capable of enjoying or 
of suffering, equally with ourselves ; and we 
possess the power of administering to their 
well-being, or of proving injurious to it. 

Rational and intelligent agents, being furnish- 



SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 123 

ed with certain rules of conduct, which respect 
both themselves and others, are subjected to 
various degrees of approbation or censure, accord- 
ing as they act conformably to such rules, or in 
violation of them. 

These peculiarities introduce a train of Pas- 
sions and Affections, very distinct from those 
which are excited by the selfish principle alone. 
Self-love confines its attentions to certain quali- 
ties and properties, merely as they have an in- 
fluence upon our oxvn personal welfare; and we 
deem these qualities good or bad, solely as they 
produce certain effects upon Ourselves* The 
Social Principle extends its regards to the state, 
the conduct, and the character of Others ; and 
it operates according to the degrees of their 
connection with us, — 'to their powers of com- 
municating or of receiving from us either good or 
evil, — to their actual enjoyments or their suffer- 
ings, — to their prospects of future good or ex- 
posure to evil, — to their occasional or habitual 
deportment, — and to the degrees of merit or 
demerit attached to their dispositions and con- 
duct, as conscious and intelligent agents. 

Numberless are the Passions, Emotions, and 
Affections proceeding from these different 
causes; and they vary in their complexion and 
character, according to the peculiarities of their 



124 SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 

excitements. Yet they are all reducible to the 
two grand distinctions which have been already 
pointed out. They may be placed under the 
Cardinal Affections of Love and Hatred, in 
which Good or Evil are the predominant ideas. 
Nor can there be a disposition in the class of 
obiects now under consideration, or of ourselves 
towards them, which may not, in one point of 
view or other, be ranged under these general 
heads* 

It is obvious that these affections of Love and 
Hatred, primarily relate either to the Persons, 
or to the Characters of their objects. The Good 
refers to that which we behold in them, or wish 
them to possess ; and the Evil to the supposed 
depravity of their characters, or the malevolence 
of disposition we may entertain towards them. 
The predominant ideas therefore of good and 
evil respect these alone. The affections of 
Love and Hatred are excited, by the immediate 
interest we take in the merits or the welfare of 
the objects, or by the personal resentments 
indulged against them. 



No one general term is adapted to all those 

iona and affections, which belong to the' 

social principle. Dr. Hartley, however, has 



SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 125 

comprehended them all under the name or 
character of Sympathy. This he divides into 
four Classes : rejoicing at another's happiness ; 
grieving at his misery; grieving at his happiness; 
and rejoicing at his misery. Bat the word 
sympathy, whether we advert to its genuine 
import or common usage, is ill adapted to the 
two last divisions. The usual idea of sympathy 
is that of suffering with another ; which is 
the most opposite possible to grieving at his 
happiness, or rejoicing at his misery: the last is 
not suffering, and the other is suffering in a 
manner directly contrary. 

These two opposite dispositions are usually 
expressed by the opposite terms Benevolence 
and Malevolence ; the first referring to kindly 
dispositions towards its objects, and the other 
to the reverse. But should they be the best 
terms we are able to employ, yet they are not 
entirely unexceptionable; as they do not always 
convey ideas perfectly correspondent with the 
various differences, comprised under these ge- 
neral heads. 

Benevolence signifying good xvill, might, ac- 
cording to its etymology, be considered as ap- 
plicable to Ourselves as well as to others ; yet 
in its usual acceptation the idea of Self is to- 
tally excluded ; and it expresses a disposition 



126 SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 

directly opposite to the selfish Principle. — This 
good-will does not indicate itself in all those 
affections which are ranged under Benevolence. 
Some characters inspire us with the deepest re- 
verence and awe ; which affections, though 
they do not exclude benevolence, are not imme- 
diately inspired by it. Notwithstanding these 
slight objections, the word appears to be more 
deserving of being employed, as a generic term, 
than any other that can be adopted. 

Were we more familiarized to the significa- 
tion given to the term Passion, in our introduc- 
tory Chapter; were it confined to the idea of 
Passiveness, whether the cause be of a pleasing 
or displeasing nature,/ then might we with the 
strictest propriety use the term Sympathy to ex- 
press a fellow-feeling with another, both upon 
joyful and mournful occasions. It would be 
applicable to every coincidence of sensation, 
sentiment, and disposition, comprehending our 
good wishes, good opinions, and that benignity 
which rejoices in their prosperity. 

But even in this case, Sympathy can only be 
applied to incidental indications of benevolence, 
and is not to be substituted for the word itself. 
It will have the same relation to the benevolent 
Principle as desire has to that of Love. The 
Principle of benevolence pre-disposcs to these 



SOCIAL PRINCIPLE* 12? 

social virtues, and Sympathy engages in parti* 
cular acts of benevolence. To this sense its 
etymology necessarily confines it ; for we can 
neither suffer with another, nor have any kind 
of sensation in common with him, until he be 
placed in certain situations, with which we are 
become acquainted. 

There are much stronger objections to the 
Word Malevolence, as a generic term, than to 
the preceding. It always conveys the idea of 
ill-will to a considerable degree : but hourly in- 
stances of displacency, and even of anger and 
resentment, present themselves without any 
mixture of that ill-will it describes. In 
some cases, painful resentments may be excited 
by the purest good-will ; as in the anger of a 
parent towards his child, on account of conduct 
prejudicial to his welfare. Even the momentary 
ill-will indulged by a passionate man, seeking k 
revenge for injuries received, deserves not to be 
stigmatized by the odious name of malevolence, 
which conveys the idea of permanent ill-will. 

For the above reasons, and from a reluctance 
to use a term so unfavourable in its complexion 
and character, more frequently than absolute 
necessity demands, I beg leave to substitute 
JDisplacency as a generic term. Its superior 



128 SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 

propriety will be manifest from the considera- 
tion that every instance of malevolence is an in- 
dication of Displacency to a high degree, al- 
though the latter is not at all times an indi- 
cation of the former. 

The reader will not be disposed to censure as 
superfluous these minute investigations, re- 
specting the signification of terms, when he re- 
collects that the want of precision has been the 
grand source of confusion of ideas, even among 
philosophers. The least difference in our con- 
ceptions, respecting the force of words, may 
direct to very different conclusions. The 
smallest deviation from the requisite point of 
the compass, will in a short time steer the vessel 
into an improper latitude. 

In the prosecution of our Analysis under this 
Second Class, or in tracing the Passions and 
Affections which belong to the social Principle, 
I shall, according to the plan proposed, divide 
the subject into two Orders ; the first belonging 
to the principle of Benevolence, in which the 
idea of Good is the more immediate and predo- 
minant idea ; and the second to Displacency, in 
which the idea of Evil prevails. 

The benevolent Principle may refer to good 
Desires and Dispositions, and to good Opinions : 



SOCIAL PRINCIPLE. 129 

which form two distinct kinds or genera. Dis- 
placency may also be divided into two kinds, 
Malevolence, properly so called ; and disfavour- 
able Opinion, or Displacency, according to its 
usual signification. 



ORDER I. 

Passions and Affections excited by Benevolence, 
in which Good is the predominant Idea. 

I. Those which respect Benevolent Desires and 
Dispositions. 

In our general remarks concerning Love as a 
Principle, we inevitably anticipated somethings 
which properly belong to this branch of our 
Subject. It was then hinted, that our benevo- 
lent dispositions may be directed towards those 
who are connected with us, in various degrees 
of relation or intimacy; — to the whole human 
race indiscriminately, in which it is termed 
Philanthropy ; and to all Beings rendered capa- 
ble of any portion of enjoyment; or universal 
benevolence, according to the most extensive 
sense of the expression. 

It will not be necessary, in the process of 

K 



ISO SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 

our investigation, to have the distinction be- 
tween the rational and irrational creation, al- 
ways in our view. The dispositions towards 
each are similar ; though rational Beings, from 
their superior importance, are the most inte- 
resting, and the diversity of their situations 
admits of a greater variety of correspondent 
affections. Both may be comprehended under 
the title of general benevolence. 

It will however be proper to remark, that 
the benevolence which respects our most ind- 
icate connections, approximates very closely 
to the principle of Self-love. It considers every 
thing belonging to its immediate objects, as 
belonging also to ourselves, and thus constitutes 
one common interest. Of this kind are all 
those connections which form the intimate 
relations of life, and create so large a portion 
of its happiness or its misery. Such are the 
conjugal, parental, filial, fraternal relations, 
various degrees of consanguinity, and parti- 
cular friendships. Here the habitual attach- 
ments, and benignant dispositions which the 
mind experiences, assume the character of 
affections, by way of pre-eminence. For it is 
in these relations that the kindly affections ma- 
nifest the greatest warmth and constancy. 
The general objects of our philanthropy may 



SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 131 

possess a portion of our good-will, without par- 
ticular interest being habitually taken in their 
welfare. The operation of this principle is 
confined to particular cases and situations, in 
which they may be incidentally placed. Those 
animals to which we are the most strongly 
attached, or which we may have appropriated to 
ourselves, are considered as sustaining an occa- 
sional, and accidental connection ; and when 
they are the most requisite for our use and com- 
fort, we chiefly value them as the instruments 
and means of our convenience and pleasure;. 
Their influence is chiefly temporary. They 
are transferred with little regret. The mind 
may become versatile and changeable towards 
them, without the imputation of cruelty 
or injustice. But in the social relation, the 
kindly affections dwell with the well-disposed 
mind, and are perpetually operative. 

These social affections may arise from various 
causes, which give them their distinguishing 
characteristics ; and they may possess various 
degrees of strength; which, in most cases, 
is regulated by the degrees of their utility. 
Some are deemed instinctive; that is, originally 
implanted in the breast, without the conscious 
aid of reason or reflection. The love of Parents 
for their offspring is adduced as an evidence 

k 2 



132 SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 

of instinctive affection. This is observable in 
persons who seem to have eradicated every 
other social affection. They still retain a soli- 
citude for their young, after they have rendered 
themselves strangers to every other virtue ; 
and indulge a fondness here, amidst the greatest 
animosities against those around them. But 
whatever ideas we may affix to the word instinct, 
self-love seems to form its basis. Parents ma- 
nifestly contemplate their children as scio?w 
from the stem ; and the selfish affections ac- 
company them, not only as being their appointed 
representatives, but as second selves. The su- 
perior strength of affection natural to the female 
breast, which receives a daily increase by un- 
remitted habits of care and attention, gives 
the appearance of a much stronger instinct 
to the maternal, than to the paternal affections. 

Some of the social affections arise from the per- 
ception, or the persuasion of amiable qualities, per- 
sonal or mental, for which a strong predilection is 
formed ; as in the conjugal relation. This pre- 
dilection having also a sexual influence, may 
become a passion, the most impetuous and un- 
governable. The sexual passion is rendered 
remarkable for its contrarieties. It may be 
considered as the most generous and the most 
iclfishj — at once the most interested, and the 



SOCIAL AFFECTIONS. 133 

most disinterested ; it is ready to sacrifice every 
thing, even life itself, for the beloved object ; — 
but it is anxious to appropriate the beloved 
object entirely to itself. 

Where the impetuosity of passion is not 
succeeded by indifference, it gives place to 
the milder and more permanent joys of conjugal 
affection. 

Filial affections, if they do not originate from, 
are closely connected with an early sense of 
superiority, united with a conviction that this 
superiority is exercised in perpetual cares and 
acts of kindness. 

Fraternal affection owes much of its strength 
to the closest habits of intimacy, the perception 
of one common interest, and an impressive sense 
of the inestimable value of domestic harmony. 

"XSxt friendly affections are inspired by the con- 
templation of pleasing qualities, and the per- 
ception of a similarity in disposition. They are 
always cherished by reciprocal acts of kindness. 

All these connections may be said to relate 
most intimately to Self. They manifest an adop- 
tion of others into our hearts; They blend and 
intermix interests so completely, that the ardent 
desire of good towards the particular objects of 
these affections, is not considered as a branch 



134 BENEVOLENCE. 

of disinterested benevolence. All the Passions 
and affections which have been enumerated un- 
der the preceding Class, as primarily belonging 
to the selfish principle, may be excited by the 
state and situation of those we love, with equal, 
and sometimes with superior vigour. In events 
incidental to them, Joy, Desire, Hope, Sorrow, 
Fear, Anger, become as quick and impetuous, as 
in cases where our own interests are exclusively 
concerned : and wherever the Universal Parent 
has constituted us the agents, or the guardians 
of the good fortune of others, we enjoy the af- 
fections of Satisfaction, Contentment, Com- 
placency, &c. according to the degrees of their 
prosperity, or, the value of circumstances con- 
tributing to it, as if this good immediately per- 
tained to Ourselves. 



To the good- will which extends itself be- 
yond the circle of personal attachments, and 
with which our own permanent welfare is not so 
intimately connected, — to the good-will which is 
often exercised towards strangers, and which is 
some times exercised by generous minds to- 
wards enemies, is the title of Benevolence usually 
applied. Because it is here that the innate be- 
nignity of disposition appears the most conspi- 



SYMPATHY. 135 

cuously. In these instances of good-will no- 
thing selfish appears. The benevolence acquires 
the character of being pure and disinterested. 

Considering this benevolence as a Principle 
constituting a pre-disposition, or a readiness of 
temper to act in a manner correspondent to the 
particular situation of the object, the direct 
operation of this principle will manifest itself 
by emotions and affections, to which the term 
Sympathy seems to be peculiarly applicable. 

According to the observations already made 
upon Sympathy, it may be considered as an in- 
ward feeling, which is excited by the particular 
and extraordinary situation of another; or which 
harmonizes with the condition and feelings of 
its object. Sympathy indicates a mind attuned 
to correspondent vibrations, whether they be of 
a pleasing or displeasing kind. Consequently 
it operates with various degrees of strength, 
according to the degrees of danger to which its 
objects may be exposed; — to the misery they 
suffer, and the aggravating circumstances at- 
tending it; — to the good fortune with which 
they are surprised and delighted;— and to their 
capacities of receiving good. It also disposes 
the mind to accommodate itself to the tastes, dis- 
positions, and manners of others, in the social 
intercourses of life. 



136 SYMPATHY. 

In this enlarged sense of the term may sym- 
pathy be considered as a passion^ an affection, 
and a disposition. 

In some urgent and extraordinary cases, 
Sympathy rises into an emotion, which yields 
not, in strength and exertions, to the most vio- 
lent of the selfish passions. When its object is sud- 
denly exposed to some instantaneous and tremen- 
dous danger, which demands immediate aid, the 
whole soul is devoted to the sufferer. Danger and 
relief are the thoughts which occupy the mind, 
to the total exclusion of every other. Impelled 
by this irresistible emotion, the sympathizer 
plunges into the ocean and braves its billows, or 
rushes into the midst of flames, regardless of 
their horrors, to snatch a wretched victim from 
destruction. He is insensible to personal dan- 
ger, where it is the greatest. I will not say 
that he does not listen to the suggestions of 
prudence, as prudential thoughts are not sug- 
gested. There is no passion, excepting anger, 
approaching to madness, which resembles the 
heedless impetuosity of this emotion. Rage, 
eager to punish an offence or to revenge an insult, 
will also rush into danger, and expose its own 
life in order to glut its passion; but its pallid 
countenance and the tremour of its limbs, indi- 
cate that Self is always predominant. The im- 



SYMPATHETIC SORROW. 137 

pulse of Sympathy renders the generous mind 
completely courageous. It is a stranger to per- 
sonal fear \ all its anxieties are transferred to the 
perils of the object. 

When the evil is less sudden and alarming ; 
when it is apparently of a permanent nature, sym- 
pathy with distress becomes an affection. 

Sympathetic affections are distinguished into 
various species, and discriminated by various 
appellations, according to the peculiarities at- 
tendant upon their cause, or the particular state 
of their object. 

They may be divided into those which respect 
Distress, Prosperity, Imitation. 

Of those which respect Distress, the following 
are the principal. 

Compassion. Compassion is that species of 
affection, which is excited, either by the actual 
distress of its object, or by some impending 
calamity which appears inevitable, It is a 
benevolent sorrow at their sufferings, or their 
approaching misery. The etymology of the 
word expresses this idea with strict propriety ; 
as it signifies suffering with the object* 

Compassion is always connected with a dis- 
position to relieve, and will always prompt to 
vigorous exertions, wherever there is a pos- 



13$ SYMPATHETIC SORROW. 

sibility of success ; unless some important con- 
siderations should render the endeavour improper 
or unjust. 

Compassion has not a necessary connection 
with the character of its objects. Their distress 
is a sufficient excitement. It is frequently 
exercised upon the unworthy, whose reiterated 
imprudences or vicious conduct, may have been 
the cause of their wretchedness. From the 
great extent and universality of this affection, 
it may justly be considered as a generic name, 
comprehending several other affections which 
have a more specific application; as Mercy, 
Commiseration, Pity, 8$c. 

Mercy is the most exalted branch of com- 
passion. It particularly refers to that state of 
mind, which induces us to exercise our com- 
passion upon persons whose fate is, in some 
respect, at our disposal. It disposes us to relin- 
quish demands, which, if enforced to the 
utmost, would render us the immediate agents 
of misery. It is peculiarly applicable to un- 
worthy or criminal behaviour towards ourselves, 
which would inevitably involve the offender in 
distress, were we to be tenacious of our rights. 
In a word, it is that dignified compassion which 
induces us to suppress resentment, to pardon 



SYMPATHETIC SORROW, 133 

offences, or mitigate punishments, as far as dis- 
cretion may admit. 

Commiseration, Although this term seems 
synonymous with the preceding, yet in its ge- 
neral use, it is somewhat different. It is always 
preferred when we wish to express our sym- 
pathy for misfortunes, which it is not in our 
power to remove ; or for which there is no appa- 
rent remedy. Commiseration, ruminating upon 
the state and sufferings of others, induces a per- 
manent concern. In such cases it may be said 
that we commiserate the unfortunate sufferer, 
rather than that we have compassion upon him. 
But although this is a more helpless, it is not an 
useless affection. It soothes the mind of the 
afflicted, and greatly alleviates their sorrows, 
when every other consolation fails. 

Condolence is the expression of our commise- 
ration. 

Pity is also similar to the two preceding 
affections, but it is more frequently applied to 
particular circumstances, in the State and Situa- 
tion of the object, rather than his immediate 
feelings. Thus we often pity those who have 
no pity upon themselves ; whose dispositions 
and conduct are leading them into evils, of 
which they entertain no apprehensions, or con- 
cerning which they are not solicitous. Th§ 



140 SYMPATHETIC SORROW. 

decrepit and infirm also are the objects of our 
pity, though they may sustain their infirmities 
with an enviable cheerfulness. Children ren- 
dered destitute of worthy and affectionate 
parents, and exposed to future calamities, of 
which they are unconscious, are deemed pecu- 
liar objects of pity. Nay, their ignorance of 
their misfortunes augments the force of our sym- 
pathetic feelings. 

Generosity is the disposition which prompts 
us to bestow favours, which are not the pur- 
chase of any particular merit. It has not, like 
mercy, any immediate relation either to impru- 
dences or criminality. It is benevolence sym- 
pathizing with some peculiarities in the state or 
circumstances of another, which demand our 
aid, either in the remission of pecuniary claims, 
in voluntary grants, or in donations and bene- 
factions to assist their indigence. It generally 
relates to some concessions, sacrifices, or pecu- 
liar exertions which have been made, in the exer- 
cise of the benevolent principle. The extent 
of generosity is measured by the advantages 
and pleasures, which have been relinquished in 
favour of another; or according to the troubles 
and difficulties which have been encountered, by 
the benefactor on one hand, and the slender pre- 



SYMPATHETIC SORROW. HI 

tensions of the object to these benevolent offices, 
on the other. 

Liberality has sometimes a similar import 
with Generosity. Sometimes it has a particular 
reference to the largeness of pecuniary or other 
donations. In the present day it is frequently 
applied to sentiments respecting another. It 
is used in opposition to a narrow contracted 
mode of thinking, or to a censorious disposi- 
tion, inspired by a difference of opinion. It ex- 
presses a freedom from the bias of prejudice or 
partiality. The man who is disposed to think 
,well of, and act with kindness towards persons, 
whose religious or political creed differs mate- 
rially from his own, is deemed liberal minded* 

Thus may Liberality be considered as a spe- 
cies of generosity, which usage chiefly applies 
to free donations, or to subduing unfavourable 
pre-possessions respecting the opinions of ano- 
ther. It is a liberation from the confined 
manner of acting, or of thinking, which charac- 
terizes either the parsimonious or the bigot. 

Charity, in its original import, is synonymous 
with Love. In its application it is sometimes 
used to express a disposition to entertain a 
favourable opinion of the moral character or 
conduct of others, in opposition to unfavour- 
able reports, until the strongest evidences 



142 SYMPATHETIC SORROW, 

implant conviction ; at other times, it signifies 
giving of alms, and doing good to inferiors. 
Benevolent exertions in behalf of the wretched, 
or the oppressed, are deemed acts of chanty. 

Condescension is that species of benevolence. 
which designedly waves the supposed advan- 
tages of birth, title, or station, in order to ac- 
commodate ourselves to the state of an inferior, 
and to diminish that restraint which the apparent 
distance is calculated to produce in him. It 
greatly enhances the value of every other species 
of benevolence. 

From the above analysis we perceive, that 
Mercy, Commiseration, Pity, Liberality, &c. 
are different branches of Compassion adapted 
to the peculiar situation and exigencies of its 
objects. While Compassion relates to distress, 
in general, without minute distinctions, its rami- 
fications respect criminality of character or con- 
duct, — the permanency of distress, — state and 
situations which strike us as peculiarly unfortu- 
nate, — minuter exigencies, — reputation, — and in- 
feriority of station. It is not always requisite 
to give to each species of compassion its appro- 
priate term ; yet the diversity of misfortunes, 
and the diverse alleviations of each, have imper- 
ceptibly introduced a correspondent phraseology, 



SYMPATHETIC JOY, 14S 

which in particular cases, manifests its peculiar 
propriety. 



. Another important branch of Benevolence 
consists in partaking of the good fortune of 
others ; in the participation of their Joy, upon 
the accession of good, or liberation from evil. 

If the term Sympathy be employed in this 
connection, it will denote a pleasurable sensa- 
tion excited within us, similar to that enjoyed 
by the primary participant of good, 

It is observable that no particular terms arc 
appropriated to this species of sympathy. There 
are no nice discriminations which indicate the 
different kinds of good, or the circumstances 
relative to it, in a manner correspondent with 
those which have been traced under sympathetic 
sorrow. Freedom from distress, or the increase 
of actual enjoyment, produce, as it were, one 
simple effect upon the mind of the benevolent 
sympathizer, without those various and more 
complicated sensations, which a diversity in 
misfortunes may occasion. These pleasing sen- 
sations can only be expressed by the general 
terms of joy, gladness, happiness, 8$e. We re- 
joice at the fortunate event which has made 
another happy ; we are glad to hear of thm 



144 SYMPATHETIC JOY. 

success ; are happy to be informed of their wel- 
fare, &c. 

In some instances, this species of benevo- 
lence becomes a very lively emotion, and the 
sudden impulse of joy may emulate that inspired 
by our own good fur tune, although the object 
should be almost a stranger to us. When, for 
example, our minds have been previously and 
deeply affected with the knowledge of his dis- 
tress ; — when a prosperous change has suddenly 
take place ; — and particularly when this change 
has been accomplished by the triumph of the 
party over cruelty and oppression. In such 
cases, we enjoy this sudden transition from 
painful to pleasing sympathy, and we partici- 
pate in that exultation over tyranny or injustice, 
to which every man entertains an hatred, unless 
it be his own act. 

But, excepting upon extraordinary occasions 
of this nature, our sympathies with the good 
fortune of others, are much inferior in strength 
to those we experience from their distress. 
Various reasons may be assigned for this dif- 
ference. — The influence of many blessings, 
newly acquired, may not be so extensive and 
important, as the influence of a single calamity ; 
— it is scarcely possible for any one to be ele- 
d to the pinnacle of happiness, in so rapid 



SYMPATHETIC JOY. 145 

a manner as he may be plunged into the depth 
of distress ;— good fortune, to whatever state or 
circumstances we may apply the term, is gene- 
rally of slower progress, is accumulated by almost 
imperceptible degrees, and therefore is not calcu- 
lated to make a vivid impression, at any one 
period of its progress ; — the object may be more 
deeply afflicted in his relative and social connec- 
tions, by the misfortunes or irregular conduct of 
an individual, than he could feel himself benefited 
by their prosperity ; consequently were we to 
sympathize with him, in a manner correspon- 
dent with his own feelings, joyful events could 
not make an impression upon us equal to his 
afflictions ;— those distresses which call forth 
our sympathy of sorrow are generally promul- 
gated to a considerable extent, while recent 
acquisitions of good, with all the striking cir- 
cumstances attending them, are mostly confined 
to the narrow circle of relatives and friends. — 
To these incidental causes we may justly add 
the wise constitution of our nature, as the final 
cause. Sympathy with the distresses of another 
is infinitely more useful than rejoicing in his 
prosperity. It is an incentive to administer 
relief, to annihilate this distress, and to restore 
the sufferer to the pristine state of ease and 
comfort ; and therefore is it rendered, by the 

L 



146 SYMPATHETIC JOY. 

Great Source of Benevolence, more powerful 
in its influence and operations, than the sym- 
pathy of Joy in their welfare ; which cannot be 
productive of equal good. The different kinds 
of sympathetic sorrow, are admirably adapted to 
the particular state of its objects, in order that 
each may receive its correspondent benefit. 
These considerations will explain the reason 
why an insensibility to the misfortunes of any 
one, is much more opprobrious that an indif- 
ference to his actual enjoyments. 

The immediate expressions of our joy are 
termed Congratulations. 

All the affections excited by the contempla- 
tion of Good or Evil, which relate to others, 
are manifestly compound. Sympathy with 
sufferings, is composed of benevolence and 
sorrow ; and cordial congratulations are the 
effusions of benevolence and joy. 

It is observable that, in the benevolence we 
arc now contemplating, the affection of Love 
is not necessarily placed upon the object per- 
sonally, on account of any excellence of cha- 
racter, or peculiar amiableness of disposition. 



SYMPATHETIC JOY, 147 

It rejoices in the welfare of another, unconnected 
with his virtues. The Capacity of enjoyment 
is a sufficient motive for attempting to impart 
it ; and a state of distress is a sufficient incite- 
ment to attempt relief. In its noblest exer- 
tions, benevolence indicates itself by the com- 
munication of good, in opposition to evil de- 
serts, and in a strong propensity to protect 
from misery, which the bad conduct of the 
offender has not been able to subdue. It be- 
comes a desire of promoting happiness, too 
ardent to ^e extinguished, by injury itself. 

Sympathy is also applicable to the Sociable- 
ness of the human character ; to the nature of 
man as formed to live in society. This is ma- 
nifested by the reciprocal pleasure and satisfac- 
tion we experience in our daity intercourse ; — 
by the eagerness with which we receive and 
communicate tidings that interest our fellow- 
men ;• — by the love of imitation, and the rea- 
diness with which we conform to the customs, 
manners, and dispositions, and acquiesce in 
the opinions of others, without attention to 
the higher authority of propriety or impropriety, 
or weighing motives and arguments in the 
balance of reason. In short, it respects every 
act, habit, and sentiment, of which to parti- 
cipate in common is gratifying to our feelings. 

l 2 



148 COMPLACENTIAL AFFECTIONS. 

and constitutes so large a portion of the en- 
joyments and seductions of life. 



This sympathetic Imitation brings us by 
imperceptible degrees to our Second Division. 



II. The Affections derived from Good Opi- 
nion. 



In this class of Social Affections, the opera- 
tions of the Benevolent Principle are not so 
immediate. Though benevolence is associated^ 
it is not the primary agent. It is rather a con- 
sequence than a cause. It is not our benevo- 
lence which inspires us with these favourable 
opinions, but their good qualities which 
awaken and direct our benevolence. Our af- 
fections are drawn forth by an impressive sense 
of some species of excellence in character ; 
and they may be placed upon objects, whose 
situations do not require either our sympathetic 
joys or sorrows. These are most properly ex- 
pressed hy complacential regards ; for they con- 
sist both in the approbation of the mind, and 
feelings of the heart. They relate to conduct 



COMPLACENTIAL AFFECTIONS. 149 

and qualities, concerning which our judgment 
pronounces that they possess merit, while they 
are rendered interesting by virtue of our social 
connections. 

The nature of Complacency, as it refers ei- 
ther to ourselves, or to our most intimate 
connections, has already been considered.* I 
shall only observe in this place, that when we 
are rendered participants of good, from those 
qualities which are the proper objects of compla- 
cency ; or when we contemplate peculiar marks 
of mental or moral excellencies, in others with 
whom we are conversant, our approbation is 
accompanied with various degrees of affection 
for them, although they may not be within 
the sphere of our intimacy. 

Of these affections the following are the 
most conspicuous. 

Gratitude. Gratitude is a pleasant affection,ex- 
cited by a lively sense of benefits received or in- 
tended, or even by the desire of being beneficial. It 
is the lively and powerful re-action of a well dis- 
posed mind, upon whom benevolence has con- 
ferred some important good. It is mostly connect- 
ed with an impressive sense of the amiable dispo- 
sition of the person by whom the benefit is con- 
ferred, and it immediately produces a personal 

* See p. 69 passim. 



150 COMPLACENTIAL AFFECTIONS. 

affection towards him. When the affection 
operates according to the natural course of 
influence, it will be correspondent to the impor- 
tance of the good obtained, — the distance in 
station between the recipient and his bene- 
factor, — the smallness of his claims,— perhaps 
the consciousness of deserving very opposite 
treatment. These circumstances unite to warm 
the heart into raptures. The grateful mind 
is impatient of a silent and passive reception of 
the blessing. It cannot be restrained from ac- 
knowledging its obligations, either by expres- 
sions or deeds. It considers every return in its 
power as an act of the strictest justice ; nor 
is it deterred by difficulties or dangers from 
making the attempt. The term most familiarly 
employed was original^ suggested by this idea. 
The obligation is perceived, and felt ; and the 
person benefited considers himself as bound, 
in honour and justice, either to repay or ac- 
knowledge the debt, by a bond that cannot be 
cancelled. 

Wc shall not wonder at the peculiar strength 
and (energy of ihis affection, when we consider 
that it is compounded of love placed upon the 
good communicated, affection for the donor, and 
joy at the reception. Thus it has Goodness for 
its object, and the most pleasing, perhaps umx- 



ADMIRATION. 151 

pected, if not unmerited, exertions of goodness, 
for its immediate cause. 

Thankfulness refers to verbal expressions of 
gratitude. 

Admiration. Although there is scarcely a word 
in more familiar use than the term admiration^ 
yet much ambiguity has attended its precise 
signification ; nor have authors of the greatest 
celebrity, been uniform in the sense they have 
affixed to it. Sometimes it has been deemed 
synonymous with Surprise ; sometimes it is used 
to express Wonder ; sometimes it is applied to 
subjects, as a mark of degradation ; at others, 
as expreseive of excellencies. 

In Milton's Paradise Lost, it is more than 
once employed to denote wonder. 



■Let none admire 



That riches grow in hell. 



BOOK I. L.690, 



In the following passage of Shakespear, it 
obviously signifies wonder and astonishment. 
Lady Macbeth says to her husband, terrified 
at the sight of Banquo's Ghost, 

You have displac'd the mirth, broke the good meeting, 
with most admired disorder. 

MACBETH. 



152 ADMIRATION. 

Mr. Pope has used it to express the indiscri- 
minating applause of Ignorance : 

For Fools admire, but Men of Sense approve. 

Mr. Grove defines admiration to be " that 
" sudden surprise at the novelty of an object, 
<l by which the soul is fastened down to the 
" contemplation of it," He also asserts that 
* according to the different characters of its 
" object, it is called esteem or contempt*' 

These significations have doubtless been given 
in conformity to the Latin words, miror and 
admiratio, which are equally expressive of sur- 
prise, wonder, astonishment, and that vivid 
pleasure which the sudden perception of some- 
thing extraordinary, is calculated to produce in 
the mind. 

But in the most pertinent and appropriate use 
of the terms to admire, and admiration, they 
arc manifestly deviating from a generic to a 
specific sense : and in proportion to our advances 
in precision and accuracy, we feel not only the 
advantage, but the necessity of applying them 
to some kind of excellency exclusively ; otherwise 
we shall be destitute of words to discriminate 
the finest feelings of the soul, from those which 
are common to the most ignorant and unculti- 



ADMIRATION. 153 

vated. Even Idiots may be surprised : the most 
Ignorant may wonder, and frequently do wonder 
the most ; but neither of them are susceptible 
of that impression which is best expressed by 
admiration. 

If we adhere stedfastly to the rule, that no 
two words are perfectly synonymous, which 
cannot be used with equal propriety in every 
possible connection; we shall find that admi- 
ration is as superior to surprise and wonder, 
simply considered, as knowledge is superior to 
ignorance ; for its appropriate signification is 
that act of the mind, by which we discover, 
approve, and enjoy some unusual species of 
excellence. 

The authority of Poets is of little weight, 
when we aim at philosophical precision. Their 
object is to produce some striking effect ; and 
this must be accomplished by other means, than 
by dividing and subdividing ideas into their 
component parts. Their subjects frequently 
borrow strength from foreign auxiliaries, which 
they claim a licence to press into their service, 
as often as they require their aid, in direct viola- 
tion of primitive rights. As the ancient Poets, 
by the personification of attributes and cha- 
racters, have peopled both Worlds with innu- 
merable deities, which reason has found it very 



154 ADMIRATION. 

difficult to expel; thus have Poets, in general, 
by the use of tropes and figures, by availing 
themselves of resemblances and affinities of 
every species, given energy to their thoughts ; 
but they have inspired false ideas, which philo- 
sophical precision finds it difficult to eradicate. 
They have represented things which are not, as 
if they were ; and thus imposed a severe task 
upon philosophy, to discriminate the differences 
which they have confounded. 

Our best prose writers, whose subjects demand 
an attention to just distinctions, generally apply 
admiration to some degree of Excellency. 

" When we have those elevated ideas of na- 
ture," says Mr. Dryden, " the result of that 
" view is admiration, which is always the cause 
of pleasure." Mr. Addison observes, that 
" neither Virgil nor Horace would have gained 
" so great reputation had they not been friends, 
u and admirers of each other." In the follow- 
ing passage, Archbishop Tillotson gives a full 
and satisfactory explanation of the term. 
" There is a pleasure in admiration ; and this is 
11 that which properly causes admiration, when 
" we discover a great deal in an object which 
" we understand to be excellent : and yet we 
" see we know not how much more beyond that 
" which our understandings cannot fully reach 
11 and comprehend." (See Note R.) 



ADMIRATION. 155 

That Excellence which is the subject of ad- 
miration, may either consist in the intellectual 
powers of mind, or dispositions of the heart. 
Admiration may be excited by the contemplation 
of greatness and extent of genius, by indications 
of superior talents, by plans and projects which 
discover great ingenuity in contrivance and 
invention, or unusual skill in the execution. 
It is often excited by extraordinary exertions 
of benevolence; .such as dangers encountered 
to protect and save a friend, a stranger, or an 
enemy ; by the greatness of the sacrifice made 
to misery, and the compassion that excites to 
extraordinary acts of mercy. In short, the ob- 
jective cause of admiration is whatever indicates 
a superior degree of wisdom, ingenuity, good 
sense, or benevolence. To such qualities it is 
properly confined. Power abstractedly consi- 
dered is not the object of admiration; though 
the dignified or benevolent exertions of power, 
to the production of good, may excite the 
highest degree of admiration, and place it 
among the strongest of our emotions. 

It is obvious that the range of admiration 
is, from the simpler approbation of the mind, 
up to the most lively sensation, according to 
our conceptions of the extent of excellence, 
and the degrees of our interest in its effects. 



156 ADMIRATION. 

It is also blended with various other emotions, 
according to different circumstances attendant 
upon the passion. It is frequently introduced 
by Surprise; when, for example, the discovery 
of these excellencies is sudden and unexpected ; 
and then it becomes a vivid emotion. It is 
generally connected with some degrees of Won- 
der ; — as we are so frequently ignorant of the 
causes which enabled any one greatly to excel 
ourselves or others : but since it is always ex- 
cited by the real discovery of some good qua- 
lities, it is not to be confounded with an emotion 
which arises from ignorance and embarrassment, 
previous to the discovery. 

When the evidences of wisdom and goodness 
exceed our utmost comprehension, or proceed 
far beyond the usual extent of excellence itself, 
they may excite Astonishment. 



Whatever is Good, or productive of Good, 
is the proper object of Love. Excellence must 
of consequence be peculiarly calculated to excite 
this affection in a superior degree: hence the 
pleasing and intimate connection between Love 
and Admiration. When these are united with 
Gratitude, they constitute the happiest and 
sublimcst affections of the soul. When the 



ESTEEM, RESPECT. 15? 

object manifests extraordinary benevolence;—- 
when immeasurable extents of wisdom and 
goodness direct power to execute their pur- 
pose ; — when incalculable advantages are the 
issue of their united operations, admiration 
swells into delectable astonishment, and our 
conscious incapacity to fathom is an augmenta- 
tion of enjoyment. 

Esteem is the value we place upon some de- 
gree of worth. It is higher than simple appro- 
hation, which is a decision of the judgment. Es- 
teem is the commencement of affection. It 
is a degree of love entertained fur others, on 
account of their pleasing qualities, though 
they should not immediately interest ourselves ; 
by which it is distinguished from gratitude. 
The term is peculiarly applicable to virtuous 
and amiable dispositions of the heart, such 
as honesty, integrity, patience, kindness, gen- 
tleness, &c. which have no necessary connec- 
tion with the understanding. Thus may we 
entertain an Esteem for persons of merit, al- 
though they are at a remote distance from our 
intimacy : we esteem the character of a person 
merely from the report of his good qualities. 

Respect is that favourable impression which 
the goodness of a character has made upon 



158 VENERATION, &c. 

the person contemplating it, united with a 
share of good sense. An union of both these 
qualities is requisite. Goodness alone is not 
sufficient to create respect. For should it be 
seated in a mind which indicates extreme imbe- 
cility, it cannot be deemed respectable. On 
the other hand, superior sense in a mind desti- 
tute of goodness, will not inspire respect. It 
will either waste itself in idle speculations, 
which renders it indifferent to us ; or it may 
degenerate into low cunning, which renders 
it hateful. Should it be connected with power, 
in a wicked and perverse mind, it will excite 
horror and dismay; which are very remote from 
respect. 

This affection is always connected with a 
cautious disposition not to disoblige its objects ; 
inspiring a solicitude to obtain their good-will. 

Veneration is a higher degree of Respect; in 
which the mind seems to be more forcibly struck 
with xvisdom, connected with the sterner virtues. 
Hence we speak of characters which are more 
venerable than amiable. The term is chiefly 
applicable to wisdom matured by years, or con- 
nected with some peculiar dignity of title or 
Office, and indicated by integrity and upright- 
ness. Thus wc speak of venerable ancestors, 



VENERATION, &c. 159 

venerable parents, magistrates, &c. from a pre- 
sumption of their superiority in wisdom. 

Awe is the impression made upon us by the 
lively idea of Power; a power which would 
inspire distressing fear or terror, were it not 
modified by other circumstances and qualities, 
suggesting the idea of safety. It may be in- 
spired by things inanimate, when the percep- 
tion of irresistible power is united with a con- 
fidence of safety* Thus lofty mountains, steep 
precipices, deep caverns, the tempestuous ocean, 
inspire the mind with Awe, in situations where 
they cannot injure us. When the emotion is 
inspired by Character, it acknowledges a power, 
restrained from pernicious exertions, either by 
justice, or benevolence. 

Reverence is the veneration paid to superior 
sanctity, intermixed with a certain degree of 
awe. It is the high Respect paid to the sacred 
character of its object, attended with a con- 
scious inferiority in moral worth. Esteem and 
Respect may be inspired by the qualities observ- 
able in our equals, and the former more particu- 
larly in our inferiors; but Veneration, Awe s 
and Reverence imply various degrees of superio* 
rity in their objects. 

It is manifest from the above Analysis, that 



160 VENERATION, &c. 

the qualities which influence our favourable 
opinions, are various degrees and modifications 
of Goodness, Wisdom, and Poxver ; that some of 
our complacential affections are inspired by the 
predominance of one, some by the predominance 
of another ; and in some there is almost an indis- 
tinguishable union. Gratitude refers to good- 
ness indicated by our reception of benefits. 
Esteem refers to goodness in its feeblest indica- 
tions ; therefore it is that we frequently express 
our esteem for the good qualities of the heart, 
in any one, more than for the soundness of his 
understanding. Respect and Veneration refer to 
various degrees of wisdom, or intellectual power 
united with goodness; and Awe may relate either 
to physical or intellectual power, which becomes 
impressive without inspiring dread. Reverence 
relates to superiority in moral endowments, con- 
nected with awe at intellectual powers, and a 
consciousness of our own deficiencies upon a 
comparative view. Admiration may refer to an 
unusual display of either of these qualities, 
separately ; or to the union of them in an extraor- 
dinary degree. 



As self-complacency has its counterfeit in 
pride and vanity, thus are the complacential af- 



VENERATION, &c. 161 

fections liable to similar perversion, and give 
rise to the following imperfections. 

Fondness. Though this affection is frequently 
pardonable, and sometimes amiable, yet it is an. 
acknowledged weakness. It indicates an attach- 
ment to whatever belongs to us, or is immedi- 
ately connected with us, beyond its intrinsic 
merit. Sometimes it is inspired simply by the 
idea of its being our own property; sometimes 
it is contracted or strengthened by habit; — some- 
times it is the excess of love, where love is most 
natural, which indicates itself by infantile man- 
ners, or culpable indulgences; — and sometimes 
it is the excess of affection manifested to inferior 
animals, to which their superiors have a much 
better claim. 

Partiality. This is such an excess of personal 
attachment as obscures the judgment, or cor- 
rupts the heart. It inclines to a more favourable 
opinion of the motives, conduct, and general 
merit of its object, than is consistent with the 
justice due to others. 

When any of the social and sympathetic af- 
fections are very strong, they rise to Emotions, 
and produce some correspondent tokens in the 
countenance. Complacency indicates itself by 
ineffable smiles \ the countenance becomes ani- 

M 



162 VENERATION, &c. 

mated, and the eyes sparkle with delight. Sym- 
pathetic joy manifests itself by the indications 
characteristic of joy. Sympathy with distress 
retains something of the benignant smile, mixed 
with marks of dejection, of deep concern, or in- 
ward anguish. When admiration rises into 
transport, all the symptoms peculiar to surprise 
are sometimes mixed with marks of compiacen- 
tial love, and sometimes checked by veneration 
and awe, in which some portion of fearful ap- 
prehension becomes an ingredient. 

In all these sympathetic affections, the Eye 
is the most expressive. It is properly termed 
the Index of the Soul. Particular attitudes and 
gestures, and the various forms and plaits of 
the features may be counterfeited by the un- 
feeling heart; but it cannot so easily imitate the 
brisk suffusions of joy, the sympathetic tear, 
the deep veneration and awe, and the eager 
admiration, which real feelings transmit im- 
mediately from the heart, into that wonderful 



organ, 



MALEVOLENT DESIRES, &c. 163 



ORDER II. 

Passions and Affections excited by Displacency, 
in which Evil is the predominant Idea. 

The reason for preferring the word Displacency 
to Malevolence, as a generic term, has already 
been given. Malevolence is rejected, as not 
being so applicable to every branch of that dis- 
pleasure we may possibly indulge against others ; 
whereas Displacency comprehends those various 
kinds of discontent to which we are exposed, 
in our social intercourse. Displacency may in- 
dicate itself by dispositions exceedingly inimical 
to its objects, or it may consist in warm disap- 
probation of their conduct. In the first sense, 
it is opposed to the operations of the benevolent 
principle ; and in the other, it is the reverse of 
complacency, which indicates various degrees of 
afTectipnate approbation. 

The word Displacency is solely applicable to 
our intercourse with the human species, and is 
not employed to express discontent or uneasi- 
ness, from any other source. 

Displacency divides itself also into two kinds, 
m 2 



164 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

It may be indicated by malevolent desires and 
dispositions towards the object: or by unfa- 
vourable opinions and disapprobations, without 
any mixture of Malevolence. 

I. The displacency which is indicated by 
malevolent desires and dispositions, 

These may be either of a permanent nature, 
or merely occasional. The former relates to 
that Malevolence or ill-will which is constant 
and uniform in its influence ; the other to the 
passion of Anger and its various modifications, 
which have some particular acts of an unpleasing 
and irritating nature, for their immediate 
objects. 

The first species of Malevolence is a branch 
of that general principle of Hatred, which has 
already occupied our attention. See Ch. i. 
Sect, hi.) It originates from various incidental 
causes;— such as from reiterated injuries, and vex- 
ations ; — from unjust or exaggerated representa- 
tions of the temper, designs, motives, conduct 
of another, which are unpleasant or pernicious; — 
from the partialities so intimately connected 
with our social intimacies and affections, which 
rise to violent prejudices against those who 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 165 

appear inimical to their interests ; — from a spirit 
of envy and jealousy, which connects hatred ot 
the Person with repining at their good fortune. 
Clans and classes of Enmity may thus be form- 
ed, which, augmented by the power of social 
sympathy, will finally become inveterate and 
implacable. Malevolence therefore commences 
with some idea of evil, belonging to and con- 
nected with the object; and it settles into a 
permanent hatred of his person, and of every 
thing relative to him; 

The principle thus formed gives rise to the 
following malevolent affections. 

Malignancy or Malignity. Both these words 
express a disposition which cherishes inveterate 
hatreds, and maintains implacable war against its 
object ; a disposition which deliberately plans 
schemes of mischief, and employs every means 
that power, mental or physical, can furnish to 
the prejudice of another. These words are 
nearly synonymous. In some connections, 
Malignity seems rather more pertinently applied 
to a radical depravity of nature, and Malignancy 
to indications of this depravity, in temper and 
conduct in particular instances. 

Both may be manifested by the perversion of 



166 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

power, whether physical or intellectual; and 
our dread of the disposition will be proportioned 
to our conceptions of the magnitude of this 
power. Hence the terror inspired by the idea 
of Demons and wicked Spirits, or Beings of an 
higher order, who are supposed to be devoid of 
every thing that is good, and replete with 
every thing that is evil. So that 

To do ought good never can be their task, 
But ever to do ill, their sole delight. 

Milton. 

To such Beings we ascribe Malignancy to an 
infinite extent. 

Malice, on the other hand, is more frequently 
employed to express the dispositions of inferior 
minds, to execute every purpose of mischief, 
within the more limited circle of their abilities. 
It often shews itself by little incidents; such 
as, — by thwarting the favourite purposes of 
another ; — by refusing the good that might be 
communicated without personal injury ; by en- 
couraging unfavourable reports; — by raising 
unjust suspicions; — by perverse misrepresen- 
tations, &e. This temper is sometimes ex- 
pressed by spite, or by liaving a spite against 
any one. Thus, if we ascribe Malignancy 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 16? 

to Beings of a superior order, by way of pre- 
eminence, malice and a malicious disposition, 
may with peculiar propriety be reserved for the 
minor agents of mischief, whose power of doing 
evil is not proportionate to their inclinations. 

Envy, This is a painful sensation excited by 
the view of something desirable in the state and 
situation of another^ which self-love wishes to 
appropriate. To envy is to repine at the good 
conferred upon another, or possessed by him. 
Thus it is a perfect contrast to the sympathy 
which rejoices at his welfare. Envy entertains 
a degree of sorrow that the good contemplated 
should escape ourselves, and of anger that it 
should fall to the share of another. The inordi- 
nate self-love which excites to envy, naturally 
induces the envious person to imagine that he 
is more deserving, than the object who has been 
favoured. He contemplates his own supposed 
merit, in opposition to the supposed demerit of 
the more happy object, until he becomes fully 
convinced, in his own prejudiced judgment, of 
the injustice of the distribution ; and feels a 
spirit of resentment arising against the possessor, 
and every cause of his enjoyment. 

Thus is envy that species of malevolence, 
which is inspired by the conjoined influence of 
pride, sorrow, and anger, 



368 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

Envy is denominated a passion, together with 
many other of the malevolent affections ; partly 
because it may be very strongly excited by par- 
ticular incidents, and partly in consequence of 
that singular law of usuage which assigns the 
word Affections to the benevolent feelings, and 
Passions to the powerful influence of vicious 
dispositions. (See Ch. r. Page 3.) 

Rancour is that degree of malice which preys 
upon the possessor. His heart is torn with vexa- 
tion when he contemplates the happiness of ano- 
ther, or when he is foiled in his evil purposes 
towards him. 

Cruelty, A cruel disposition respects the 
particular temper manifested in the contempla- 
tion or infliction of absolute misery. It has 
various degrees. Sometimes it is expressive of 
that hardness of heart, which is able to look 
upon extreme distress without any sensations of 
humanity. Sometimes cruelty is indicated by 
the voluntary and unnecessary infliction of mise- 
ry : and in its highest state it rejoices and 
triumphs in the diffusion of horrors; in the 
wanton shedding of blood, and spreading desola- 
tion. It is gratified with the convulsions of 
agony; groans and lamentations are music in its 
cars. 

This fiend-like temper may proceed from a 



AND DISPOSITIONS, 169 

natural insensibilty, strengthened by a perverse 
education ; — from envy ; — from a spirit of re- 
veng ■ for supposed injures; — from cowardice, 
resenting the panic it feels ; — or from insati- 
able ambition, which wades through torrents of 
blood, and renders the mangled bodies of the 
slain, stepping-stones to that pre-eminence of 
station after which it aspires. 

Censoriousness is a disposition to find fault 
with the conduct, sentiments, or dispositions 
of another, deeming every action improper, or 
ascribing it to improper motives. 

Prejudice is the reverse of partiality. This 
inclines to the favourable side in judging or vin- 
dicating of conduct, more than reason, or cha- 
rity demands; prejudice, on the contrary, is 
that degree of malevolence which disposes us to 
pre-judge the character, conduct, or motives of 
another to his disadvantage, without having the 
proper evidences before us. It is obvious that 
the partiality indulged for one person, may ex- 
cite, or greatly increase our prejudice against 
another. 

It is observable that the common use of each 
of these terms is not entirely correspondent 
with their original import. Partiality properly 
signifying a partial and imperfect view of the 
evidence, is in itself applicable to an undue bias 



170 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

of opinion or disposition, whether it be favour- 
able or disfavour able to the object; avid prejudice 
as it originally signifies prejudging, is in itself 
equally applicable to a precipitate decision for 
or against any one; but custom applies the term 
partiality to a disposition in favour, and preju- 
dice, without an expletive, to a disposition 
against another. 

There is a personal hatred, which has no spe- 
cific name. It consists of an habitual dislike 
against some particular object, without being 
connected with ill-will, or a desire of his being 
unhappy. It avoids social intercourse with the 
party, or renders social intercourse irksome. It 
is sometimes the residue of anger which forgives, 
as it is frequently expressed, but does not forget. 
It is sometimes inspired by unfavourable reports 
and misrepresentations, constituting insufferable 
pr< ; lices; and not unfrequently, by some very 
disagreeable peculiarity of manners in the object. 

Ingratitude cannot be termed an affection. 
It is the negative of a virtue, which a feeling 
heart places among the first of obligations. It 
is an insensibility to benefits received, either 
arising from stupidity, culpable inattention, or 
innate pride, which annihilates the idea of a 
favour, and considers every service rendered as 
the discharge of a debt. 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 171 

Apathy is a singular stagnation of all the 
social feelings. It professes neither to love nor 
to hate; it affects an indifference to which it 
cannot possibly attain, as it terminates in -a dis- 
gust of life and all its objects. Apathy is a kind 
of gangrene affecting the social principle, which 
like a mortified limb in the corporeal system, is 
an incumbrance to the patient, and a nuisance 
to others. 

Neither dislike, ingratitude, nor apathy, are 
absolutely chargeable with malevolence ; but as 
they are the disgraceful negatives of every 
social affection, and are much more prepared to 
hate than to love, this seems to be their proper 
department. 

The second species of Malevolence relates to 
those occasional and more transient fits of ill- 
will, which are excited by particular provoca- 
tions, and which are not totally repugnant to the 
benevolent affections. These are indicated by 
Anger, and its various modifications. 

Anger has already been considered as the 
passion which is excited by a quick sense of 
injury ; and it has been described as having a 
double relation; the one immediately respecting 
ourselves, the other respecting the offender. To 
the first we directed our thoughts under the 



172 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

selfish passions; where the influence of anger 
upon our personal feelings, and effects upon 
the corporeal system, were particularly consi- 
dered. Vie shall now confine our attention to 
the changes produced in our minds respecting its 
object* 

As long as we are under the influence of 
Anger, considered either as a passion or an affec- 
tion, we experience a temporary suspension of 
our usual complacency, and even of our good- 
will and general benevolence, towards the object 
of our displeasure. Under the impulse of the 
first emotion, we are conscious of a desire that 
the offender should suffer, in some degree pro- 
portionate to this recent instance of his de- 
merit ; we are prompted to imagine that jus- 
tice itself demands a punishment adequate to 
the offence ; we feel ourselves much inclined 
to become the ministers of justice, and are 
impatient of delay in the execution of her 
commands. 

When the provocation arises from the conduct 
of any one, with whom we are intimately con- 
nected, our habitual love of their persons and 
regard for their well are, may restrain the passion 
within the bounds of justice, and the explosion 
which gave vent to the passion may restore the 
t-alm. When it aiises from the misconduct of 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 1?3 

a person, for whom we are particularly inter- 
ested, and when this misconduct endangers his 
welfare, the very principle of benevolence 
converts our complacency into its contrary. In 
this case, being such an expressive indication 
of our displeasure as to inspire terror, it is 
admirably calculated to strike the offender with 
awe, and reclaim his conduct. As soon as pas- 
sion is able to attend to the united voices of 
reason and affection, they will frequently join 
to palliate the offence, by ascribing it to some 
incidental cause ; to the common frailties of our 
nature, to the strong impulse of particular cir- 
cumstances, &c. and the offender becomes re- 
instated in our favourable regards. But reite- 
rated provocations being indubitable marks of 
culpable inattention, disrespect, or depravity of 
disposition, will entirely change our opinion of 
character, and inspire us with indifference or 
permanent displeasure against the cause. 

Rage has been described as the madness of 
anger. 

Revenge is an insatiable desire to sacrifice 
every consideration of pity and humanity, to 
the principle of vindictive justice. It renders 
the demands of that terrific giant paramount to 
every other claim. It is a propensity to reta- 
liate evil, too fervent to be cooled by time, too 



174 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

deep and inveterate to be obliterated by conces- 
sions and entreaties. It anticipates joy in the 
contemplation of sighs and groans, and the only 
moment of transport is the instant of inflicting 
misery. 

We see that this disposition approaches very 
near to permanent malevolence, of the most 
despicable character. The abstract idea of jus- 
tice, however, forms a partition between them ; 
for to this malevolence has no rightful claim. 
But its more honourable distinction consists in 
that repentance, which humanity excites in the 
mind that is not totally obdurate, after the 
gratification of this dreadful passion. The 
avenger feels, too late, that he has sacrificed 
realities to a phantom ; and that to inflict 
misery is in no case, the path to happiness. 

Wrath is a deep and irritating sense of an 
injury. It is deliberate anger; being chiefly 
inspired by the contemplation of various aggra- 
vating circumstances attendant upon the of- 
fence. The desire of retaliation is not a consti- 
tuent part of it; by this it is distinguished 
from revenue. But it occasions a ferment in 
the spirits incompatible with the indulgence of 
complacency. 

Resentment, This affection has been de- 
scribed to be a deep reflective displeasure, 



AND DISPOSITIONS, 17* 

against the conduct of an offender. We „may 
now observe, that resentment is chiefly excited 
by some personal offence, committed against the 
laws of social intercourse, of friendship, or of 
gratitude ; — by some affront, that wounds our 
self love, it may be, our pride; — by some repre- 
hensible inattention to our minuter claims;— or 
by the want of respect and affection, to which 
we imagine that the tenour of our conduct 
towards the object, has given us an undoubted 
right. It may terminate in indifference, and, 
in weak minds, in malice ; but it is generally 
appeased by concessions and acknowledgments. 
Suspicion. This is a comfortless state of 
doubt concerning the conduct and character of 
another. The mind is greatly embarrassed re- 
specting the degree of esteem, cordiality, or 
friendship, which is due to the object. Suspi- 
cion may be excited by some kind of accusation, 
not supported by evidence sufficient for convic- 
tion, but sufficient to trouble the repose of con- 
fidence. When exercised towards Intimates, it 
is an anxious suspension of mind between 
complacency and displacency ; between that 
respect we were accustomed to entertain for 
them, and the painful apprehension that they 
no longer deserve it. We feel an incipient 



176 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

anger and resentment, which we dare not to in- 
dulge, and cannot suppress. 

Jealousy is a species of suspicion that relates 
to conduct, which still more intimately con- 
cerns ourselves. It is a painful apprehension of 
rivalship, in cases that are peculiarly inte- 
resting to us. It will of consequence increase in 
strength, according to the value we place upon 
the object, and to the degrees of danger to 
which we imagine it may be exposed. It is 
the inseparable companion of the ambitious, 
who view every competitor, and every one ca- 
pable of becoming a competitor, with a jealous 
eye. It is sometimes engrafted upon pride, which 
is deepl}' wounded by appearances of neglect. It 
is a frequent attendant upon love ; and in a 
milder sense of the term, it may be considered 
as an anxious solicitude least we should be sup- 
planted in the affections of those we most highly 
esteem. The passion is sometimes excited in 
weak minds, by the very excess of affection ; 
for this excess is prone to be perpetually upon 
the watch, and torments itself with groundless 
fears. Jealousy, in the extreme, contains a com- 
plication of the most tremendous passions which 
can agitate the human breast. Though it has 
love for its basis, yet it suffers the united tor- 
ments of every painful emotion. It finds equal 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 177 

danger in the most opposite appearances. 
Every token of innocence is interpreted into a 
proof of guilt ; and every instance of affection, 
as a mark of insulting hypocrisy. 

It is a green-ey'd monster, which doth make 

The meat it feeds on. ■ ■ * 

, Trifles light as air 



Are to the jealous, confirmations strong 
As proofs of holy writ. 



SHAKESPEAR'S OTHELLO. 

Under the influence of this baneful passion 
the mind becomes, at intervals, the sport of 
transporting hope, and wild despair; is alter- 
nately tormented, by fits of rage and the depth 
of contrition, for excesses committed in its trans- 
ports. In a word, uniting the extremes of 
dreadful hatred and passionate fondness, it en- 
tertains most cruel suspicions of the object it 
most adores; and is tempted to destroy that 
which it dreads to lose ! 

The class of evil passions under permanent Ma- 
levolence, are indications of the depraved charac- 
ter and dispositions of their subject, in whom 
they are seated, not having any immediate refer- 
ence to the character of their object. Those which 
are now described as the modifications of anger, 

1ST 



178 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

respect the impressions, which occasional devia^ 
tions from the usual tenour of conduct, make 
upon the mind of the person most interested; 
in which, both the feelings and indications of 
ill-will are of a more transitory nature ; so that 
they deserve not to be confounded with perma- 
nent hatred. 

We shall now proceed to consider those 
emotions and affections which are inspired by 
the contemplation of Evil ; and in which neither 
malevolence, nor any of the selfish affections, 
are necessary ingredients. 



II. The Displacency which is indicated by 
unfavourable opinions of conduct and disposition. 
This gives rise to the following emotions and 
affections. 

Horror. Horror is that very strong and 
painful emotion, which is excited by the view 
or contemplation of something peculiarly atroci- 
ous in the conduct of another; by some vice 
which exceeds the usual extravagance of vice; 
enormities that surpass the bounds of common 
depravity — such as impurities too gross to be 
warned, profligacies too shocking to be repeated, 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 179 

and cruel ties which make us shudder at the recital. 
It may also be excited by the extremes of agony, 
mental or corporeal, or by sufferings and punish' 
ments at which our natures recoil. 

This passion may be deemed the antipode of 
admiration. The one is inspired by the con- 
templation of surpassing excellency ; the other 
by the excess of vice and wretchedness. As 
that is one of the most pleasing sensations 
we can possibly enjoy, this is among the most 
painful we can possibly suffer. Scenes of 
the above description excite a tremour upon 
the mind, a species of terror, scarcely equalled 
by the most lively apprehensions of danger. 

Indignation expresses a strong and elevated 
disapprobation of mind, which is also inspired 
by somethingtlagitious in the conduct of another* 
But it does not always suppose that excess of 
depravity which alone is capable of committing 
deeds of horror. Indignation always refers to 
culpability of conduct; and cannot, like the pas- 
sion of horror, be extended to distress either of 
mind or body. It is produced by the violation 
of some indispeusibie obligation, connected 
with circumstances peculiarly aggravating ; — 
by acts of treachery, the abuse of confidence 
base ingratitude, &c. which we cannot coll- 
ar £ 



180 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

template without being provoked to anger, and 
feeling a generous resentment; though we 
should not be interested in the consequences of 
the conduct we condemn. Indignant emotions 
are always excited by particular incidents. 

Contempt. This is a more calm and deliberate 
affection of the mind. It directs its chief at- 
tention to the character and disposition, which is 
capable of committing unworthy and disgrace- 
ful actions. Its objects are radical baseness, 
and radical imbecility where it ought not to 
exist. Thus we despise the man who is capable 
of fraud, deceit, falsehood, and every species of 
moral depravity, which indicates an extraordi- 
nary degree of meanness. The man whomakes 
great pretensions to more exalted powers, and 
better qualities than he really possesses, and the 
man who vainly boasts of much more than he 
can perform, or courts our admiration of accom- 
plishments of which he is destitute, or which he 
poscsses in a very inferior degree, renders him- 
self also an object of contempt. 

Thus the characters which are sunk below 
the common level of humanity, and those which 
arrogantly and impotently attempt to rise above 
it, are universally deemed the proper objects 
of this emotion. 



AND DISPOSITIONS, 181 

Both indignation and contempt are accom- 
panied with a certain elevation of mind. The 
observer feels and enjoys a conscious supe- 
riority, when he compares himself with the 
offender. This sense of superiority is more 
strongly marked in contempt. When it rises 
to a certain height it indicates, 

Disdain. Disdain is such a degree of con- 
tempt as precludes any eommerce with the 
party despised. It considers him as totally 
unworthy of our notice; — even of our repre- 
hension^ which always supposes a possibility 
of reclaim. It feels as if there was something 
so repulsive in the character of the aggressor, 
that he is no longer entitled to the rights of 
social intercourse. 

Contempt and disdain are often accompanied 
with a satirical smile, which strongly insinuates 
that basenesss and meanness are also intermixed 
with large portions of folly. 

Irrision. This term is employed to express 
an affection, inspired by any peculiarity in sen- 
timent, disposition, or conduct, that we deem 
an offence against some acknowledged law of 
congruity, some standard of propriety univer- 
sally received and, respected ; but which is not 
of sufficient magnitude to excite anger, or 
any of its ramifications. It chiefly refers to 



182 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

something odd, whimsical, absurd, which is 
calculated to excite laughter, rather than incur 
our displeasure. Various mistakes, and egre- 
gious blunders, which indicate culpable igno- 
rance, inattentions, and extravagances, are the 
proper objects of irrision. 

The above seem to be the principal emotions 
and affections which are inspired by the contem- 
plation of conduct and character. They are 
strong marks of displacency, which does not 
arise from malevolence in our dispositions, but 
on the contrary, from the warm love of bene- 
ficent virtue. Nor are they necessarily con- 
nected with personal injuries, though a sense 
of injuries will infallibly impart great energy 
to each emotion. 

As anger is the guardian of our own personal 
interests, thus is the present class of emotions 
and affections destined to be the guardians of 
virtue, decency, and propriety in general. It 
is remarkable that the mind is affected by trans- 
gressions against these, in exact proportion 
to the degrees of culpability obvious in the 
offence. Horror rouses within us such a degree 
of resentment, as becomes the severest reproof 
to the enormities at which it shudders; and 
when excited by deeds of cruelty it calls up 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 183 

a laudable spirit of revenge ; and it renders the 
mildest and meekest dispositions solicitous for 
a power of retaliation. Indignation is always 
directed against the violation of some sacred 
law, which is respected by every man who 
is not destitute of virtue and honour. Contempt 
is the punishment directed against that mean- 
ness of character, and perverseness of conduct, 
which sink a man beiovv the level of social 
intercourse, and disqualify him for decent and 
respectable society. Irrision and ridicule are 
the protectors of order, decency, and propriety 
in the lesser departments ; against which the 
transgressor is thus made to feel his offence. 
He is taught to perceive that his conduct or 
principles are inconsistent with common sense, 
and to suspect that he is in danger of being 
ranked in the opprobrious class of fools. 

The visible tokens of emotion under each 
species of displacency, are characteristic of its 
nature. Those painful sensations which are 
peculiar to the most malevolent passions, legibly 
inscribe their marks upon the countenance* 
The deep sunk eye, the pallid anxiety of Malice 
and Envy, indicate the inward torments of 
the mind ; and the ineffectual attempts to smile, 
in transient gleams of satisfaction at misery, 



184 MALEVOLENT DESIRES 

only serve to render horror more horrid. Fear 
and dread have been considered as the most 
painful emotions inspired by the selfish prin- 
ciple ; and their pathological symptoms manifest 
an insuperable anxiety and depression. Malig- 
nity has adopted these feelings with their ex- 
ternal marks ; intermixing them with the irri- 
tations of anger; which, however, it attempts 
to repress from bursting forth into emotions, 
through the apprehensions of detection. 

The displacency of anger manifests the 
tokens descriptive of anger already noticed j 
which, according to the degrees of their vio- 
lence, strike terror into great offenders, or 
inspire the thoughtless and inattentive with 
respect and awe. 

The horror excited by the excess of wicked- 
ness or of misery, approaches to terror, both 
in sensation and in externakmarks. Indignation, 
conicmpt and disdain, paint upon the counte- 
nance a singular mixture of dignified superiority 
and deep disapprobation. A certain elevation, 
becoming the majesty of insulted virtue, is 
united with a lively sense of the depravity and 
meanness of the offender; and a constrast is 
instantaneously formed between cxaltedness of 
character, and the state of degradation into 
which he has fallen. The satirical jocularity 



AND DISPOSITIONS. 185 

accompanying contempt, in irrision, throws into 
the countenance, marks of exultation over 
the imbecility or absurdities of the person 
ridiculed. Without subscribing to the hypo- 
thesis of Mr. Hobbes, that pride is the efficient 
cause of laughter, it must be acknowledged, 
that this species of laughter is always accompa- 
nied with an insulting consciousness of supe- 
riority. 

In the above Analysis we have attempted 
to trace the origin of the Passions, their excit- 
ing causes, their immediate objects, and their 
numerous ramifications. We have contemplated 
the infinite diversity and contrariety of effects, 
which proceed from that one principle the 
Love of Good, in Beings formed as we are, 
stationed in a world where every surrounding 
object is able to produce its own specific im- 
pression; Beings whose individual, and whose 
social interests, are so many, various and com- 
plicated. 



But this Analytical Survey does not termi- 
nate the history of the Passions. There are 
various other points of view in which it is 
proper to contemplate them, in order to in- 



186 MALEVOLENT DESIRES, &c. 

crease our acquaintance with the rudiments 
of self-knowledge, and enable us to draw 
those moral and practical inferences, which 
may prove most conducive to the love and 
practice of Virtue. 

These are reserved for the Second Part of 
our Treatise, 



END OF PART THE FIRS?, 



PART II. 
PHILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS 



AND 



INQUIRIES, 

Founded upon the preceding Analysis. 



PART II. 
PHILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS 



AND 



INQUIRIES, 

Founded upon the preceding Analysis. 



CHAP. I. 

Observations respecting the Laws of Excitement. 

OBSERVATION I. 

Surprise the efficient Cause of Passion. 

In different parts of our Analysis of the Passions, 
the influence of the introductory emotions^ in 
quickening affections of the most opposite na- 
ture into a passion, has fully appeared. It has 
been shewn, that whatever strikes us in a sud- 
den and unexpected manner, generally makes, 
for the instant, a more vivid impression, than 
things and circumstances of much greater con- 
sequence, with which we have been familiar- 
ized, or which have been more slowly and pro- 



190 CAUSE OF PASSION 

gressively introduced to our notice. It has 
been rendered obvious, that Wonder is com- 
pounded of surprise, and the impression made 
upon the mind ; by the idea of Intricacy ; — and 
that Astonishment unites the perception of 
vastness with surprise ; — we have remarked, that 
these are, by universal suffrage, emphatically 
termed emotions ;— and we have seen the influ- 
ence of these introductory emotions, in passions 
of the most opposite characters. 

These considerations united make it highly 
probable, that the essential and characteristic 
difference between a Passion and an Affec- 
tion> depends upon the superaddition of Sur- 
prise, to the natural effect produced by the real 
or supposed quality of an object ; — that this 
Emotion, conjoined with the specific nature of 
its exciting cause, is virtually the efficient cause 
of a Passion ; the percussion of surprise rendering 
the affection visible, by characteristic signs, coi- 
respondent with its specific nature. 

Thus for example, in Joy, the pleasing part 
of the impression owes its origin to the posses- 
sion, or undoubted expectancy, of some desirable 
good. This, in its lowest influence, produces 
some degree of change in the corporeal frame. 
It is a sensation, and must be felt somewhere. 
The vividness of the impression occasioned by 



CAUSE OF PASSION. 191 

the impetus of surprise, renders this sensation 
more vivid, diffuses its effects over the whole 
system, and occasions a delectable and ungo- 
vernable flow of spirits, which becomes con- 
spicuous to every spectator. But as Novelty 
is the exciting cause of surprise, in proportion 
as the novelty of good subsides, surprise gra- 
dually diminishes, and leaves the mind under the 
influence of an affection^ more proportionate to 
the real value of the object. 

Thus we may suppose the Passion of Anger, 
to consist of that disagreeable sensation, which 
a sense of injury will always occasion, quickened 
by surprise into an ungovernable emotion. The 
reluctance with which we part with any thing 
contributing to our benefit or enjoyment, will 
be quickened by surprise into the agonies of 
sorrozv ; which is also able to convert painful 
apprehensions into the excess of Fear. 

Nor does the acknowledged fact, that our 
passions are sometimes excited by deliberate 
contemplation, militate against the opinion. 

This can only take place in affairs of high 
importance ; and in such cases the more delibe- 
rate survey consists in examining, and reflecting 
upon every circumstance, relative to the nature 
of the exciting cause, which necessarily pro- 
duces a variety of new and unexpected combi- 
nations, each of which will be attended with a 



19« SURPRISE, &c. 

proportionate degree of surprise ; and although 
there may not he in any one circumstance, that 
quantum of Novelty which so powerfully strikes 
the mind, in cases that are sudden and totally 
unexpected, yet, the combined influence of the 
aggregate number of JNovelties, may finally pro- 
duce the most extravagant passions. Thus may 
the mind calculate the variety of benefits accru- 
ing from some prosperous event, until it be tran- 
pcrted xvith joy ; — enumerate the evils of priva- 
tion, until it becomes frantic xvith sorrow; — 
dwell upon the number and magnitude of pro- 
vocations which aggravate an injury, until re- 
sentment shall be converted into rage ;— and by 
ruminating upon the extent of danger, it maybe 
driven into despair. 

If this conjecture be admitted, it will give a 
beautiful simplicity to the theory of the Pas- 
sions. It shews that they may be decomposed 
into the simplest elements; while it indicates 
the manner, by which the combination of these 
elements may be productive of such an infinite 
variety, both in nature and strength. It shews 
that the different degrees of force in the quick- 
ening agent, or of its reiterated influence, are 
ulated to give various degrees of momentum 
to each particular affection. 



AFFECTIONS, &c. 193 



OBSERVATION II. 

Passions and Emotions are of a transitory na- 
ture ; the Affections alone are permanent. 

According to the distinctions which have 
been made between Passions, Emotions, and 
Affections, it clearly appears that the two for- 
mer are in their nature transient, and that the 
affections are capable of much longer duration. 
The passions have been represented as vivid 
sensations, passively or involuntarily, produced 
by some strong idea excited in the mind-; and 
emotions as the external marks of these. But 
as this passive state of mind is transitory, so 
are its external marks; and as both gradually 
subside, they give place to some correspondent 
affection, which remains as long as our opinion, 
and the interest we take in the object, shall 
continue. It necessarily follows from these 
facts, that we are not to look to the passions 
and emotions either for permanent well-being, 
or for permanent wretchedness. They must 
cither die away and leave no impression, as in 

o 



194 AFFECTIONS ALONE 

cases where the imagination was deceived, re- 
specting the value or importance of the exciting 
cause, or they are the harbingers of some more 
durable affections ; and it is the influence of 
these affections which has the permanent effect 
upon our well-being. Thus, when we give 
ourselves over to the delectable tumults of Joy, 
the joy is incidental. It is hastily introduced 
by the sudden perception or impressive sense of 
some acquisition, which we deem important to 
present or future welfare ; of a something, which 
we expect to be more or less durable in its na- 
ture, or to diffuse its beneficent influence to a 
considerable extent. These advantages are con- 
centrated, as it were, in the imagination, at the 
instant of joy. They operate upon the mind as 
the solar rays collected in a focus dart upon the 
surface of a body; and though the pleasures of 
joy are often greater than those derived from its 
causes, yet we naturally expect much more than 
the momentary well-being introduced by the 
♦motion itself. 

In the first impulse of Sorrow, the magnitude 
of the loss is the most impressive idea. As the 
mind becomes more intimately acquainted with 
the nature and extent of the privation, tbe 
agonies of sorrow will either subside into indif- 
ference, from the perception that the loss wns 



PERMANENT. 195 

not of that importance as had been imagined, 
and that it has been amply supplied by some 
valuable and unexpected blessing; or the vivid 
impression will be effaced by time, which al- 
ways places before us a variety of objects new 
and interesting ; or finally, the transports of 
sorrow will gradually give way to habitual grief 
and melancholy. 

Thus Fear is inspired, and becomes agonizing, 
from the apprehension of some species of cala- 
mity ; and the influential idea at the instant, is, 
that by the expected calamity we shall be last- 
ingly deprived of some Good we wish to retain, 
or that it will be introductory to some durable 
Evil; though the fear itself may be mdch more 
painful than the evil we dread. Anger is roused 
by an immediate sense of injury committed or 
threatened; that is, by the apprehension of 
some robbery of the good to which we have a 
claim. Here again the mind, comparing the 
present with the past, or looking forwards to 
the future, perceives or apprehends a disagree- 
able change of circumstances or of state; and 
is incensed against the offending cause. When 
the first impulse subsides, it is succeeded by the 
affections of grief, resentment, indignation, fyc. 
according to the nature of the insult suffered, 
or the aggravations of the offence; and these 

o 2 



196 AFFECTIONS ALONE 

become durable as the idea or perception of the 
injury received. 

Nor does the transition which is sometimes 
made from affection to passion invalidate these 
remarks. It has been observed, that when the 
object possesses many complicated and interest- 
ing circumstances, these, by being placed before 
the memory, and distinctly examined, may gra- 
dually warm the imagination, and increase the 
strength of the affection, until the party be 
worked up into violent emotions. But when 
the passions are excited in this manner, they 
are also of short duration. The preternatural 
state of mind demands too great an expenditure 
of animal spirits, to render the passion lasting ; 
and it soon relapses into the kindred affection. 
In cases deemed peculiarly interesting, and in 
persons of quick and lively feelings, gushes and 
fits of passion may be frequently excited by the 
same cause, and the mind may be placed alter- 
nately under the influence of the passion and af- 
fection ; but wherever passions and emotions are 
permanently vehement, it becomes an indication 
of insanity. It is a morbid irritation, over which 
reason has totally lost its controuling power. 

The permanent Affections are therefore to 
be considered as constituting that habitual state 
of mind, into which the primary passion im* 



PERMANENT. 197 

pelled it. Our ideas, and with them our affec- 
tions, concerning the object, are now changed. 
Instead of our former indifference, we contem- 
plate it with some degree of pleasure or pain, 
become habitually attached to it, or indulge an 
habitual aversion respecting it. 

Thus it is obvious that none of the leading 
passions and emotions constitute our permanent 
Welfare, or the contrary. They simply mani- 
fest the first impression which the sudden change 
of our state has made upon us. The lasting 
effects, in consequence of this change, are to 
be learned from the Affections. If the Good 
introduced by Joy prove itself to be a lasting 
good, though it may be partial and incom- 
plete, it may inspire Contentment. If it 
be the completion of an ardent desire, it 
communicates Satisfaction. If it meet with 
approbation, and be reflected upon as the result 
of a plan well-intended, wisely formed, and 
successfully executed, it becomes the source 
of Complacency. Fear sinks into permanent 
Dread, or unmixed with any particle of hope, 
into lasting Despair; Sorrow into confirmed 
Melancholy ; and Anger into Resentment and 
Displacency. \ 



198 RELATION OF 



OBSERVATION III. 

Relation of the Passions and Affections to each 
other. 

It has frequently been remarked, that the in- 
fluence of any particular passion or emotion, 
disposes the mind to be subjected t ■■ some other, 
that is of a similar nature and tendency; while 
it places the disposition at a remote distance 
from the affections of a contrary complexion. 
Dr. Hartley has observed, correspondent to 
the grand division of the passions which he 
had adopted, that " the five grateful passions, 
" Love, Desire, Hope, Joy, and pleasing Re- 
" collection enhance each other ; as do the 
" five ungrateful ones, Hatred, Aversion, Fear, 
" Grief, and Displeasure." Addison, Hume, 
Lord Kaims, have made similar remarks, and have 
adduced the association of ideas as the cause. 
But as the temper of mind produced by one 
affection, predisposes to the affection which is 
most analogous, though it may not be immedi- 
ately dependent upon it, may we not infer that 
the as ociation of ti e Affections will be prior to, 
and introduce that of Ideas? 

Thus, according to the division whi h has 
been adopted in this Treatise, not only are 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 199 

gladness, cheerfulness, mirth, contentment, 
satisfaction, complacency, &c. the offsprings 
of Joy, but while the mind is under their 
pleasing -influence, it is disposed to every affec- 
tion of the pleasing kind, which may be in- 
spired by very different causes, or by circum- 
stances too trivial to excite either of these emo- 
tions or affections, in its calm and influenced 
state of mind. Let us suppose, for example, 
the exciting cause to consist in something 
merely personal ; yet the pleasing sensation 
produced, inclines at the moment, to the affec- 
tions of generosity, charity, sympathy, com- 
passion, and mercy : nay, at such seasons it 
is disposed to expand, that it may embrace all 
mankind; and the humbler acts of virtue, 
with which we might have been contented, at 
another period, will now appear contracted and 
unsatisfactory. 

Upon this principle is the custom manifestly 
founded, of making valuable presents to the 
messengers of welcome tidings, or rewarding 
them with some peculiar marks of complacency : 
a custom which has been practised in every 
age and nation. The overflowings of joy in- 
spire a generosity of temper, which absolutely 
requires an object ; and none can immediately 
appear more meritorious, than the person who 



200 RELATION OF 

has been the instrument, as it were, or the in^ 
strumental cause of Joy. The delectable sen- 
sation communicated to the mind of the prin- 
cipal participant, immediately excites in his 
breast a grateful affection for the person, whose 
communications have been the cause of it.; 
though he may have merely acted in an official 
capacity ; and possibly, contrary to his secret 
inclinations. The liberation of captives, and 
prisoners of various descriptions, upon acces- 
sion to the throne ; — the institution of sports and 
pastimes, that joy may be diffused among the 
multitude, upon events apparently replete with 
much future happiness, as on births, marriages, 
and on the arrival of a young heir to the pos- 
session of an ample fortune; — the pleasing in- 
citements of illuminations, fire-works, distri- 
buting good cheer to the populace, are univer- 
sally felt as harmonizing with the exhilarated 
state of mind, which welcome tidings, of a 
private or public nature, are calculated to excite. 
In like manner does the lustre of great actions, 
inspire us with a certain respect for those most 
intimately connected with the Agent, whom 
we consider as the parent stock, productive 
of merit in every ramification ; or as able to 
shed desert over every connection. Under the 
influence of these grateful and liberal principles, 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 201 

we are induced to imagine that children are 
entitled to share the rewards due to their pa- 
rents. Hence those hereditary honours which 
too frequently irradiate the Unworthy, and 
demonstrate that the generous inference is not 
always conclusive. 

From these associating affections it proceeds, 
that the perception of good qualities centered 
in the Mind of any one, disposes to an attach- 
ment to his Person. Favourable impressions 
inspire an inclination to cultivate friendship ; 
and friendship between the sexes has a powerful 
tendency to inspire love. That love, which, in 
delicate minds, appears to be at the remotest dis- 
tance from every thing sensual, will finally ex- 
cite the stronger and, warmer passions. Nor are 
we without many instances of these becoming 
most impetuous, from their being founded upon 
sentimental refinements. 

As the passion of Sorrow proceeds from the 
loss of what we have loved, it may impercep- 
tibly dispose, — in persons whose passions are 
strong but very transient,— to the affection of 
Love towards the object commiserating our 
loss. No one can appear so worthy of the trans- 
fer, as the friend who sympathizes deeply with 
the affliction. The Poet has justly observed 
that " Pity is akin to love" In these moments, 



202 RELATION OF 

the commiserator forgets every fault, even where 
he knows that fault exists. He brings forward 
every good quality, which in his opinion, rei> 
ders the Afflicted less deserving of their suffer- 
ings. We may also add that the gratitude 
which this pity inspires, is accompanied with 
the most favourable sentiments of the humane 
disposition, and has a tendency to produce a pre- 
dilection for the person of the sympathizer. In 
short, whatever gives birth to any of the kindly 
affections, may be productive of personal predi- 
lections, and terminate in love, both as an affec- 
tion and a passion. Othello says of Desde- 
mona, 

" She lov'd me for the dangers I had pass'd, 
And I lov'd her that she did pity them." 

Nor can the dramatic Writer be accused of 
exaggeration, who represents the beautiful and 
accomplished Zemira, as passionately fond of the 
generous monster Azore, whom she at first 
viewed with horror and detestation. 

To this pleasing association is it also to be 
ascribed, that we arc so prone to be blind to 
the faults of those we love. We are eager to 
represent to ourselves those persons who have 
taken possession of our esteem, as being en- 
tirely worthy of it. We dwell upon every good 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 203 

quality ; we forget, or discover excuses for 
every defect. 

It has been remarked, more than once, that 
whenever an amorous temper has taken a reli- 
gious turn, it excels in the warmth and fervour 
of its devotion. We might urge as an apology, 
that what appears excellent can alone be the 
object of love; and where the mind is pecu- 
liarly susceptible of excellence, it will evince the 
warmth and strength of its affection, whether 
it be placed on our own species, or on beings of 
a superior order. 

These two causes united may serve to explain 
a fact, which has been noted by Rousseau and 
many others, that the language of religion and 
of love is so very similar. The Lover also has 
his idol ; adoresher perfections, calls her angelic ; 
talks of altars, prostrations, vows, sacrifices, 8$c. 
That is, what is human, in the warmth of his 
affection, he contemplates as divine ; and the 
person who has some striking accomplishments, 
he pronounces to be perfection itself. 

The connection between the disagreeable pas- 
sions and affections is not less obvious. The 
various affections originating from the idea of 
Evil, whether it be past, present, or appre- 
hended, are so closely united, that they can 



204 RELATION OF 

scarcely be considered as illustrations of the 
subject. We are, for example, disposed to be 
angry at whatever occasions sorrow, and there 
is a vindictiveness in fear, which may render it 
dangerous to its most innocent cause. But pre- 
dispositions to the indulgence of unpleasant 
affections, are generated in cases where the con- 
nection is not so immediate. Disagreeable feel- 
ings, induced by their proper object, are produc- 
tive of other disagreeable affections, where, 
strictly speaking, there is no proper object. 
Whatever irritates, renders the mind impatient, 
peevish, quarrelsome; disposes it to magnify 
trifles into real grievances, and to imagine a just 
cause of offence, where, perhaps, approbation has 
been merited. It engenders suspicions and 
jealousies, and disposes to envy the peace, tran- 
quillity, or good fortune of another. In this 
state of mind, a transition is also made from 
things to persons, and some degree of guilt is 
imputed to the latter, in consequence of the evil 
passions stirred up by the former. It is upon 
this principle that Tyrants have been known to 
sacrifice, in the impetuosity of their vexation 
and rage, the innocent messengers of evil tidings. 
Thus has Homer, that faithful historian of 
nature, represented Agamemnon, as pouring out 
a torrent of invectives against the harmless and 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 205 

venerable priest, who was compelled, by virtue 
of his office, to utter unwelcome truths. 

<f The Prophet spoke : when with a gloomy frown 
The monarch started from his shining throne $ 
Black choler fill'd his breast, that boil'd with ire, 
And from his eye-balls flash'd the living fire. 
Augur accurst ! denouncing mischief still, 
Prophet of plagues, for ever boding ill ! 
Still must that tongue some wounding message bring, ; 
And still thy priestly pride provoke thy King V 

pope's homer, il. 1. l. 127. 

It is thus that not only the " Genus Irritabile 
" Vatum" but controversial authors of all descrip- 
tions, have been so prone, in defence of their 
particular sentiments against their opponents, 
to decend to personalities. Theologians in par- 
ticular have been accustomed to evince their 
zeal for sacred truths, by the most unchristian, 
hatred against the imagined supporters of error; 
and they have not failed to ascribe unworthy 
motives, or depravity of heart, to those who 
remain unconvinced bv the force of their arsis- 
ments. This is the latent cause of all those reli- 
gious persecutions, which have deluged the 
world with blood, and disgraced humanity. 

As, in the transports of Gratitude, we are 
disposed to imagine virtues, where they do 
not exist, thus. in the transports of resentment, 



206 RELATION OF 

we are prone to the contrary extreme. A sin- 
gle cause of enmity, blackens the whole charac- 
ter of our antagonist ; and the man who has 
been guilty of one fault, that touches us to the 
quick, becomes, to an heated imagination, the 
vilest of miscreants. The friends and connec- 
tions of the Aggressor, are also considered as 
participants in his crimes : nay, the adherents 
and dependants upon the grand offender, are 
contaminated by his guilt. Thus have towns 
and countries been laid waste without remorse; 
murder and rapine have been deemed laudable; 
and the sacrifice of thousands, in resentment 
of the vices and disorders of a few, has been 
frequently celebrated, as an heroic display 
of vindictive justice! Hence it is that disgrace 
of character is unjustly spread over a whole 
family, on account of the ill conduct or igno- 
minous punishment, of one of its members. 
Even the unconscious instruments of mischief, 
according to this propensity^ of our nature, 
are frequently treated as guilty, or as partici- 
pants in the crime. Imprudent parents have 
thus nourished a spirit of revenge in their chil- 
dren, by encouraging them to beat the play- 
things which have accidentally given them pain, 
or the ground against which they have fallen. 
It iai recorded of the celebrated Cranmei\ 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 20f 

who flourished in the reign of Queen Mary, 
that having repented of his impiety, in yield- 
ing to the solicitations of the priesthood, and 
seductive promises of the court, and signed 
an acknowledgment of the Pope's supre- 
macy, when he was brought to the infernal 
stake, he resolutely held the offending hand 
in the flames, till it was consumed ; from a 
spirit of resentment at its having been the in- 
strument of his apostasy. In this singular 
instance of imputed guilt, our sympathy with 
the sufferings of the unfortunate man, our 
admiration of his magnanimity, and our sur- 
prise at the strange manner in which he indi- 
cated a pious indignation at his former conduct, 
furnishes an apology for an act, which, under other 
circumstances, must have been contemplated 
as the excess of childish cruelty. (See Hume's 
History of England, Vol. iv. p. 431.) — For 
the same reason we admire the undaunted cou- 
rage of Mucius Ssevola, who, as we are in- 
formed by Florus, thrust his hand into the fire, 
because it had not succeeded in its attempt 
to strike the King of Etrurla. But had he 
caused a Dependant to be punished in this 
manner, for a similar failure, he would have 
been held forth to execration. 

It is upon the same principles that the strong 



208 RELATION OF 

impressions of Fear or of Sorrow, change the 
appearance of every thing around us. Every 
trifle becomes the cause of terror; and every 
object loses its power to charm, unless it should 
administer to our melancholy. Sorrow natu- 
rally disposes to impatience, discontent, and 
fearful apprehension, in cases which have no 
connection with the primitive cause. Heavy 
disappointment, where expectation was ill- 
founded, forbids us to indulge hope where the 
encouragement is the greatest. Fear and dread 
dispose to cruelty, to treachery, and sometimes 
to acts of desperation which resemble courage.. 
As the passions and affections which are most 
analogous to each other, so readily blend to- 
gether, or succeed in an easy currency, it is 
natural to suppose that those which are of 
an opposite nature and tendency must be re- 
pulsive; as joy and sorrow, hope and fear, 
love and hatred. For although complicated 
circumstances may place the mind under their 
influence, at the same period, yet the one is 
calculated to oppose and check the other ; 
each exerting it characteristic influence. Thus 
when the success of any desired event is partial, 
sorrow may accompany joy. The effects of 
glad tidings are rendered incomplete, by the 
addition of some mournful catastrophe. When 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 209 

victory, for example, is purchased by the death 
of a friend, or of a favourite general. In 
such chequered incidents, the mind passes over 
from one event to the other, and feels the in- 
fluence of each, separately and alternately. 
In cases of a dubious nature, the mind is some- 
times stagnated, or suspended between hope 
and fear; and sometimes agitated by each pas- 
sion by turns. In this manner may love have 
some intercourse with anger; as in parents, 
whose resentment, at the improper conduct 
of their children, may even be inspired by 
the warmest affection ; and the lover may be 
tormented by the caprices of his mistress, whom 
he cannot resolve to hate. The opposite pas- 
sions and affections are, in instances of the 
like nature, excited by different and opposite 
circumstances, residing in the same exciting 
cause ; each producing its own characteristic 
effect. 

Fearful, anxiety, and joy in the. extreme, are 
so diametrically opposite, and their pathological 
effects upon the system so contrary, that an 
immediate transition from the one to the other 
is extremely difficult, if not impossible; and by 
the violence committed upon the animal system, 
it might be productive of fatal consequences; 
It is observable that in such cases, the salutary 

p 



210 RELATION OF 

transition is made through the medium of the 
pathological effects, which are the usual indi- 
cations of Sorrow. Tears and joyful lamen- 
tations are the first tokens of the removal of ex- 
cessive fear. A sudden relaxation, as it were, 
succeeds to the agonizing constriction which 
accompanies that passion, and this prepares the 
mind for the pleasing vivacity which is the na- 
tural character of joy. Every medical practi- 
tioner, as often as he has assisted at any painful 
and dangerous operation, which has proved suc- 
cesful, must have observed these effects produced 
upon the sympathizing attendants; and every 
affectionate Female will recollect these singular 
emotions, upon the happy delivery of her friend, 
whom she has supposed to be in imminent danger. 
The singularity may perhaps be explained in 
the following manner. Previous to the fortu- 
nate issue, Sorrow for the sufferings of the dis- 
tressed object, and anxious Fears respecting the 
event, were intimately blended together; while 
the pathological tokens of the latter, suppressed 
those of the former. Upon the sudden removal 
of Fear, its characteristic restrictions are re- 
moved, the residue of Sorrow becomes perma- 
nent, and the agitated spirits are tranquillized 
by the effusion of tears. 



PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS. 211 

A Melancholy state of mind is most soothed, 
at the commencement, by what seems to feed 
its melancholy. The excess of grief will listen 
to nothing which is not somewhat in unison with 
it. It may afterwards be alleviated by a degree 
of cheerfulness, in a friend who has wept for 
the distress, and whose sympathy has thus in- 
spired a confidence. But no greater violence 
can be committed upon persons in the anguish 
cff sorrow, than an attempt at gaiety, or the 
proposition of frivolous amusements. 

Nothing so effectually subdues the violence 
of Anger, as the fortunate suggestion of ludi- 
crous ideas. Whatever excites a smile or a 
laugh, excites a sensation totally incompatible 
with rage, or with deep resentment. It has 
often happened that a something ridiculous, in 
the ideas or conduct of the offender, has averted 
the punishment due to his carelessness and in- 
advertency; or that some gay and cheerful 
thought, has at once obliterated resentment, 
against a conduct not entirely trivial. We are 
told by ancient fabulists, that when Apollo was 
about to shoot Mercury, who was disguised as 
a herdsman, being incensed at this thievish deity, 
for having stolen some cattle which Apollo was 
destined to watch, he applied to his quiver for 

i> <2 



212 SEAT OF THE 

an arrow, in order to revenge the offence; but 
discovering that the arch thief had prevented 
the effects of his anger, by previously stealing 
all the arrows, he was so diverted at the jest that 
his anger immediately subsided. Iracundiam 
voluptate superante. 

In the quarrel between Jupiter and Juno, Ho- 
mer represents ^the Queen of Heaven as terrified 
into silence, and merely attempting to suppress 
the signs of a resentment, which she could not 
subdue/ But he informs us, that it was the jest 
of Vulcan, in taking upon him an office, for 
which he was so ill qualified, and becoming cup- 
bearer, which effectually restored mirth and 
good-humour among the Celestials. 

Vulcan with awkward grace his office plies $ 
And unextinguished laughter shakes the skies. 

Popi. 



OBSERVATION IV. 

Oh the Seal tf the Passions. 

It is usual for Writers on the Passions to 
speculate concerning their Seat, whether it be in 



PASSIONS. 213 

the spiritual, or in the animated material part of 
Man. Some philosophers place the passions solely 
in the corporeal system. Among these was the 
celebrated Des Cartes. Mr. Grove, on the 
contrary, defines the passions to be " the affec- 
" tions attended with peculiar and extraordinary 
" motions of the animal spirits;" and in opposi- 
tion to the sentiments of Des Cartes, he says, "I 
" am inclined to think that a sensation of the 
" soul generally precedes a change in the spirits; 
" external objects not being able to raise a fer- 
" ment in the spirits, till they have first struck 
" the mind with an idea of something noble, 
" frightful, amiable, &c." 

Others again, ascribe some of the affections 
to the animal principle, and some to the rational. 
Dr. Reid is in doubt whether " the principle of 
" esteem, as well as gratitude, ought to be 
" reckoned in the order of animal principles, or 
" if they ought not rather to be placed in a 
" higher order." He has finally, however, 
placed the esteem of the Wise and Good in the 
order of animal principles ; not from any per- 
suasion that it is to be found in brute animals, 
but because it appears in the most unimproved, 
and the most degenerate part of our species, even 
in those in whom we hardly perceive any exer- 
tion either of reason or of virtue. 



2U SEAT OF THE 

But, what is still more singular, tlie same af- 
fection is sometimes placed, by this philosopher, 
under the animal, and sometimes under the 
rational principle. Speaking of resentment he 
observes, " that sudden or instinctive resentment 
" is an animal principle, common to us with 
li brute animals; but that resentment, which 
u some authors call deliberate, must fall under 
" the class of rational principles." He also ex- 
cludes " the parental affection from the rational 
" principle, because it is not grounded on an 
" opinion of merit in the object." ( See Reid's 
Essays on the active powers of Man. Es. in. 
Ch. 4.) 

This contrariety of opinions among philoso- 
phers themselves, the vague conjectures and ar- 
bitrary positions they have advanced, too plain- 
ly evince that we are not prepared for disqui- 
sitions of this kind. They prove that it will be 
impossible to arrange the passions and affections, 
with any precision, under these two heads, un- 
til we shall have obtained more accurate ideas 
of the nature of the rational and spiritual part 
of man, on the one hand, and of the vivified 
matter which is supposed to constitute his ani- 
mal nature on the other. 

Those who place the passions, or any of the 
affections, in the Body, confess that it must be 



PASSIONS. 215 

an animated Body- But they do not explain 
to us the cause of this animation ; or what is 
that vivifying principle, which so wonderfully 
changes the properties of the dead, insensible, 
inactive matter. When we shali know the 
Cause of sensation or of perception, in it slowest 
stage ; and when we shall have discovered what 
that is which thinks, reasons, and wills, we 
may be better qualified to decide concerning 
the seat of the passions and emotions. 

The reason which induced Des Cartes and 
others, to make all the affections sensual, is ob- 
vious. It is easy to perceive that we cannot 
ascribe affections to the spiritual part of man, 
without admitting the passions also ; nor these 
without being perplexed with the appetites; 
which, although confessedly sensual, frequently 
excite those emotions and passions, which must 
be ascribed to the Spirit, if it be susceptible of 
emotions. But this combination, or reciprocal 
influence, they deem to be totally inconsistent 
with those intellectual honours which they are 
solicitous of ascribing, exclusively, to our spi- 
ritual natures. 

Dr. Reid's embarrassment seems to arise from 
the expection that the rational principle must 
always act rationally ; which leads him to infer 
that whenever the passions and affections do not 
receive the sanction of reason, they are to be 



216 SEAT OF THE 

assigned over to the animal principle. But this 
hypothesis will tempt us to doubt of the very 
existence of the rational principle, in numbers of 
our species. It leads us to conclude that the two 
natures, deemed so diametrically opposite to 
each other, possess powers so perfectly similar, 
that it is difficult for the keenest discernment to 
distinguish between their operations ; and it 
compels us to infer, that whenever some of our 
affections become conformable to reason, they 
have changed their seat from the animal to the 
rational principle. 

Philosophers and Divines, who distinguish 
Man into the three several parts of Body, Soul, 
and Spirit, which, notwithstanding the intimacy 
of their union, they suppose to be different in 
their natures; ascribe the appetites to the Body, 
the passions and affections to the Soul, and to 
the Spirit, those intellectual powers which seem 
remote from passions or emotions of any kind. 
By such an arrangement they mean to compli- 
ment the Spirit with the most exalted station; 
but the honour, like many other projects of am- 
bition, is entirely at the expence of its happiness* 
If the affections pertain to the Soul exclusively, 
that alone is capable of enjoying. The Spirit is 
deprived of every motive for speculation ; and 
since it sometimes happens that speculations of 



PASSIONS. 21? 

the most ohtruse kind, excite pleasing sensations, 
the Spirit must certainly perceive, though it has 
no faculties to lament its hard lot, as often as it is 
conscious that these delightful sensations, which 
are its own work, are transferred to the Soul. 

Without entering therefore into enquiries of 
this nature, which for want of data must be con- 
jectural and unsatisfactory, it will be more cor- 
respondent with my plan, simply to state inter- 
esting facts, and leave it to the Metaphysician 
to draw such consequences as he may deem 
most legitimate. 

It must be admitted that every passion, emo- 
tion, and affection, proceeds from certain impres- 
sions or ideas excited, concerning the nature, or 
state, or quality, or agency of the exciting cause. 
These Ideas have undoubtedly their seat in that 
part of man we distinguish by the appellation 
of mind. The exciting cause therefore changes 
the state of the Mind, respecting the parti- 
cular object. From total indifference it be- 
comes some way or other interested. This new 
impression, if it possess a certain degree of 
strength, produces a correspondent change 
upon the body. Universal observation and 
universal phraseology, which is doubtless found- 
ed upon this observation, unite to evince 
that a very perceptible influence of every strong 



21 S SEAT OF THE 

emotion is directed towards the heart* The 
Heart experiences various kinds of sensation, 
pleasant or unpleasant, over which it has no con- 
troul ; and from thence the influence of agi- 
tated spirits seems to be diffused over the body. 
Their more gentle effects are not visible to the 
spectator ; nay, the subject himself is not con- 
scious perhaps of any thing more than, either 
a change of sentiment, or the perception of 
the stronger influence of a former sentiment, 
connected with something agreeable or dis- 
agreeable in this perception; a something which 
attache* more strongly to the object, or creates 
some degree of repugnance. This state of 
mind is styled an affection, and it appears to 
be totally mental ; but stronger influences pro- 
duce such changes, that the inward disposition 
becomes obvious to the spectators, through 
the medium of the corporeal frame. It is now 
called an emotion, and this may increase in 
strength until the whole system becomes agi- 
tated and convulsed. 

From this statement it appears incontestible, 
that the Affections and Passions have their ori- 
gin in the Mind, while Emotions are corporeal 
indications of what passes within; according 
to the conjecture expressed by Mr. Grove. 

It also proves, that to confine the affections 
to the Mind, and refer the passions to the ani- 



PASSIONS. 210 

mal principle, is to theorize in opposition to 
facts. For numerous instances have presented 
themselves, in the course of our Analysis, 
which indicate that the difference between 
the gentlest affection and the most turbulent 
passions, consists m degree, not in nature. What- 
ever produces silent satisfaction, in its mild- 
est influence, will produce the extravagance 
of joy in its strongest. Fearful apprehen- 
sion, in its excess, is terror; and displea- 
sure, in its most inordinate exertions, is rage. 
When the gentlest affections are rendered con- 
spicuous, their existence is known by some 
visible change produced in the countenance, 
through the medium of the nervous system ; 
while the most violent agitations of the mind, 
operating upon the same nervous system, pro- 
duce ungovernable transports. Hence it is 
rational to infer, that the finest affections, and 
the strongest passions, are equally sensitive, 
or equally spiritual in their natures. 

It is natural for those who favour the hypo- 
thesis, that man consists of " different natures 
marvellously mixt," to ascribe the appetites 
solely to the corporeal system, or to the animal 
nature of man, and to call them carnal, because 
the immediate objects of the appetites relate 
to the wants and gratifications of the body. 
But do they recollect that these appetites are 



220 SEAT OF THE 

frequently awakened by the attention paid by the 
Mind, to their particular objects, exciting Con- 
cupiscence, which is always attributed to the 
Mind? When the desires considered as carnal, 
are excited by a particular state of the body, 
that is by certain changes made in the corpo- 
real system, which generate particular wants, 
as in the sensations of hunger and thirst, the 
mental part of our nature is immediately con- 
scious of these uneasy sensations, wills to re- 
move them, and expects gratification in attend- 
ing to the demands of appetite. Thus the 
whole man becomes interested, without the 
possibility of placing a barrier, to arrest the 
operations of the mind, and render the appetite 
purely corporeal. 

When the power of immediate gratification 
is possessed, none of the accessary passions and 
emotions are called forth, and, in some cases, 
we are not conscious of mental exertions. 
But if the gratification cannot be immediate ; 
if it be uncertain ; if any formidable impedi- 
ments present themselves ; then the whole soul 
is powerfully aroused: hopes and fears are ex- 
cited concerning the event ; anger and jea- 
lousies arc indulged against rivals and causes 
of impediments ; sorrows and vexations are 
inspired by our disappointment. These betray 



PASSIONS. 221 

the interest which the Mind has taken in plea- 
sures which are termed sensual. Where the 
indulgence has been illicit, repentance also, 
and remorse confess that the Soul feels itself 
responsible for gratifications which are deemed 
merely carnal. 

On the other hand, the finer affections of 
Love,, such as the filial, the parental, the social ; 
and benevolence in its more tranquil exertions, 
being so much exalted above the appearance 
of every thing selfish, and having no immediate 
personal gratification for their object, are gene- 
rally attributed to the higher principle in our 
nature. But the love of beauty and of at- 
tractive qualifications between the sexes, be- 
coming sexual, may create desires denominated 
carnal ; and benevolence becoming sympathy 
and compassion with deep distress, produces 
the corporeal effects of agonizing grief or fear, 
and is virtually as sensual or carnal as any of 
the appetites ; though usage is offended at such 
an application of the terms. 

Thus it appears that the grand principles of 
love and hatred, desire and aversion, produce 
their effects upon the whole system, when they 
operate with a certain degree of force: though 
for the sake of discrimination we give different 
names to these effects ; and to manifest our 



222 SEAT OF THE 

sense of the superiority of one class of our 
desires and affections, when compared with 
another, we annex various degrees of respect- 
ability to those which are most remote from 
the gratification of corporeal wants. 

When the affections of love and desire are 
placed upon objects deemed the most sensual, 
they are called appetites ; and they are stigma- 
tized with the epithet of carnal appetites, be- 
cause they are merely corporeal in their object, 
and are peculiarly liable to the most shameful 
abuse. They begin and terminate in gratifica- 
tions which do not call forth one amiable qua- 
lity, or respectable exertion of the Mind. When 
indulged within the limits permitted, they are 
void of merit ; if illegitimate, or indulged to 
excess, they are accounted ignominious. In this 
lingular predicament are those gratifications, 
which have for their final cause, the support or 
production of life, exclusively placed. 

The finer species of corporeal enjoyments, 
reject the degrading epithets of sensual and car- 
nal, with disdain. No one is said to be carnally 
disposed, when his ears are gratified with the 
charms of music; when his eye surveys the 
beauties of nature. He is not charged with 
having an insatiable Appetite for paintings, or 
condemned for inordinate Concupiscence, though 



PASSIONS. 223 

he should expend his fortune in making pur- 
chases, or exhaust his health by incessant appli- 
cation to the art. For though his senses are 
equally gratified, as in the other instances, yet 
the enjoyment is furnished by objects which are 
more dignified in their nature, and have been the 
result of skill and ingenuity. It is here that 
merit commences, both in the power of enjoy- 
ment, and in the power of execution; and lan- 
guage distinguishes gratifications, from these 
sources, by the more elevated appellation of 
taste. This very term, by the way, is an indi- 
cation of the power of the object of our pursuit, 
to elevate our ideas, respecting the expressions 
employed. The word taste, although it is a 
metaphor borrowed from one of the carnal sen- 
sations, loses the grossness of its original mean- 
ing in the new mode of its application. It is 
ennobled by its object, till we forget that it is 
of a plebeian origin. 

The pleasure derived from agreeable odours 
being, as it were, the medium between the 
grosser appetites, and the pleasure inspired by 
harmonious sounds, or the objects of vision , 
neither exposed to the disgrace of the former, 
nor possessing the merit of the latter, has no 
epithet either of contempt or respectability. 

When Love and Desire are placed upon nobler 



224 SEAT OF THE 

objects than any of the preceding; such as 
knowledge, virtue, or any other mental qualifica- 
tion, the superior dignity of these pursuits, and 
their elevation above every thing deemed sensual, 
and above the gratification of a refined taste, 
confer a dignity upon the affections themselves, 
until they seem to be of an higher origin, and 
emulate every thing we can conceive of the 
most exalted Spirits. For we cannot entertain 
more elevated sentiments of immaterial created 
Intelligences, than that they possess an ardent 
love of knowledge, wisdom, and moral obliga- 
tion. 

Nor have we any reason to ascribe those 
powers of the mind, which by way of pre-emi- 
nence we denominate intellectual, to any other 
principle than that which is the source of the 
affections, and is interested in the cravings of 
the appetites. The state of mind, and its con- 
scious perceptions, must vary according to the 
kind of employment in which it is engaged. 
When its occupation is simply to investigate 
truths of any kind, to examine, deliberate, 
judge, and resolve, it is in a very different state, 
than when it is forcibly struck with the bene- 
jicial or pernicious nature and tendency of these 
truths, or of any influential quality with which 
it is become acquainted. It contemplates 



PASSIONS. 225 

abstract ideas, which may have a distant refe- 
rence to utility, in a mood very different from 
that which it experiences when very attractive, or 
very alarming properties present themselves to 
the imagination, whose influence upon our well- 
being seems to be direct and immediate. 

Yet in the calmer exercise of the mind, in its 
most abstruse speculations, there is a species of 
permanent pleasure of which it is conscious, and 
which is preferred, by the philosopher, to the 
strongest emotions, which are as transient as 
they are violent; until by some new and inte- 
resting discovery, he is surprised into joy, or 
intricacies occur which disturb and irritate. 
He then experiences, that passions and emotions 
will sometimes intrude themselves into the 
apartment, where the door seems to be most 
obstinately shut against them. Nor can his 
more tranquil pleasures be ascribed to any other 
cause than to a strong predilection for the study 
which most occupies his attention, to his love of 
knowledge, to the gratification of his curiosity, 
to the satisfaction derived from the enlargement 
of his ideas and improvement of his understand- 
ing, to his ardent desire of discovering some- 
thing which may extend his fame, or prove 
beneficial to humanity ; that is, to honourable, 
noble, and useful affections. 



226 SEAT OF THE 

The Reader will perceive that these remarks 
have not the most distant reference to the grand 
question, concerning the materiality or immate- 
riality of the Soul. They are simply opposed to 
those unfounded hypotheses, and vague conjec- 
tures, which, instead of explaining any one phe- 
nomenon, render our ideas more embarrassed. 
They indicate that we ought not to multiply 
principles, until we are qualified to assign to 
them their distinct offices, without encroach- 
ments or confusion. What can be more unsatis- 
factory than to suppose the existence of princi- 
ples, totally opposite in their natures, in order 
to explain the contrarieties observable in human 
character and conduct ; and yet to allow that, 
in some instances, the operations of these prin- 
ciples are so similar, that philosophers them- 
selves cannot ascertain the distinct province of 
each? Or what can be more superfluous than 
to imagine the existence of these distinct prin- 
ciples, merely to confer honour upon the one, 
and load the other with disgrace, when the 
nature of the object pursued, and the disposi- 
tions towards it, will solve every difficulty ; 
will indicate an exalted or a depraved state of 
the Mind, without suggesting a single doubt 
v ther the spiritual man ought, in any respect, 
to become responsible for the disgraceful pro- 



PASSIONS, 227 

pensities of the carnal man, with whom he is 
compelled to inhabit ? 

It has been alleged that, during the impetus 
of passion, the soul is in a state of much greater 
activity than at any other period. In most in- 
stances this is probably the case. Yet we should 
recollect that during the excitements of passion, 
the soul must necessarily manifest the greatest 
activity to the spectator, from its peculiar exer- 
tions upon the corporeal system. Whereas in 
the exercise of deep thought, the activity of the 
soul is concentrated within. Of consequence, 
when the mind is absorbed in profound medita- 
tion, instead of indicating more activity than 
usual, the external appearance will indicate less. 
Hence it is that deep thinkers are so frequently 
confounded, by those who are not deep thinkers, 
with the stupid. In such cases, the activity of 
the soul can only discover itself by the result 
of its labours; or by the injuries which intense 
application may have committed upon the con- 
stitution. Instances have existed in which 
mental occupation has produced an insensibility 
to every foreign impression. The subject has 
remained unmoved, in the midst of scenes cal- 
culated to excite the most horrid tumults of 
soul. When the Philosopher of Syracuse was 
so wrapped in contemplation, as to be insensible 

a 2 



226 CAUSES, &c. 

to all the horrors of a siege, his mind could 
not be less active than theirs who were the most 
agitated, by the scenes of complicated distress 
which surrounded them. 



CHAPTER II. 



Causes which create a Diversity in our Affections, 
enumerated. 

It may seem natural to expect that men, 
formed with similar, and often with equal 
powers of discriminating the nature of objects, 
■ — in whom the sensations of pleasure and pain, 
happiness or misery, are also similar, — and who 
are exposed to similar causes of excitement, 
should indicate a correspondent similarity in 
their affections, instead of such a diversity which 
is so conspicuous, not only in different persons, 
but frequently in the same person. It is well 
known that the predilections of individuals, for 
the supposed means of happiness, are extremely 
various; that one man wiH pursue with ardour, 
what another will contemplate with indifference, 



INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE. 229 

or with disapprobation and disgust. Nor is 
there any person who entertains, invariably, the 
same disposition towards the same object. At 
one instant, he will not only feel a much stronger 
affection for it than he did at the preceding, 
but he may to-day contemplate, with contempt 
and abhorrence, that which yesterday may have 
excited raptures. 

It is of considerable moment to trace the 
principal causes of these diversities, or point out 
some of the circumstances which have a very 
powerful influence over our minds. The num- 
ber and extent of these will permit little more 
than an enumeration. 



§ 1. The Influence of Experience. 

These diversities and changes may, in many 
cases, be ascribed to the difference observable 
between the suggestions of a lively imagination, 
and the more faithful reports of Experience. 
Our pre-conceptions are seldom accurate. If 
they be not entirely false, or totally opposite to 
the nature of the subject, they are almost sure to 
err on the sideof excess or of defect. Experience, 
in numberless instances, corrects such errors, and 



230 CAUSES, &c. 

teaches us to estimate the qualities of objects as 
they realty exist, and not according to a pre- 
judiced conception, or an heated imagination. 
This will of consequence teach us highly to 
prize many things, which we had before ne- 
glected or despised, and to dismiss, with indif- 
ference and contempt, many things on which a 
deluded imagination had placed our supreme 
happiness. Such changes will take place in 
every individual in his passage through life. 
Their nature, and the uses made of them, con- 
stitute the difference between the wise man and 
the fool. 

But there are many other causes which act 
more uniformly, upon whole classes and bodies 
of people, and give to each class a certain cast 
of character. Some of these are very similar 
in their effects ; others dissimilar, irregular, and 
capricious. 

Among those which are more uniform in their 
influence, may be placed the distinctions in 
character and dispositions observable in the 



§ 2. Difference of Sex. 

In most animals, of the inferior order, there is 
a manifest difference between the male and fe- 



DIFFERENCE OF SEX. 231 

male, both in external appearance and instinctive 
properties, the former being generally of a stron- 
ger make than the latter } and excepting at the 
moments when the powers of the female ar§ 
called forth to the protection of their young, 
more courageous in disposition. 

Similar laws manifestly prevail in the human 
species. The very form and constitution of 
the Man indicate that he his rendered capable of 
more robust employments ; and his stronger 
contextureis, generally speaking, connected with 
a disposition to greater exertions : whereas the 
superior delicacy of contexture which distin- 
guishes the Female, is mostly accompanied with 
a much greater delicacy of character. Her dis- 
positions to strong and vigorous exertions, 
either of body or of mind, are not so universal, 
and she generally places her affections upon 
objects and duties which are more confined and 
domesticated. 

Nor do the customs prevalent in savage, or 
less polished nations, invalidate the above re- 
marks. In those countries where bodily labour, 
or the fatigues of husbandry, are wholly con- 
signed to the females, while their husbands ap- 
pear indolent and inactive, this indolence 
is merely the repose enjoyed in the intervals of 
still greater exertions. War, or the chace, arc 



232 CAUSES, &c. 

exclusively their province, and when engaged 
in these, the men endure much greater fatigues 
and hardships than those allotted to their part- 
ners. 

It is readily acknowledged that these peculi- 
arities of make and of character, are not so 
uniform as to resist the influence of causes which 
have a tendency to counteract them. Singu- 
larity of temperament, the force of custom and 
education, particular situations in life, may 
place individuals of each sex, out of their proper 
sphere, and induce a peculiarity of individual 
character. But this change seldom meets 
with the approbation of either sex. An effemi- 
nate Man is despised, and a masculine Female 
has little power to charm. 

An essential difference is also observable in 
sexual predilections. The female prefers the 
strong, the bold and courageous, the spirited and 
enterprising. Her ideas of beauty and comeli- 
ness, are, instinctively, such as correspond the 
least with the delicacy of her own person. 
Men in general are most enamoured of those 
qualities and dispositions which indicate a con- 
trary character. They talk of the delicacy of 
form and amiable softness of the sex. They 
think that the milder virtues sit with peculiar 
grace upon the female ; such as gentleness, 



DIFFERENCE OF SEX, 233 

f 

patience, compassion, and tenderness. It is ex- 
pected that she should excel in piety, in faith, 
hope, and resignation. Men contemplate a fe- 
male atheist with more disgust and horror, than 
if she possessed the hardest features embossed 
with carbuncles. They excuse, and many are 
disposed tobe pleased with, such foibles as proceed 
from delicacy of frame, or greater sensibility of 
mind; while they express their disapprobation 
of a bold forward temper, though it should be 
accompanied with a great superiority of talents. 
Although moral obligation, as referring to 
the grand standard of virtuous conduct, may 
be the same; yet the rougher vices of oaths 
and intoxication are appropriated by men ; 
while the evasive ones of artifice, &c- are deemed 
less opprobrious in the female. 

It is maintained that men are most impetuous, 
but that females are most deeply affected with 
the tender passion : that if the man have not a 
speedy recourse to the pistol or the rope, he will 
probably survive the agonies of disappointment, 
under which the softer sex will gradually pine 
and die. These facts have induced a Trench 
author to remark, that women consider love as 
the serious business of life, and men render it 
subordinate to many others* It is however wviv 



234 CAUSES, &c. 

versally deemed to be the province of man, first 
to declare his passion ; and it is universally ex- 
pected that the female should receive the decla- 
ration with a modest coyness, and experience 
some degree of struggle with her delicacy, before 
she acknowledge the passion to be reciprocal. 
The female has, in general, a stronger affection 
for every thing she pursues than men, who arc 
more frequently impelled to act from necessity. 
She generally follows her inclination in the dis- 
charge of her social and domestic duties, as well 
as in the pursuits of pleasure, elegant accom- 
plishments, or of literature. Those who are of a 
scientific turn, compensate for any defect in ex- 
tent of erudition, or depth of investigation, 
with which they are sometimes charged, by 
brilliancy of language and beauty of sentiment, 
which so frequently pervade and embellish 
their writings. Females are supposed to be 
much fonder of ornaments than those of the 
other sex, who are not reputed fops; and it is 
said that they more deeply resent any neglect 
or slight of their persons. They are warmer 
in their friendships, and their strong attach- 
ments can scarcely be weakened by any thing 
but rivalships. If slighter incidents more easily 
discompose their tempers, this is abundantly 



DIFFERENCE OF SEX. 235 

recompenced by their superior patience under 
severer trials. In cases of extreme danger and 
difficulty, they have not only been equal to the 
support of their own spirits, but they have set 
an example of heroic courage to their despond- 
ing Lords. But it is also allowed, that when 
the female mind becomes thoroughly depraved, 
they greatly surpass the other sex in cruelty, 
revenge, and every enormity ; which is justly 
supposed to elucidate the common proverb, 
" Corruptio optimi, est pessimal 

In giving the above epitome, either of facts 
or opinions, the author has purposely avoided 
entering into the controversy relative to rights 
and powers, or to Equality or Superiority of 
capacities. He does not wish to draw a com- 
parison between the lustre of the respective 
virtues, or nicely to balance the respective 
vices of each sex. His concern is with dif- 
ferences alone. If these exist ; if characteristic 
differences, commencing with early child- 
hood, — when the little Miss delights in her doll, 
and arranges her domestic play- things, while 
her more hardy brother is driving a hoop or 
whipping a top, — run through every period of life, 
it is of no moment to the subject under conside- 
ration, whether they are to be ascribed to na- 
tural and physical, or to artificial or incidental 



236 CAUSES, &c. 

causes ; or which characteristics have a prepon- 
derancy of excellence. (See Note S.) 

This manifest diversity, and in some respects 
total contrariety in disposition and character, 
is necessarily connected with an equal diversity 
and contrariety of tastes and affections : for 
the former derive their origin from the latter; 
the character being itself both formed and 
indicated, by a series of predilections and aver- 
sions. If therefore each sex has its distin- 
guishing characteristics, if their tastes and 
inclinations be not precisely similar, sexual dif- 
ference must be productive of different ideas 
respecting the qualities of objects, and create 
the most opposite affections respecting them : 
so that objects and circumstances perfectly the 
same, shall to each sex appear in different points 
of view. That which makes little or no im- 
pression on the one, being calculated to produce 
strong emotions in the other; becoming the 
source of pleasure or displeasure, of enjoyment, 
or of infelicity. 

Another cause which operates in a similar 
manner is 



DIVERSITY OF TEMPERAMENT. 237 

<§ 3. Diversity of Temperament. 

Not to enter into the physiological charac- 
teristic of each temperament, concerning which 
physiologists themselves are not agreed, we 
shall only observe, what has never been dis- 
puted, that there is such a diversity in the 
original constitution of individuals of each sex, 
as may not only influence the mental powers, 
but also the affections of the mind ; such as 
may pre-dispose one person to be affected by 
scenes and circumstances, in a manner very 
different from another. 

Some are naturally more irritable in their 
tempers, others more placid : that is, one will 
perceive and feel causes of provocation in 
situations or conduct, which excite no emotions 
in the mind of another. Some are naturally 
of a melancholy cast, which spreading a gloom 
over every object, prevents them from observ- 
ing and enjoying those qualities which may 
excite cheerful ideas, and communicate pleasur- 
able sensations to another. This man is natu- 
rally sanguine in his disposition : he forms a 
thousand projects, and is full of hopes respect- 
ing each. He is highly delighted with such pros- 
pects as are invisible to others; and is charmed 
with ideal properties, which never entered into 



238 CAUSES, &c. 

the imagination of those who are not under the 
agreeable delusion. The disappointments to 
which such a temper is inevitably exposed, 
become plentiful sources of vexation, which 
the less sanguine fortunately escape. The timid 
on the contrary, ruminate over every possibility 
of evil. They dare not to indulge hope through 
fear of disappointment. They see and mag- 
nify pernicious tendencies, which were totally 
overlooked by persons of the contrary disposi- 
sition. Some are naturally indolent; and this 
indolence of temper prevents them from per- 
ceiving those qualities in objects, which arouse 
the attention of the more active ; and it induces 
them to give the preference to their beloved 
ease. Some are of a social cast ; and they dis- 
cover a thousand joys in societies, which appear 
indifferent or insipid to the lover of retirement. 
Thus is there a natural and habitual disposi- 
tion, to be differently affected by the same ob- 
jects ; to each of which the imagination gives 
a colouring, corresponding with the permanent 
and characteristic state of mind. 

Another cause invariably produces a change 
in our ideas and dispositions, towards particular 
objects, in a manner equally uniform and cha- 
racteristic ; and that is 



REGULAR PROGRESS, &c. 2S9 



§ 4. The Regular Progress of Human Nature, 
from Infancy to Advanced Age. 

The changes which take place in our affections 
and pursuits, from this cause, are incontestibly 
marked by the hand of Nature herself; and 
they maintain a degree of uniformity in every 
person, of every nation and age, whose longe- 
vity carries him through each period. 

The strong desires of the Infant are at first 
confined to its corporeal wants. No part of 
nature is known to him, excepting that which 
serves to satisfy the cravings of appetite, and 
-the nurse who administers it. During this 
state, agonies of grief and ecstacies of joy are 
instantaneously excited, and as instantaneously 
subside. In advancing Childhood, curiosity be- 
gins to awake, and increased attention is paid 
to every thing around us. Our pursuits, our 
pleasures, our pains, become daily more nume- 
rous and complicated. With growing powers, 
the love of action accompanies this inquisitive 
disposition. The healthy and vigorous, chiefly 
delight in those amusements which occupy the 
mind, increase corporeal strength and address, 
and imperceptibly enlarge the stock of ideas. 
At this period, varied affections, and a thousand 



240 CAUSES, &c. 

gushes of passion, engage and agitate the breast 
by turns. Hopes and fears, quarrels and recon- 
ciliations, eager pursuits and quick satiety, oc- 
cupy every hour. 

Upon advancing towards Manhood, new pas- 
sions and desires are implanted. Social connec- 
tions acquire strength and permanency. Sexual 
affections arise, and the multitudinous passions 
which surround them. Ambition is roused, and 
means are pursued productive of important 
ends. Interesting objects crowd upon the aN 
tention, increasing the ardour of the mind, and 
calling forth the most vigorous exertions. Gay 
and lively imagination gilds every scene with 
delight, and to enjoy seems to be the whole ob- 
ject of our existence. 

Parental affections, cares, solicitudes, hopes 
and disappointments, joys and griefs, of a more 
durable and serious nature, succeed to the 
thoughtlessness of younger years. The social 
affections, which seemed, at an early period, to 
be instinctive, ripen into a lasting and benevo- 
lent concern for the good of others. These 
manifest themselves, in some characters, by 
directing the attention to plans and projects of 
public utility ; while in others, inordinate self- 
love and insatiable ambition, become the first 
springs of action. 



REGULAR PROGRESS, &c. 241 

A placid state of mind and love of ease, na- 
turally form the habitual disposition of the aged. 
Their other affections mostly derive their com- 
plexion from the scenes of their preceding 
years. Repeated injuries, confidence abused, 
and various disappointments, united with their 
growing infirmities, are apt to inspire a peevish 
humour, and render suspicion and the excess of 
caution, the prevailing disposition. Long ha- 
bits of frugal industry, joined with repeated 
observations, or with personal experience, of 
the dependent and neglected state of the needy, 
will often create an inordinate love of wealth, 
which, a conviction that it cannot be long en- 
joyed, is not able to subdue. A desire of ease 
and tranquillity, which now constitute their 
principal enjoyment, is apt to render the Aged 
vexed and irritated at the smallest interruptions. 
Some aged persons, on the other hand, acquire 
a placid cheerfulness, by the recollection both 
of difficulties surmounted, and of arduous duties 
performed, which are never to recur. Conscious 
of having filled the various connections and re- 
lations of life, with propriety and usefulness, 
they have treasured up a fund of complacency 
and lively hope, to console the decline of life. 
Even the difficulties with which they struggled, 



R 



242 CAUSES, &c. 

and the dangers they have escaped, now become 
the sources of satisfaction. 

Thus lias every period of life its characteristic 
influence upon our ideas and our affections ; 
placing new objects before the mind, and repre- 
senting the former ones in very different shapes 
and colours, from those which first occupied the 
imagination. 

§ 5. National Customs. 

National customs, however widely they may 
differ from each other, have also a very power- 
ful and permanent hold on the affections. For 
these the inhabitants of every country imbibe a 
prepossession, from the earliest infancy. Early 
habits seem to be propagated with the species ; 
so intimately are they formed and moulded into 
the growing frame ! and these early propensities 
are every day strengthened and confirmed by 
universal example. Custom and habits recon- 
cile whole nations to climates the most un- 
friendly, and to occupations the most arduous 
and servile. 

What softer natures start at with affright, 
The hard inhabitant contends is right. 



NATIONAL CUSTOMS. 243 

The history of the manners and customs of 
different nations, fully demonstrates that they 
are divided into large masses of predilections 
and prejudices, strong attachments and strong 
aversions ! It evinces the feeble influence 
of the rational faculties, either in forming or 
correcting customs, the most beneficial, or the 
most pernicious. Nay, should experience itself 
begin to suggest better principles, to some 
superior and reflecting minds, ages may roll 
before any one will venture out of the common 
course, and attempt to reduce them to action ; and 
his best endeavours will probably be rewarded 
with ridicule and contempt. Though causes 
merely incidental may have conspired to intro- 
duce a peculiarity of manners, and to form 
national characters, yet being once formed, 
they become the sovereign rule of thought and 
action. They are diffused over the most ex- 
tensive communities; and unless freedom of 
intercourse be held with neighbouring na- 
tions, not an Individual can escape the impres- 
sion. Thus it is that the inhabitants of one 
district, contemplate those things as essential 
to well-being, which others hold in abhorrence ; — 
that one class of people reveres as incumbent 
duties, observances which others contemplate 
as the greatest absurdities ; — that some are in- 

R 2 



244 CAUSES, &c. 

vincible attachments to rites, which those who 
are not under the influence of the same pre- 
possessions, justly consider as a disgrace to . 
humanity. 

Whether custom should influence opinion, 
or opinion introduce custom, they both operate 
upon the affections, and generally manifest the 
plenitude of their power, by the number and 
magnitude of the absurdities they render fami- 
liar and acceptable to the mind. These have 
for successive generations established the em- 
pire of imaginary beings ; and the affections 
of reverence, love, and gratitude have been 
thrown away upon ideal objects ! These have 
sanctioned the most inveterate hatreds. They 
have consecrated immortalities, and dignified 
theft, prostitution, and murder ! They have 
rendered the austerities of Brachmen and Monks 
venerable to the multitude; have laden the 
Gento6 Female with insufferable disgrace, who 
refuses to expire in torments, from affection 
to her deceased husband ! These, in the most 
enlightened countries, enjoin it upon the Man 
of Honour to murder his best friend for a 
hasty expression, or some other indiscretion 
of a momentary transport ! Opinion has 
clothed a fi til mortal with Infallibility; has 
communicated that exclusive attribute of Deity 



NATIONAL CUSTOMS. 245 

to Councils and Synods, and bowed the neck 
of myriads to the empire of their decrees. 
It has elevated the Worthless into the character 
of saints, and those who have most deserved 
the divine indignation have been invoked as 
the most prevalent intercessors! It has repre- 
sented the Universal Parent as the tyrant '; 
instead of the benevolent friend of mankind ; 
and it has conducted to the torture those who 
presumed to think more worthily of him. 

But the diversities of opinions and manners, 
with their correspondent predilections and aver- 
sions, exceed enumeration. It is these diver- 
sities which furnish the amusement derived from 
the perusal of travels ; and as no two nations 
on the giobe correspond in every instance, the 
peculiarities of each, illustrate, in a striking 
manner, the truth of our observation. They 
indicate the inconceivable variety of sentiments 
and affections, which incidentally take place 
among beings of the same species, inhabitants 
of the same sublunary system, conversant with 
similar objects, and possessing similar powers 
of mind. 



246 CAUSES, &c. 



§ 6. The Force of Habit. 



Similar to the customs which pervade large 
bodies of men, is the force of habit over In- 
dividuals. The mind frequently acquires a 
strong and invincible attachment to whatever 
has been familiar to it, for any length of time. 
Habits primarily introduced by accident or 
by necessity, will inspire an affection for pecu- 
liarities, which have the reverse of intrinsic 
merit to recommend them. These become, as 
it were, assimilated to our natures. We con- 
template them as belonging to ourselves so in- 
timately, that we feel an irksome vacuity in 
their absence, and enjoy a great degree of 
satisfaction in their being re-placed ; merely 
because we have been habituated to them. 
How frequently does it happen that the most 
trifling circumstances, in early life, will decide 
the lot of our future years ; creating affections 
and aversions, which have the most lasting 
influence! To this cause we may frequently 
ascribe, a preference for one trade, pursuit, or 
profession, rather than for another. Thus we 
perceive that children sometimes make choice 



THE FORCE OF HABIT. 24? 

of the employments of their parents or their 
neighbours, because it had agreeably engaged 
the attention of their juvenile hours. They 
love to imitate and play the man, till an affec- 
tion is acquired for the occupation itself. This 
is generally the case where the occupation is 
of an active nature, and most adapted to the 
vivacity of youth. If, on the other hand, 
their minds are strongly impressed with the 
confinement, slavery, or any other disagreeable 
circumstance attending the employment, to 
which they are daily witnesses, they are inclined 
to the contrary extreme, contract an aversion, 
and give the preference to any other pursuit, 
the inconveniences of which are unknown to 
them. 

It is needless to enlarge farther upon these 
particulars; as every individual must be con- 
scious of their truth. There is no one who does 
not feel the power of habit, both as the source 
of pleasure and of displeasure. It is expe- 
perienced in every station and connexion in life. 
It is experienced in what we eat, or drink, 
in particular modes of dress, in our habitations 
and their furniture, and in our own character* 
istic peculiarities. 



248 CAUSES, &c. 



§ 7. Principle of Self -love. 

The influence of this principle has frequently 
shewn itself in the course of our Analysis. Its 
tendency to magnify the good or evil which re- 
lates to ourselves, is perpetually felt. But we 
shall now confine our attention to the effects of 
appropriation ; or the attachment generated, and 
the affections indulged, respecting every thing 
we call our oxen. 

Mr. Hume has collected together many strik- 
ing instances of the effect of this principle. (See 
Dissertation on the Passions.) He attributes it 
to pride; but then he defines pride to be a certain 
satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some ac- 
complishment or possession which we enjoy. With- 
out examining the propriety of this definition 
in this place, (See Note I.) the influence of Self, 
respecting appropriation, must be universally ad- 
mitted. " It is always," says he, " our know- 
" ledge, our sense, beauty, possessions, family, 
11 on which we value ourselves. — We found 
" vanity upon houses, gardens, equipage, and 
11 other external objects; as well as upon per- 
" sonal merit and accomplishments. — Men are 
11 vain of the beauty either of their country, or 



\ 



PRINCIPLE OF SELF-LOVE. 249 

* s their county, or even of their parish ; of the 
" happy temperature of the climate, in which 
" they are born ; of the fertility of their native 
" soil ; of the goodness of the wines, fruits, or 
f victuals produced by it; &c." " Every thing 
" belonging to a vain man, is the best that is 
*' any where to be found. His houses, equipage, 
" furniture, clothes, horses, hounds, excel all 
" others in his conceit, &c." 

These, and many other facts, which might be 
enumerated, indicate an innate propensity to 
value whatever we possess, merely from the in- 
cidental circumstance of its being our own. That 
this disposition frequently gives rise to the ex- 
cess of vanity, is not to be disputed : but the 
disposition itself is so important that it cannot 
be dispensed with. The strong attachment to 
whatever is our own, because it is our own, is 
one of the happiest propensities of human na- 
ture* It is the recom pence of all our desires, 
pursuits, and exertions. Without this principle, 
every object in life would appear uninteresting 
and insipid; and the majority of our habitual 
affections would be annihilated. It is this which 
forms that intimate and pleasing connection 
with every thing around us ; and enables trifles 
themselves greatly to administer to our comfort 
and satisfaction. 



250 CAUSES, &c. 

But the diversity which it creates in our indi- 
vidual affections is no less obvious. Every man 
has a distinct atmosphere of good. A circle 
which is his own. Every particle composing it, 
is viewed by another with eyes of indifference; 
but by himself with complacency and delight 



§ 8. The Influence of Education. 

By education is understood in this place, any 
attempt to enlarge the ideas and improve the 
mind by the acquisition of general knowledge, 
or proficiency in any particular branch. Educa- 
tion introduces to an intimate acquaintance 
with numberless objects, which are totally un- 
known to the ignorant; and every object pos- 
sesses some quality of a pleasant or unpleasant 
nature, proportionably multiplying or diversify- 
ing our agreeable or disagreeable sensations. 
With the Ignorant, objects are comparatively 
few. Scenes before them are of no great extent ; 
and even these are overlooked by the majority, 
whose years pass away in a kind of sensitive in- 
dolence, without their testifying the marks either 
of apathy or affection. 

Sometimes, however, a natural acuteness of 



INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION. 251 

understanding is observable among the most 
illiterate, accompanied with lively sensations 
and very strong affections ; and when they are 
once roused, by objects which appear interesting, 
their passions are most violent, What they 
hnoxv can alone appear important to them, and 
the very little they possess is their all. Their 
whole souls are concentrated in that which gives 
pleasure, and all the powers of body and mind 
are exerted to repel whatever gives pain. This 
will indicate the cause of that remarkable 
strength of passions and affections, both of the 
benevolent and malevolent kind, so observable 
in savage nations ; and the impetuosity of cha- 
racter so often manifested by the active and un- 
informed in every nation. 

The cultivated mind, by increasing its ac- 
quaintance with innumerable subjects, will in- 
evitably discover some pleasing quality in every 
object of its pursuit ; of consequence, both at- 
tention and affections are divided and subdivided 
into innumerable ramifications ; and thus, al- 
though enjoyment may upon the whole be aug- 
mented, by aggregate numbers, yet each indi- 
vidual quality possesses but a moderate share of 
influence. 

The Young and Inexperienced are generally 
affected by simple objects. The causes of their 



'JbJ 



CAUSES, &c. 



joy or anger, sorrow or fear, are seldom com- 
plex. When the powers of the mind become 
more enlarged, the affections are more diversi- 
fied and rendered more complicated ! Thus upon 
the perception of favours and obligations, the 
joy from good becomes united with gratitude to 
the author of that good ; with love, veneration, 
respect, for his character ; with admiration at the 
extent of the good, or at some peculiarity in 
the delicacy and liberality with which it was 
conferred. Experience introduces the passions 
of hope and fear, by teaching us the knowledge 
of Good worth possessing, on the one hand, 
and the accidents to which it is liable on the 
other. 

It is observable further, that the Young and 
Inexperienced, whose habits are not yet formed, 
and to whom every thing is new, are most apt 
to be influenced by the introductory emotions of 
surprise and wonder. Their inexperience renders 
things and events, which are familiar to others, 
new and strange to them. They are prone to be 
in ecstacies from acquisitions and advantages, 
comparatively trilling; and to be agitated by small 
or imaginary evils, because their imaginations 
have not been corrected by experience. But, if 
these passions from more simple causes, are fre- 
quently stronger in them than in others, it is 



INFLUENCE OF NOVELTY. 253 

equally true that their affections are less perma- 
nent. A rapid succession of novelties, and the 
immense variety which increased knowledge 
introduces, quickly efface the preceding impres- 
sion. 

But this subject is inexhaustible. A whole 
Encyclopedia could not do it justice. The infi- 
nite diversity of pursuits, which, in the present 
day, engage the attention of an awakened world, 
exceeds enumeration. Each pursuit is accompa- 
nied with its peculiar predilection, and presents 
an infinite variety of qualities to the inquisitive 
mind, which excite their correspondent emotions 
and affections. 

Other causes which influence our ideas of 
qualities have a very powerful, though very 
transient effect. They are merely the epheme- 
rons of the mind ; nor have they that imme- 
diate relation to the supposed merit or demerit 
of the object, which exerts its influence in all 
the preceding cases. These are the influence of 
Novelty and of Fashion. 

§ 9. Influence of Novelty. 

As by the power of habit we are reconciled to 
circumstances, and even enjoy complacency in 



254 CAUSES, &c. 

situations, merely because we are accustomed 
to them ; thus will the Novelty of an object 
frequently render it interesting for the moment, 
and give it a temporary pre-eminence to many 
things which we know to possess intrinsic merit. 
Novelty is in itself the most transient of all qua- 
lities^ it begins to decay from the first moment 
of its existence ; being solely adapted to that 
instinctive curiosity, which may be considered 
as an appetite for knowledge. Novel objects will, 
at first, excite a degree of wonder and admiration, 
from their being supposed to possess something 
strange, rare, or peculiar : but as these are rela- 
tive qualities alone, and as this relation refers 
solely to our ignorance and inexperience, their 
effects are evanescent; for when the subject is 
no longer novel to us, it does not seem any 
longer to possess them. When novelty is no 
more, we shall either reject them with indiffer- 
ence or displeasure, or they may continue to at- 
tract our attention, by our perception of other 
and more permanent qualities. 

The love of novelty may, in some minds, be 
considered as a disease ; as a false appetite which 
craves more than it can digest, and seeks a va- 
riety of viands, from whence it derives but very 
little nourishment. This passion, though it ren- 
ders us perpetually inquisitive, perpetually im- 
pels us to sec objects through a false medium. 



POWER OF FASHION. 255 

At first, they are rendered peculiarly attractive, 
through the adventitious colouring which the 
imagination has given them. They appear insi- 
pid when their novelty is gone, or become depre- 
ciated beyond their deserts, from the disappoint- 
ment of our expectations concerning them. 
Fondness for novelty, when carried to an excess, 
renders a person whimsical in his choice, and 
unsteady in his pursuits. Momentary pleasures 
terminate in satiety and disappointment ; which 
are insuperable impediments to that deliberate 
investigation and habitual experience, which 
alone can enable us to judge of the real nature 
and intrinsic qualities, of the objects around us. 
But no cause whatever is so whimsically ver- 
satile and tyrannical, in exciting attachments and 
aversions, as the 



§ 10. Power of Fashion. 

This power is an ideal influenza, spreading 
with the utmost rapidity, and infecting a whole 
community where it commenced ; sometimes 
extending to distant nations, and acquiring such 
strength, in its progress, that nothing can resist 
its force ! It does not possess the degree of 
merit attendant upon the excessive love of 



25G POWER OF FASHION. 

novelty, which always imagines the object to 
possess some degree of worth ; a circumstance 
this, by no means essential to the influence of 
fashion ; whose authority is, in general, derived 
from things known to be idle and insignificant. 
Fashion gives absolute sway to modes, forms, 
colours, &c. wantonly introduced by the whim 
of an Individual, with whom the majority have 
not the most distant connection, and concerning 
whom the}' are totally ignorant; unless cir- 
cumstances and situations of notoriety should 
render their characters either equivocal, or wu 
equivocal. It is capable of instantaneously 
altering our opinion of the nature and quali- 
ties of things, without demanding any painful 
exertions of the understanding, or requiring 
the slow process of investigation. With the 
quickness of a magic wand, it in a moment 
subverts all those ideas of beauty, elegance, and 
propriety, we had before cherished. It makes 
us reject, as odious, what we had lately contem- 
plated as most desirable; and raptures are in- 
spired by qualities, we had just considered as 
pernicious and deformed. Unwilling to re- 
nounce our title to rationality, unable to resist 
the power of fashion, we make every attempt 
to reconcile reason with absurdity. Thus, in num- 
berless instances, do we attempt to vindicate to 



POWER OF FASHION. 25? 

ourselves and to others, the novel affection. We 
are assiduous to find out some peculiar excel- 
lence or advantage, in whatever becomes the 
idol of the day; and to discover some insuffer- 
able defect in the divinity we have discarded. 
That which was once deemed grand and ma- 
jestic, in size or form, will now strike the eye as 
insupportably clumsy \ and the regularity we 
one admired, now renders an object stiff, precise, 
and formal. Colours, which were yesterday so 
delicately elegant, will appear to-day faint, faded, 
and lifeless \ and those which were lately much 
too strong and glaring for our weak optics, be- 
come in an instant bright, glowing and majes- 
tic. Fashion will render that particular garb 
which we once thought so warm and comfort- 
able, hot and insupportable as the sultry dog- 
days; and it makes the slightest covering, 
contrary to its pristine nature, remarkably plea- 
sant in the depth of winter. The flowing hair, 
or adjusted ringlets, shall at one period be con- 
sidered as becoming and elegant; at another, 
be rejected as an insufferable mark of effemi- 
nacy, and reprobated as demanding a culpable 
waste of our most precious time ; while their 
close amputation is deemed both manly and 
commodious. Fashion has power to influence 
our ideas of graceful proportions ; it elongates 

s 



258 CAUSES, &c. 

or contracts the form of the leg in one sex, 
and of the waist in the other. It directs de- 
cency to excite a blush, at being detected with- 
out any other head-dress than that ordained by 
nature; and it is also able to suppress the blush 
of female delicacy, at exposures which scarcely 
leave any room for the exercise of the most 
licentious imagination. 

Thus does fashion powerfully, expeditiously, 
and absurdly change both our Opinions and 
our Affections, according to the dictates of the 
most wanton caprice! 



§ 11. Love of Singularity. 

This is the direct opposite of the former ; 
and though the love of singularity cannot, in 
its own nature, be so extensive as the power 
of fashion, yet it is very operative, where it 
does exist. It constitutes the motive and the 
pleasure of those, who are bold enough to 
deviate from the accustomed modes of thinking 
and acting, in order to attract the public atten- 
tion. As the servile imitators of fashion are 
ashamed of being singular, these on the other 
hand, glory in singularity. They disdain to 
be placed in the line with common men, and 



LOVE OF SINGULARITY. 25 J> 

think that they shall be respected as command- 
ing officers, by starting out of the ranks. This 
disposition always indicates itself in those who 
are the first introducers of fashions, which the 
multitude so eagerly follow. But it has its influ- 
ence in more important cases, It has even- 
tually a powerful sway over the public at large ; 
who seem ready to enlist themselves under some 
chief, without being choice about either the na- 
ture of the service, or of the recompense. Specu- 
lative philosophy, politics, and religion, are the 
three provinces in which the influence of this 
disposition is remarkably conspicuous. It is 
often the source of new theories, which sometimes 
instruct, sometimes astonish, and sometimes 
infatuate the world. It is always discontented 
with whatever is, and is always stimulated to 
seek something different. In politics, it is ini- 
mical to monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, 
according as either of them is the established 
form of government. In religion, it deviates 
from the popular creed, whatever that may be. 
The creed being popular, is deemed a sufficient in- 
dication of its being erroneous. This disposition 
has a much closer affinity with very superficial 
thinking, than withj'ree inquiry, for it generally 
proposes crude opinions as the only counterpoise 
to public opinions, without paying any respect 

s 2 



260 CAUSES, fee. 

to the weight of evidence, on either side. The love 
of Singularity has too often a pernicious effect 
in disputing societies, and sometimes in semina- 
ries of learning; and it is highly prejudicial to 
that investigation of truth, which is the professed 
object of these institutions. The disputant op- 
poses sentiments generally received, from the 
love of disputation, or from the desire of exer- 
cising and displaying his talents. He directs 
all his attention to the arguments which appear 
to be the most novel, specious, and embarrassing. 
Thus he not only excites doubts in the minds 
of others, and triumphs in his success, but 
being habituated to search arguments of oppo- 
sition, without attending impartially to the 
force of evidence, he is finally caught in the 
web of his own sophistry. He finally imagines 
that truth is on the side which he at first 
supported from vanity ; and he rejects as errors, 
sentiments he secretly revered, when he wan- 
tonly began to combat them. Thus does he 
experience a total revolution in his manner 
of thinking and acting. He considers those 
things as indifferent, absurd, and pernicious, 
which he has once thought of the highest im- 
portance ; and this state of mind is necessarily 
productive of a change in his affections and 
dispositions towards them. 



POPULAR PREJUDICES. 261 



§12. Popular Prejudices. 

As whole communities sometimes entertain 
an uniformity in sentiment, with their corres- 
pondent predilections and aversions ; thus are 
they not unfrequently divided and subdivided 
into sects and parties, each of which is rigidly 
tenacious of a particular class of ideas, contracts 
very strong attachments to the espousers of 
the same cause, and thinks itself fully autho- 
rized to treat those of opposite sentiments, 
with contempt and hatred. Philosophy, reli- 
gion, and politics manifest also, in a thousand 
instances, the influence of this principle. The 
two former are distinguished into a diversity 
of schools and sects, which cherish the flattering 
idea that they are the sole supporters of truth. 
Thus it is that a zealous attachment to particu- 
lar sentiments, is seldom the result of an impar- 
tial examination. It is often the consequence 
of an early education, and often it proceeds 
from an implicit confidence in the virtues, ta- 
lents, and superior judgment of their chief, 
or some other incidental circumstance, which 
has cast the mind in the mould of particular 
opinions, and made an impression upon it too 
deep ever to be obliterated. 



262 CAUSES, &c. 



Nor does this principle cease to operate, in 
countries which deem themselves the most 
remote from servile attachments, or unfounded 
prejudices. The rancorous spirit which too fre- 
quently prevails in every contested election, 
will avouch the truth of our assertion. Can- 
didates for some particular office, professedly 
of high importance to the interests of the com- 
munity, at once start forth from ohscurity. 
They are immediately idolized by one party, 
as the mirrors of every excellence, and stigma- 
tized by the other, as totally devoid of merit, 
and unworthy the name of man. Social inter- 
course is interrupted; — intimate friends become 
implacable enemies ; — and during this wretched 
ferment, a total suspension takes place of all 
the principles of honour and integrity; while 
every sluice of scandal and defamation is thrown 
open, without reserve and without remorse. 
Partiality and prejudice act and re-act like the 
waves of the troubled sea, until they are worked 
up into a tremendous storm. At these periods 
such phrensics have been known to disturb 
the brain, that the wanton shouts of a mob 
have been productive of outrage and murder, 
and the colour of a ribband has excited eon- 



ASSOCIATED AFFECTIONS. 263 

Pulsions, as violent as those produced by the 
sight of water in the canine madness ! 

To this principle also may we not ascribe a 
phenomenon, which appears otherwise inex- 
plicable. Persons who in their individual cha- 
ractersarehighly respectable, both for sound sense 
and integrity, will frequently in their political 
capacities, pursue a conduct the most incon- 
sistent with either; — uniformly act on the ex- 
travagant idea, that the existent Minister, 
whoever he may be, is uniformly right in his 
principles, perfectly disinterested in all his ac- 
tions, and infallible in his plans: or, on the 
contrary, will regularly and incessantly oppose 
him ; as a compound of depravity and igno- 
rance ; whose every plan is big with mischief, 
and every exertion of power the application of 
the strength of a Samson, to overthrow the 
pillars of the constitution ! 



§ 13. Associated Affections. 

The influence of Association, in suggesting 
of thoughts, has frequently engaged the atten- 
tion of philosophers ; and the power of trivial 
incidents to recall former ideas, is universally 



264 CAUSES, &c. 

confessed. But their power is perhaps equally 
extensive over the affections. 

As one passion or affection pre-disposes the 
mind to the indulgence of that which most 
nearly resembles it, thus all the affections which 
havebeen indulged toa considerable degree, seem 
to change the complexion of every surrounding 
object. Places in which we have been happy, 
strike us, as if they had been both witnesses 
and participants of our bliss; while distress 
invariably diffuses a gloom over locality itself, 
and over every circumstance that reminds us 
of what we have felt. Nor can we call to our 
recollection any place, in which we have en* 
joyed peculiar satisfaction, without feeling an 
affection for that spot ; or recollect scenes of un- 
happiness, without feeling something like resent- 
ment against the theatre of our sufferings. The 
traveller, who has been happy in a foreign coun- 
try, contracts a partiality for every thing belong- 
ing to it : if he has been ill received and ill 
treated, the gayest scenes and most advan- 
tageous circumstances belonging to that country, 
will, upon recollection, inspire him with dis- 
placency, if not with horror. 

This principle is very extensive in its influence. 
It is this which renders the spot where the Lover 
enjoys the company of his mistress, a paradise 



ASSOCIATED AFFECTIONS. 2G5 

in his sight, however different its aspect may be 
to another. The slightest present, as a token 
of Affection, inspires exquisite delight: a trin- 
ket, or a lock of hair, are, to him, of more 
worth than a kingdom. It is this principle 
which enstamps an inestimable value upon the 
relicts of Saints and Martyrs; and empowers 
fragments of their garments, their very teeth 
and nails, to work miracles, in the opinion of 
the devotee. In its more moderate exertions, 
it inspires a strong attachment to every thing 
which was once our friend's. It is this principle 
of association, which so easily implants in the 
religious and devout mind, a veneration for the 
place destined to the offices of religion; and 
inscribes Holiness upon the edifice devoted to 
sacred purposes. 

The same principle renders innumerable cir- 
cumstances, in common life, of considerable 
importance ; and in conjunction with habit, 
enables us to derive comfort from peculiarities 
of state and situation, which do not possess any 
intrinsic advantage. Every thing around us 
becomes, as it were, congenial to our natures ; 
and the pleasures of yesterday are revived in the 
objects of to-day. 

This associating principle extends its influence 
to the article of dress, and inspires a degree of 



266 CAUSES, &c. 



respectability, or the contrary, according to the 
shape of a coat, or the cock of a hat. In the 
days of our Ancestors it was reduced to a regular 
system, and occasioned that classification in 
dress, which distinguished individuals in the 
three professions, and in our courts of justice, 
from the vulgar herd. In those days the vener- 
able wig, the robe, and the band, invariably 
excited the ideas of superior skill, gravity, piety, 
and equity. These were venerated as emblems, 
until they were so frequently employed as sub- 
stitutes, that the charm was finally dispelled. 

But although this kind of association has not, 
in the present day, so extensive an effect as at 
former periods, yet it is not entirely destroyed. It 
is felt in our navies and armies, where the raw re- 
cruit is despised, and often very roughly treated 
by his more veteran associates, until they have 
lost sight of Ills ignorance and inexperience, in 
the uniformity of garb. It is felt by every 
actor, who cannot fully enter into the spirit of 
his part, until he has assumed the character, in 
his external appearance. It is invariably felt by 
those distinguished for their attachment to orna- 
ments; who so frequently mistake the elegance 
of their dress, and the value of their jewels, 
for their own personal accomplishments. It is, 
at times, felt by every one in a greater or less 



ASSOCIATED AFFECTIONS. 267 

degree ; for his mind experiences something of 
a conformity with the state of his dress; and 
the remark of Sterne, that a propensity to 
meanness is increased by the want of clean linen, 
possesses a portion of philosophy as well as of 
humour. 

This principle of association exerts an illicit 
influence in more important matters. It in- 
spires a disposition to substitute one thing for 
another, because of some points of similarity ; 
however they may differ in more essential articles. 
Thus it frequently substitutes the means for the 
end. In religion, it confounds the observance of 
rites and ceremonies with the spirit of true devo- 
tion ; and a punctual attendance upon the means 
of improvement, is deemed equivalent to pro- 
gress in improvement,, In morals, it sometimes 
respects a vice that is contiguous to a virtue; 
and it degrades a virtue, that is contiguous to a 
vice. Thus because a generous man is liberal in 
his donations, the Prodigal, who squanders in 
thoughtless profusion his own property and 
that of others, boasts of his liberality. Because 
economy is a virtue, avarice assumes the title. 
The rash and impetuous give the character of 
cowardice to caution ; and the coward confounds 
genuine courage with unpardonable rashness. 

In like manner are degrees of atrocity calcu- 



2m CAUSES, &c. 

lated, not by the innate baseness of an act, or 
by the quantity of misery it diffuses, but ac- 
cording to the nature of the punishment inflict- 
ed by human laws; or to the quantity of repu- 
tation that is in danger by the commission. 
Thus some have imagined that they respect vir- 
tue, because they abhor ignominy. They cau- 
tiously select, and adhere to the vices which 
are least injurious to reputation ; and they will 
pay peculiar attention to mere appellations, and 
modes of expression, which are designedly adopted 
to conceal the enormities of guilt. The man, who, 
in his social habits, apparently scorns to be un- 
just, will not scruple to ruin his best friends by 
rash and adventurous projects; and he simply 
calls the issue, an unfortunate speculation. The 
ruin of female honour, to the destruction of 
the peace and happiness of respectable relatives, 
being termed an act of gallantry, is scarcely 
deemed inconsistent with the character of a 
man of honour. 

These few specimens shew the nature and ex- 
tent of the associating principle. They indi- 
cate that it sometimes operates as a remembrancer, 
sometimes as an emblem or representative, and 
sometimes as a substitute; — that it may be the 
handmaid of innocent and virtuous affections ; 



THE MANNERS, &c. 269 

the source of bigotry and superstition, and an 
apology for the deepest depravity. 



When our ideas of the qualities of objects, 
and our dispositions towards them, are not 
under the influence of these adventitious circum- 
stances, when they are the most correspondent 
with their real natures, yet the impressions they 
make upon our feelings are extremely different, 
at different seasons. Sometimes we perceive that 
they exist, but we contemplate them without 
either emotion or affection; at other times they 
acquire such an irresistible influence, that they 
will not suffer a competitor. We have already 
observed that the Novelty of an object, and the 
sudden manner in which it is presented to our 
notice, have a very powerful influence over our 
affections; but there are many other adventitious 
circumstances, which from their striking effects 
upon the mind, deserve to be enumerated. For 
example : 



§14. The Manner in which Information is ' 
conveyed to us. 

It is natural to expect that a full conviction 



no CAUSES, kt. 

of the truth of interesting particulars, would, 
at all times, be attended with an impression 
proportionate to their importance. But this is 
not the case : much depends upon the manner 
in which such interesting subjects are presented 
to the mind. The information obtained by 
reading a plain and simple statement of events, 
for example, is the weakest in its influence. A 
narrative of the same events, from an eye-witness, 
whose credit may not be superior to that of the 
historian, brings us, as it were, nearer to the 
object, and makes a much deeper impression. 
Both of these are feeble compared with the 
influence of sight. It is through the organs of 
sight alone, that the most vivid and most per- 
manent effects are produced. Every minute 
circumstance is now placed before us, and each 
exerts its own impressive influence at the same 
instant. The information thus becomes com- 
plete and indubitable, without any mixture of 
obscurity in the mode of representation, or 
remains of incredulity on our parts ; — which, 
perhaps, weakens the evidence of what is con- 
sidered to be authentic history, more than is 
generally suspected. We are our own evidence, 
and we must give credit to ourselves. Hence 
we speak of ocular demonstration, and agree that 
teeing is believing. 



THE MANNER, &c. 271 

It is a singular fact, that in reading the most 
terrible events with which the pages of history 
are filled, we not only hear to read, but take 
delight in the perusal of those incidents which 
would be too affecting, were they immediately 
described to us by an eye-witness ; and which 
would excite insufferable anguish were we our- 
selves spectators of the scenes. The cool narration 
of those vices, follies, intrigues, cruelties,- op- 
pressions, of which the history of states and 
kingdoms is chiefly composed, is just sufficient 
to awaken within us a degree of horror, indig- 
nation, and sympathy, which is not inconsistent 
with the pleasure we take in the gratification 
of curiosity. We feel also self-approbation, 
which is far from being unpleasant, in the per- 
ception that we are always in te jested in the 
cause of the innocent, the weak, and the op- 
pressed; that we can detest vice, and rejoice 
in the triumphs of virtue. 

Nor does the professed Historian descend to 
those mimitice, which, in scenes of this kind, 
have the strongest hold upon the mind. His 
narrative consists in a general representation of 
facts. He tells us of thousands and tens of 
thousands who were destroyed, or led into cap- 
tivity, or reduced to extreme distress by pesti- 
lence and famine, without expatiating upon 



212 CAUSES, &c, 

minuter circumstances, which are absolutely 
necessary to compose an interesting picture. 
Thus are we much more affected with the part- 
ing of Hector from Andromache, than with the 
conflagration of Troy ; and we sympathize more 
deeply with the fate of this hero, when his 
lifeless body was dragged at the chariot- wheels 
of his proud conqueror, although it was insen- 
sible to pain, than with all the real distresses of 
the Trojan war. We surfer more from the 
simple story of Le Fevre, than from the reports 
of an hospital ; and the countryman's pathetic 
lamentations over his dead ass, have called forth 
tears of commiseration, which much more ex- 
tensive distress will not always produce. 



We shall now advert to other causes, which 
have also a powerful influence in exciting or 
directing our affections ; and have some relation 
both with the sympathy of our natures, and 
with the association of ideas and affections 
already noticed ; these are 



IMITATIVE TONES, &e. 2?S 



§ 15. Imitative Tones and Representations. 

We are so constituted as to be strongly affect- 
ed by the representation of particular states 
and situations, notwithstanding we may be con- 
vinced that they are imaginary or artificial. Mere 
tones, attitudes, gestures, imitating or resem- 
bling any of those produced by one or other of 
the passions and affections, are calculated to 
excite correspondent feelings and emotions, in 
susceptible minds. Like musical instruments 
attuned to the same key, our feelings are made 
to vibrate with the vibrations of surrounding 
objects. Even the Voice and Accents of infe- 
rior animals, expressive either of fear, or pain, 
or lamentation, or joy, or affection, have a ten- 
dency to render us apprehensive, cheerful, me- 
lancholy, or sympathizing. Rude and harsh 
sounds not only create unpleasant sensations, 
but suggest unpleasant and foreboding ideas, in 
all those who have not corrected their sensations 
by their reason. It is from this kind of associa- 
tion probably, that the croaking of the raven, 
and the scream of a night owl, are so univer- 
sally deemed ominous of mischief, by the igno- 
rant. The sprightly music of the feathered 

T 



274 CAUSES, &c. 

songsters inspires an exhilarating vivacity. The 
solitary and melodious notes of the nightingale, 
the cooing of the turtle dove, &c. have always 
furnished imagery for Poets, in their descrip- 
tions of the tender passion of love, or sympa- 
thetic sorrow. The bleating of the sheep, and 
lowing of the kine, &c. although they possess 
no real melody in themselves, yet as they denote 
the affection of the dam for its offspring, they 
universally inspire a pleasing sympathetic ten- 
derness. 

The principal charms of the Music, which 
aims at a higher character than that of difficult 
or rapid execution, consist in the imitation of 
those tones and movements which are most inti- 
mately connected with the passions and affec- 
tions of the soul; which exhilarate the spirits, 
and excite to the sprightly or graceful dance ; 
arouse and animate to martial deeds ; induce a 
bewitching melancholy ; or diffuse a pleasing se- 
renity over the mind ; — which charm by display- 
ing something like the power of persuasive elo- 
quence without words, — by holding a kind of 
conversation without ideas, — and by exciting 
whatever disposition the artist pleases, without 
suggesting a motive. 

It has been occasionally remarked, in our 



IMITATIVE TONES, &c. 2/5 

Analysis, that the powerful influence of any 
exciting cause, manifests itself by Emotions 
correspondent to the nature of the passions ; to 
seize these external appearances, or to imitate 
the expressive looks, attitudes, and gestures 
peculiar to each, is the professed object of the 
statuary and historic painter; and to do justice 
to these characteristic emotions, constitutes the 
difficulty and excellence of their art. It is the 
professed design of the Artist to excite some 
emotion, or call forth some particular affection, 
correspondent to the nature of his object. Al- 
though the power erf the sculptor is confined to 
forms and attitudes principally, yet how inter- 
esting may these be rendered to the spectator! 
Who can contemplate the Apollo Belvede?^, the 
Venus de Medicis, without admiring the human 
shape in its characteristic beauties? or the dan- 
cing Fawns, without partaking of their vivacity ? 
Or the Farnese Hercules, without a degree of 
awe? or the Laocoon and his sons, without a mix- 
ture of compassion and horror ? Or any of these, 
without being astonished at the skill, ingenuity, 
or sublimity of the artist? The enthusiastic 
encomiums bestowed upon the paintings of cele- 
brated masters ; the eagerness with which their 
labours are purchased ; the wealth and renown 
which the most distinguished of them enjoy; 

t 2 



276 CAUSES, &c. 

and the respect paid to their memories, demon- 
strate the amazing effect of their performances 
upon the mind; — the strength of our sympathy 
with every representation of passion ; — and the 
surprise we experience, that these powerful effects 
are produced by the mere distribution of co- 
lours, or of lights and shades upon board or 
canvas ! 



§ ] 6. Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence. 

If mere tones and representations so warmly 
interest the affections, though they are not able 
to convey information, or suggest any ideas to 
the mind, perfectly novel ; much deeper impres- 
sions are to be expected from means, whose pro- 
fessed object it is, to increase our knowledge of 
particular subjects, to extend our views, enlarge 
our conceptions, to employ all the force of lan- 
guage, and all the power of sympathy, in order 
to give them weight and energy; which is the 
province of Rhetoric and Oratory. 

Rhetoric is generally considered as the art of 
persuasion. It attempts to inspire conviction 
concerning some particular object, that it may 
influence the will to determine in a manner cor- 
respondent. It seeks either to arouse the mind 



RHETORIC, ORATORY, &c. 277 

to action, or to dissuade it from acting upon the 
resolutions already taken, or which are in contem- 
plation. Its immediate employment is not to 
search after truth, but to render acknowledged 
or supposed truths influential. It leaves to Logic 
the province of cool investigation, and of draw- 
ing legitimate conclusions from admitted pre- 
mises, without any regard to motives. The Rhe- 
torician is solicitous to effect some particular 
purpose, and calls in the aid of reason merely as 
an auxiliary. He attempts to influence the Will 
by reasoning with the affections; knowing that 
if they be gained over to the party espoused, the 
will is ready to follow. He therefore artfully 
conceals, or slightly passes over every circum- 
stance which is not favourable to his views, 
and he brings forward, and largely expatiates 
upon those which are. He suggests motives of 
pleasure, utility, safety, honour* pity, &c. as the 
subject admits. He not only pre-supposes the 
object in view to be of the first importance, but 
he employs every method to implant this con- 
viction, in the minds of those whom he endea- 
vours to persuade. 

These attempts become most successful, by 
a close imitation of that train of ideas, and 
those modes of expression, which any parti- 
cular passion or affection is prone to suggest. 



278 CAUSES, &e. 

If the design be to excite anger and resentment, 
rhetoric imitates the language of anger. It 
places the supposed offence in the strongest 
point of view, and describes it in the most 
vivid colours. It assiduously collects and ex- 
patiates upon every circumstance, which con- 
tributes to the aggravation of the crime. It 
is indignant against that spiritless tranquillity 
which can patiently endure such insults, and 
attributes reluctance to revenge, to some mean 
and cowardly motive. If its object be to 
excite terror \ it assembles together every cir- 
cumstance which has a tendency to alarm with 
a sense of Danger. It stigmatizes courage 
with the epithet of rashness, and flight is dig- 
nified with the title of prudence, &c. If com- 
passion be the object, it expatiates upon the 
wretched state of the sufferer; his fears, his 
apprehensions, his penitence. It palliates his 
faults, extols his good qualities ; and thus col- 
lects in one point of view all his claims to 
commiseration. 

The species of argument, which persons under 
the influence of passions and strong affections 
perpetually adopt, is rendered more efficacious 
by appropriate language; The rhetorician there- 
fore studies and imitates the particular language 
of each passion, either in its energy, vivacity, 



RHETORIC, ORATORY, &c. 2?9 

or diffuseness. Hence he liberally employs 
all those tropes and figures of speech, which 
nature suggests, and art has classified. 

Oratory adds to rhetorical compositions the 
advantages of elocution. It adapts the manner 
of delivery to the nature of the subject, and 
the appropriate language. It takes the charac- 
teristic signs of each emotion for its model, 
as far as it dares to imitate without the impu- 
tation of mimickry. It enters into the attitudes, 
gestures, tones of voice, accents, emphasis, 
expressions of countenance, inspired by the 
particular emotion, in such a manner, that not 
an idea is suffered to lose its proper effect, by 
any deficiency, in kind or degree of energy 
communicated to it; and thus it enjoys every 
advantage to be derived from the power of 
sympathy. 

Eloquence, according to the modern ideas of 
it, appears to be the medium between the im- 
petuosity which oratory admits, and which was 
highly characteristic of ancient oratory, and 
the studied artifice of the professed rhetorician. 
The term is sometimes applied to composition, 
sometimes to delivery. When applied to both, 
it comprehends a certain degree of elegance, 
both of diction and of manner. The want of 
that energy which approaches to violence, is 



280 CAUSES, &c. 

compensated by pertinency of language, fluency 
of utterance, and guarded chastity of address. 
Its excellency consists in a pleasing adaptation 
of language to the subject, and of manner to 
both. It refuses too close an imitation of the 
turbid emotions, but it delights in animated 
description. It seems rather partial to the pa- 
thetic : the elegance, and graces which it 
loves, harmonizing most easily and successfully, 
with the softest and finest feelings of our 
nature. 

The power of oratorial Eloquence is almost 
irresistible. It penetrates into the inmost 
recesses of the soul. It is able to excite or to 
calm, the passions of men at will ; to drive the 
multitude forwards to acts of madness, or to 
say to the contending passions, " Peace, be 
still." It changes the whole current of our 
ideas, concerning the nature and importance 
of objects, and of our obligations and advan- 
tages respecting them. It rouses from perni- 
cious indolence; and it renders the sentiments 
and dispositions already formed, most influen- 
tial. In a word, it has made of the human 
species both angels and monsters. It has ani- 
mated to the most noble and generous exertions, 
and it has impelled to deeds of horror! 



THE DRAMA. 281 



§ 17« The Drama. 

The successful dramatic Writer catches the 
ideas, and imitates the language of every pas- 
sion, emotion, and affection, in their different 
stages and degrees. His professed object is to 
suppose a diversity of characters, and to sup- 
port them with a correspondent train of ideas; 
to inspire them with predilections and aversions ; 
or call forth particular passions and affections, ac- 
cording to the situations in which he has placed 
them. His hopes of success depend on the close- 
ness of the imitation ; and success itself consists 
in being able to interest the heart, by exciting 
affections and emotions similar to those which 
would be felt by the reader or spectator, were he 
an immediate witness to similar scenes, in real 
life. 

The complete Actor possesses the happy 
talent of expressing, by manner, the state of 
mind represented by his author. He adopts 
what modern orators reject. He attempts to 
give force to pertinent ideas and language, by 
imitative tones, gestures, and countenance. 
These he varies, according to the versatile state 
of those who are tossed upon the billows of 
passion, agitated by some contending emotions, 



282 CAUSES, &c. 

or under the more permanent influence of par- 
ticular affections. 

In theatrical exhibitions there is a conspiracy 
to delude the imagination ; and all the powers 
of sympathy are called forth to produce the 
effect. By appropriate dresses, the persons of 
the actors are lost in the characters they assume; 
and correspondent scenery points out the very 
spot of action. The spectator leaves every idea 
of real life at the door of entrance, and volun- 
tarily yields himself up to the pleasing delusion. 
He finds himself in a new world. He is trans- 
ported, in an instant, into distant regions and 
remote ages, and feels in fiction all the force of 
truth. He laughs at mimic folly, sincerely 
weeps at artificial misery, is inspired with horror 
and indignation at imaginary baseness, and is in 
an ecstacy of joy at counterfeit happiness ! 



§ 18. Pre-disposing Causes. 

All the above causes, which operate so 
powerfully upon the mind, and impress it with 
such a diversity or contrariety of sensations, 
have still a degree of uniformity in their mode 
of action. We may still suppose that the same 



PRE-DISPOSING CAUSES. 28$ 

Individual, placed under their immediate in- 
fluence, would always entertain similar ideas, 
and receive similar impressions. But this is not 
always the case. Certain circumstances create 
such a pre-disposition within us, that we shall, 
at different seasons, be very differently affected 
by the same object, both respecting the kind of 
passion or affection excited, and the degree of 
power it may exercise over us : and they con- 
stitute that state of mind, which we frequently 
describe by being in the humour, or not in the 
humour. The circumstances to which we now 
refer, exert their primary effect upon the corpo- 
real or nervous system, render that more sus- 
ceptible of impressions, at one time than another; 
dispose it to be vexy differently affected by the 
same objects ; and through its channel, to affect 
the state of our minds concerning them. 

These observations relate to the power of 
what the medical world has termed the non- 
naturals, which exert as great an influence over 
the dispositions of the mind, as the} 7 are pro- 
ductive of salutary or morbid pre-dispositions 
respecting the body. All those circumstances, 
for example, which are calculated to invigorate 
the frame, and rouse it from a state of indolence 
and inactivity, necessarily communicate a cor- 
respondent vigour to the Mind, by which it 



284 CAUSES, &c. 

becomes more adapted to receive impressions 
of a certain class, and to be more powerfully 
influenced by particular circumstances and 
qualities in objects, than at the preceding 
period. Such are the manifest effects of re- 
freshing sleep to fatigued and exhausted natures, 
— of invigorating viands, — of cheerful weather, 
&c. Whatever produces an uneasy sensation in 
the corporeal system, is apt to render the Mind 
peevish and fretful, and dispose it to be more 
powerfully affected than usual, by incidents of 
a disagreeable nature ; such as losses, disappoint- 
ments, the improper conduct of others, &c. It 
has been frequently noticed by practitioners, 
that patients are much more fretful and impatient 
in a state of convalescence, than they were 
during the severer periods of their disease. 
Their returning powers of sensation, make them 
feel the state of the disordered frame, more mi- 
nutely than during the oppressive state of the 
desease ; and their comfortless sensation com- 
municates an unusual fretfulness to the temper. 
Again, those things which heat and irritate to a 
considerable degree, foster all turbulent and 
irritable passions ; while those which diffuse a 
pleasing sensation over the system, dispose to 
benevolence and good-will. It is a maxim with 
some, in modern days, never to ask a favour of 



PRE-DISPOSING CAUSES. 28S 

an epicure, till after his meals ; and the Ancients 
were not unacquainted with the mollia tempora 
Jandi. Whatever chills and debilitates, disposes to 
timidity ; and local situations which are retired 
and gloomy, are most conducive to melancholy 
impressions. Indeed, so dependent is the state 
of the Mind upon that of the body, that 
nothing can produce a considerable change in 
the latter, without exciting pre-dispositions, 
somewhat analogous, in the former. The food 
which recruits the exhausted powers of animal 
nature, exhilarates and invigorates the Mind : 
the excess which burdens the body, benumbs the 
powers of the soul. The painful and comfortless 
sensations produced by flatulencies and indiges- 
tions, in hypocondriac temperaments, have some- 
times produced, and sometimes been mistaken 
for an anxious state of Mind ; and the medicines 
which relieve the one will administer comfort to 
the other. The sensations of hunger, cold, fatigue, 
&c. being disagreeable in themselves, induce a 
painful restlessness in the disposition, and great 
petulance of temper. The state of the atmos- 
phere, peculiarities of climate, seasons of the 
year, have their mental influence. They dispose 
to a cheerful vivacity or gloominess of disposi- 
tion ; induce a languor, or invigorate the men- 
tal powers. The influence of Narcotics upon 



286 CAUSES, &c. 

the mind is universally noticed. The exhila- 
rating effects of opiates, the extravagant wild- 
ness, the pleasing delirium with which they 
affect the brain, the Elysian pleasures they 
sometimes communicate to the imagination, 
and the consequent torpor and debility diffused 
over the whole system, have been frequently 
noticed. Under their stimulating influence, 
man has shewn himself equal to undertakings 
which it was apparent madness to attempt; 
and the subsequent depression has marked him 
for a coward. The effects of spiritous and fer- 
mented liquors are no less obvious, as every 
one has too frequent occasions to remark. 
These effects are observed to vary according to 
the quality of the liquor, the previous state 
of the subject's mind, or the temperament of 
his body. Some kinds of potations have a 
tendency to induce a pleasing stupefaction ; 
so that if' they do not inspire new ideas, 
they seem to render the Sot perfectly con- 
tented with the few he possesses. These are the 
frequent effects of malt liquors, and the ingre- 
dients mixed with them. While other liquors, as 
the sparkling Champaign, exhilarate the spirits 
to an unusual degree, and promote a flow of lively 
and witty ideas. Tempers naturally warm and 
impetuous are, generally, very litigious and 



PRE-DISPOSING CAUSES. 28? 

quarrelsome in their cups. Others are rendered 
quarrelsome in a state of intoxication, contrary 
to their usual dispositions, through the disagree- 
able irritation diffused over the system, by the 
unusual stimulus. Some persons, on the other 
hand, who are surrounded with distracting cares, 
or oppressed with extreme poverty, having, 
for the instant, drowned thought aod reflec- 
tion in the bewitching draught, which operates 
like the waters of Lethe, they obtain a tempo- 
rary release from their mental sufferings, and 
enjoy an extraordinary and frantic flow of 
spirits, in the oblivion of their misery. 

Instances similar to the above are infinitely 
numerous ; but these are sufficient to illustrate 
the fact, that many circumstances, by primarily 
affecting the body, produce a correspondent 
change upon the Mind ; strengthen many of 
its affections, and pre-dispose to passions and 
emotions, by which it would not otherwise have 
been affected. It may be remarked, in general, 
that the sensibility of the system, or suscep- 
tibility of impression, when greatly increased 
by intoxication or any other cause, will render 
the same individual, amorous, or generous, or 
courageous, or passionate and quarrelsome, ac- 
cording as occasions and incidents, favourable 
to one or other of these affections and emotions, 
may present themselves. 



238 CAUSES, &e. 



Thus have we enumerated the principal 
causes, exerting a powerful influence over the 
affections ; which occasion that great diversity- 
observable in the human species, endowed with 
similar capacities, and apparently placed in 
similar situations : causes, by the influence of 
which, one class of rational beings differs so 
essentially from another equally rational; In- 
dividuals from Individuals in each class, and In- 
dividuals so frequently from themselves. 

Our remarks have been extended far beyond 
the limits proposed : but we have been imper- 
ceptibly carried forwards both by the singu- 
larity and importance of the subject; which 
would require volumes to do it justice, and 
which volumes could scarcely exhaust. 



MEDICAL INFLUENCE, &c. 289 



CHAPTER III 



Particular Effects resulting from the Operation 
of the Passions and Affections, considered. 

In every part of our Analytical Inquiries, the 
powerful influence of the passions and stronger 
affections, upon the whole system, has been 
manifested. The sudden changes made in the 
state of the mind, respecting particular objects; 
and the effects as instantaneously communi- 
cated to the corporeal frame, according to the 
nature and force of the impression, have been 
repeatedly considered. We have also remarked, 
that as the exciting causes are of very different 
and opposite natures, they possess various de- 
grees of merit and demerit ; and that some of 
them being of a pleasant, others of an unpleasant 
influence, they excite correspondent sensations 
within us, as long as we remain under this im- 
mediate influence. Such peculiarities are pro- 
ductive of certain effects and characteristic states, 
different from the primary object of the passion, 
although they are so intimately connected with 



2l)Q MEDICAL INFUENCE 

it. These effects may be placed under the fol- 
lowing heads : The physical, or medical influence 
of the passions ; their metaphysical, or influence 
upon the train of our ideas, correspondent lan- 
guage, &c. ; their moral, or influence upon cha- 
racter and happiness. These remain to be briefly 
considered. 



SECTION I. 

Medical Influence of the Passions. 

If we advert to the strong impression made 
by every violent emotion, upon the corporeal 
system, we shall not be surprised that the sud- 
den and powerful changes produced should, 
under certain circumstances, exert a medical in- 
fluence, in common with many other causes 
which act powerfully upon the body. Accord- 
ingly, have the Passions and Affections of the 
Mind, uniformly had a place given them among 
the non-naturals } as they are termed, or those in- 
cidental causes, which may occasionally induce 
either a salutary or morbid effect upon the body; 
such as air, exercise, rest, watchings, medica- 
ments, food, heat, cold, &c. 



OF THE PASSIONS. 291 

To enter minutely into this subject, to enu- 
merate the various facts, upon which our obser- 
vations and assertions are founded, to advance 
and defend any particular theory, would be to- 
tally foreign from the nature and design of this 
treatise, and become tedious to the class of 
Readers, for whom it is principally designed. 
Yet some observations upon the influence of the 
passions in the medical department, necessarily 
belong to a general history of the passions. 

It is not agreed in what manner salutary or 
pernicious effects are produced, by the instru- 
mentality of the passions. Without adopting 
any particular hypothesis, it will be sufficient 
for our purpose to remark, that the Phy- 
sicians of the present day generally ascribe the 
primary changes to their influence upon the 
nervous power, or grand principle of vitality; 
by which animated bodies are rendered sus- 
ceptible of an infinite variety of impressions. 
In consequence of this influence, either the 
system in general, or some particular organ, is 
made to deviate from the exercise of those func- 
tions on which health depends ; or is restored 
to its pristine office, after such deviations have 
taken place. 

Not to inquire deeply into the laws of phy~ 

U 2 



202 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

siology and pathology, I shall only add, that 
^uch bodies, or such circumstances, as are able 
to effect any important changes, produce these 
effects, — either by temperating every inordinate 
and irregular action, — by infusing a salutary 
vigour, in opposition to languor and inactivity, 
—by exciting to some excess, through the power 
of their stimulus, — by inducing a temporary 
torpor, — or by permanently debilitating the 
frame. These are properties which perfectly 
correspond with effects produced by the dif- 
ferent Passions and Affections of the mind : 
some of which manifestly elevate and invigorate 
the system, — others greatly depress, — some of 
them violently irritate, — others induce a torpid 
languor, — and others an incurable atonia. A 
few instances will illustrate these remarks. 

But as deviation and restoration refer to some 
standard, we must first suggest that the lively, 
yet temperate action of the vital influence, 
through every part of the system, constitutes 
the perfection of health. The Mind, undis- 
turbed by any violent emotions, agitations, or 
depressions of a corporeal nature, is able to 
exercise its noblest powers wit); a tranquil vi- 
gour. The Body continues in the regular dis- 
charge of its proper functions, without the least, 
.sensation of difficulty and embarrassment Res- 



OF THE PASSIONS. 293 

piration is free and easy, neither requiring con- 
scious exertion, nor even a thought. The action 
of the heart and arteries, with the consequent 
circulation of the blood, are regular and placid, 
neither too rapid nor too indolent, neither la- 
boured nor oppressed. Perspiration is neither 
checked nor excessive. Aliments are sought 
with appetite, enjoyed with a relish, and dU 
gested with facility. Every secretion and ex- 
cretion is duly performed. The body is perfectly 
free from pain, oppression, hebetude, and every 
species of uneasiness ; and a certain vivacity 
and vigour, nor to be described, reign through 
the system. 

Hope. 

The effects of that cordial, Hope, are pecu- 
liarly favourable to this envied state. In its 
more temperate exercise, it communicates a 
mild, but delectable sensation to the heart. 
It elevates and invigorates both mind and body. 
Its grateful stimulus produces a pleasing and 
salutary flow of the animal spirits, and diffuses 
a temperate vivacity over the system, directing 
a due degree of energy to every part. In short, 
it is the only passion or affection, which unites 
moderation with vigour, checks every violent 



29i MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

impetus, and removes every species of morbid 
languor. 

By comparing the effects peculiar to the pas- 
sion of Hope, with the above description of 
perfect health, the closest analogy will imme- 
diately become obvious. Its characteristic is 
to produce a salutary medium, between every 
excess and defect of < peration, in every function. 
Consequently, it has a tendency to calm the 
troubled action of the vessels, to check and 
sooth the violent and irregular impetus of the 
nervous system, and to administer a beneficial 
stimulus to the oppressed and debilitated powers 
of nature. Hence it has been the constant 
practice of Physicians, to support the hopes 
of their patients in the most alarming diseases, 
of almost every description. But it is pecu- 
liarly beneficial in those disorders which pro- 
ceed from fear, sorrow, and every species of 
anxiety, or which occasion a great prostration of 
strength, and dejection of spirits. In intermittent 
and pestilential fevers, and in various chronic 
complaints, the most efficacious remedies have 
proved inert, if administered to persons destitute 
of Hope; while an unmeaning farrago, which 
could scarcely be deemed innocent, taken with 
a confidence of success, have exceeded, in their 
efficacy, the utmost efforts of the most skilful 
practitioner. 



OF THE PASSIONS. 295 

Hope therefore demands a place among the 
medicaments that are the mildest and most 
grateful in their operation, and exhilarating in 
their effects. 



Joy, 

The medicinal influence of Joy is very similar 
to that of hope. But in its general effect, it 
is a more powerful stimulant. Joy diffuses a 
much greater vivacity over the whole system. 
It quickens the circulation of the blood, and, 
in its first impulse, it frequently excites violent 
palpitations of the heart. It renders the eyes 
peculiarly lively and animated, and sometimes, 
when the mind has been previously in a state 
of anxious fear, it stimulates the lachrymal 
gland to the secretion of tears, accompanied 
with redness, and a sensation of warmth in the 
countenance. Both Mind and Body become 
so alert, that they cannot refrain from some 
lively manifestation of their feelings, either by 
loud acclamations, or extravagant gestures. 

All that has been said of hope is applicable 
to this passion, under its more moderate influ- 
ence. But as it is in general a much more 
powerful stimulus, in many cases it is still 
more efficacious. In all those diseases, where 



296 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

the powers of nature are particularly oppressed 
and impeded, it is a potent remedy. In leucho- 
phlegmatic habits, where languid circulation, 
hebetude, chilness, &c. are prevalent, the grateful 
cordial of Joy, acts like a charm. Pervading 
the whole system, it instantaneously produces 
universal vigour, imparts vivacity to the most 
indolent, and paints the most pallid cheek with 
the glow of health. We are also assured that 
by its penetrating, exciting, and exhilarating 
power, it has cured Paralytics; and it has restored 
to their senses those who had been rendered 
insane through the excess of melancholy. 

But, as every thing possessing great energy 
may, in some circumstances, prove injurious, 
either by its own excess, or by co-operating 
with other causes, thus have the transports of 
Joy, though in their nature so salutary, some- 
times induced diseases, and sometimes ren- 
dered them more severe. They have increased 
the paroxysms of acute fevers, aggravated 
inflammatory symptoms; and in plethoric habits, 
have been productive of apoplexies. Immo- 
derate and ungovernable transports of Joy, 
have sometimes induced epilepsies, catalepsies, 
paralysis, and that class of maladies which arise 
from too great agitation of mind, in delicate 
and susceptible frames. 



OF THE PASSIONS. 297 

There are many instances upon record, of 
sudden death having been occasioned, by the 
hasty communication of very joyful tidings. 
Like a stroke of electricity, indiscreetly direct- 
ed, the violent percussion has probably pro- 
duced a paralysis of the heart, by the excess 
of its stimulus. These incidents are most 
likely to take place in subjects who were, at the 
instant, deeply oppressed with the opposite 
passions of fear and anxiety ; by which the 
natural and salutary action of the heart and 
arteries was greatly impeded. This, of con- 
sequence, will create a resistance to the impulse, 
and render it more liable to destroy the tone 
of that sensible organ. In most of the in- 
stances recorded, the persons who have fallen 
a sacrifice to the excess of Joy were in this 
particular situation ; nor was there an oppor- 
tunity given to soften the agony of fear, by a 
cautious manner of communicating the tidings. 
(See Note T.) 

Cheerfulness, hilarity, and social mirth, are in 
their effects so similar to hope and moderate joy, 
that their medical powers may be collected from 
what has been observed concerning these. Ope- 
rating also by the laws of social sympathy, they 
promote a delectable flow of spirits, which af- 
fords a temporary relief from the oppressive and 



598 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

pernicious influence of cares and solicitudes, 
refreshes and exhilarates, after the fatigues of 
labour, either corporeal or mental ; and thus, by 
renovating the Man, inspires him with fresh 
vigour, to discharge the arduous duties which his 
station in life may require. 

Love. 

Love has been considered, in the former part 
of this Treatise, both as an Affection and a 
Passion. As an Affection, in which complacency 
and good-will are the principal ingredients, it 
places the corporeal frame in a state of pleasing 
tranquillity ; in the salutary medium between 
languor and inertness on the one side, or of vio- 
lent incitement on the other. Its influence, 
therefore, is too mild to be at any time preju- 
dicial ; and it is calculated to moderate the effects 
each extreme is capable of producing. Ge- 
neral benevolence has also a similar tendency. It 
escapes the rude effects of all the irritating pas- 
sions, and diffuses a salutary placidness over the 
Whole system. 

Love between the sexes, commencing with 
predilection, and stealing into warm personal 
attachment, when reciprocal, and unalloyed by 
adventitious causes, inspires the mind with de- 



OF THE PASSIONS. 299 

light, connected with a satisfaction unknown to 
other delights. It is the reward of persevering 
hope, and corresponds with that pleasing pas- 
sion, in its beneficent effects on the corporeal 
system. It is so inimical to the rougher passions 
and emotions, that they cannot possibly subsist 
together. The blandishments of Love have 
tamed the most ferocious natures, and calmed 
the most turbulent spirits. The Passion rising 
to desire, acts as a powerful stimulant; gives 
fresh energy to the system, diffusing a general 
warmth, and increasing the sensibility of the 
frame. 

As sexual attachment is one of the strongest 
propensities of animal nature, and as it is pecu- 
liarly exposed, in civil society, to numberless con- 
trarieties, it frequently becomes the source of 
many other affections and emotions, such as hope, 
fear, joy, sorrow, anger, envy, jealousy, &c. 

Such various effects of Love, according to 
their complexities and degrees, must, it is self- 
apparent, vary their pathological and therapeutic 
influence on the animal ceconomy ; and medical 
Writers have accordingly given us numerous 
instances both of its salutary and pernicious 
powers. Its brisk incitements, in cold and tor- 
pid temperaments, have removed the various in- 
dispositions, to which such temperaments ar« 



300 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

exposed. It has fortified the body against dan- 
gers, difficulties, and hardships, which appeared 
superior to human force, It is said to have cured 
intermittents; acting, probably, like invigorating 
cordials, administered before the access of the 
cold fit, by which its return is prevented, and 
the habit destroyed, to the influence of which 
this disease is particularly exposed. In its vio- 
lent and impetuous energies, it has excited in- 
flammatory fevers, and. a larger train of evils 
proceeding from the excess of stimulus, than 
it will be necessary to enumerate. It has, also, 
in consequence of that contrariety of passions 
to which it is subject, occasioned the most dan- 
gerous and obstinate maladies ; hysterics, epilep- 
sies, bee tic fevers, the rage of madness, or the 
still more pitiable state of confirmed and wasting 
melancholy. 

Anger. 

The symptoms indicating a violent paroxysm 
of Anger, as strongly indicate the excessive 
perturbation it occasions throughout the system. 
The redness of countenance, the fire flashing in 
the eyes, the strong and agitated pulse, the 
wonderful increase of muscular strength, for the 
instant, manifest that all the powers of nature 



OF THE PASSIONS. 301 

are roused to the most violent exertions. Anger 
acts as a stimulus of the most potent kind, upon 
the muscular, vascular, and nervous systems. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that its pathological 
effects should be numerous and alarming. In- 
flammatory and bilious fevers, haemorrhages, 
apoplexies, inflammation of the brain, mania, 
have arisen from the increased impetuosity it 
has given to the vascular system ; as also sudden 
death, either from ruptured vessels, or the excess 
of its stimulating power, upon the vital organs ; 
particularly in plethoric and sanguineous tem- 
peraments. Palsies, epilepsies, aphonia, or loss 
of voice, diarrhoeas, involution of the intestines, 
and those diseases which may be attributed to 
the excessive perturbation of the nervous sys- 
tem, and also to exhausted strength, have too 
frequently succeeded to its tremendous exer- 
tions. In short, as there is no passion so turbu- 
lent, so is there none so immediately dangerous 
as excessive anger. 

Yet even this passion has been occasionally 
beneficial. As there are cases in which arsenic 
itself exerts a medicinal virtue, thus are we 
assure, by w liters of veracity, that there are in- 
stances in which the passion of Anger, by giving 
unusual energy to the system, has conquered 
such diseases as demanded a potent stimulus. 



302 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

We are told that it has cured agues, restored 
speech to the dumb, and for several days arrested 
the cold hand of death > that its stimulating 
power has, like the electric shock, proved a 
remedy in rheumatic affections, palsies, and va- 
rious chronic complaints. 

Fortitude. 

The medical virtues of Fortitude are univer- 
sally admitted. The determined resolution of 
the Mind, communicates a correspondent energy 
to the body. Cheery hope is, in these cases, a 
powerful auxiliary. Fortitude is not only a 
preservative against the pathological effects of 
fear and grief, but it renders the body less sub- 
ject to the morbid influence of putrid and con- 
tagious diseases. It enables the warrior to 
support hardships and fatigues, which would 
otherwise prove fatal to him. In the hour of 
conflict, the hopes of conquest, the power of 
social sympathy, a spirit of emulation, and 
enkindled anger against the foe, impel to achieve- 
ments, to which the powers of nature would be 
unequal, at any other period. Those who have 
had the best opportunity of observing, assure 
us (bat an army is most exposed to diseases when 
it is in a state of total inactivity. 



OF THE PASSIONS. 803 



Sorrow. 



Whoever attends to the pathological effects of 
Sorrozv, and marks its different stages; — the 
stupefaction and horror with which the sufferer 
is sometimes seized, upon the sudden communica- 
tion of evil tidings ; — the agitations which imme- 
diately succeed, introducing subsequent languor 
and debility ; — and the deep melancholy into 
which the mind subsides, after the first conflicts 
are passed, will be prepared to credit the narra- 
tions, that excessive sorrow has been the cause 
of sudden deaths, of confirmed melancholy, 
loss of memory, imbecility of mind, of nervous 
fevers, of hypocondriac complaints ; — that it 
renders the body peculiarly susceptible of conta- 
gious disorders; and that the loss of appetite, 
perpetual watchfulness, confirmed apathy to 
every thing social and exhilarating, the atten- 
tion immutably fixed upon the cause of its dis- 
tress, &c. have rapidly introduced the most ter- 
rible diseases, and hastened the dissolution of 
the sufferer. 

Nor does any case present itself, in which 
the passion of Sorrow, or the affection of grief, 
have produced salutary effects, unless by their 
being calculated to moderate the transports of 



S04 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

anger ; and thus they may have prevented or 
removed the pathological symptoms, of which 
such transports are productive. 

Fear. 

The changes instantly induced upon the body 
by abject Fear ; the universal rigour, the con- 
tracted and pallid countenance, the deep sunk 
eye, the quivering lip, the chilness, torpor, 
prostration of strength, insufferable anxiety 
about the region of the heart, &c. are so per- 
fectly analogous to the morbid influence of ex- 
cessive cold, to the symptoms of typhus fevers, 
and the first stage of intermittents, that no one 
can doubt of the pernicious influence of this 
passion, in pre-disposing the body to the like 
diseases, and in aggravating their symptoms. 
Fear is peculiarly dangerous in every species of 
contagion. It has instantaneously changed the 
complexion of wounds, and rendered them fatal. 
It has occasioned gangrenes, indurations of the 
glands, epilepsies, the suppression of natural 
or beneficial secretions. It has induced a per- 
manent stupor on the brain ; and the first horrors 
of the imagination have, in some cases, made 
too deep an impression to be effaced, by the 
most favourable change of circumstances. We 



OF THE PASSIONS. SOS 

have seen that Joy itself, though in its nature 
so pleasing, and in its general effect so salutary, 
has proved the cause of sudden death; it is 
therefore not difficult to admit that the agonizing 
effects of this dreadful passion, may be able to 
paralyze the grand organ of circulation, and 
like some pestilential diseases, instantaneously 
induce the torpor of death. 

So pernicious are the natural and character- 
istic effects of Fear! Yet in that state of body 
where a sedative power is requisite, and where 
a considerable degree of torpor has a tendency 
to check too great incitement, even this passion 
may become beneficial. Thus it has been known 
to relieve excruciating fits of the gout ; to have 
rendered maniacs calm and composed; and in 
some cases, it has restored them to the regular 
use of their faculties. The effects of Fear, in 
affording temporary relief in the tooth-ache, are 
universally known ; acting as some systematica 
express themselves, by its sedative power, by 
which an inflammatory tension is appeased ; or as 
others, by inducing a torpor on the nerves, and 
thus rendering them insensible to pain. 

Terror, which is the agitation of Fear, some- 
times produces effects upon the body, common 
to agitation, simply. In some cases it rouses 

x 



30(5 MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

the energy of the system to an unusual degree ; 
and in others, it produces the irregular and con- 
vulsive action of the muscular system. Hence 
it is said to have caused, in some instances, and 
in others, to have cured the attacks of catalep- 
sies, epilepsies, and other spasmodic disorders. 
We read of its having cured tertian fevers in- 
duced by fear; — restored speech to the dumb, 
and motion to paralytic limbs; — that by agitating 
the vascular system, it has been productive of 
haemorrhages ; — and also that it has been success- 
ful in dropsical habits. Perhaps the contractile 
power of fear, united with the agitations of ter- 
ror, have both constricted and stimulated the 
relaxed and indolent absorbents, and enabled 
them to renew their office. The passion of 
Terror has frequently excited languid hypochon- 
driacs, to exertions they had deemed impossi- 
ble ; and all their former maladies have been 
obliterated by their apprehensions of impending 
danger. 

Shame. 

Shame is sometimes connected with Fear, 
sometimes with Terror; and consequently it 
will, in particular instances, manifest symptoms 
belonging to these emotions. But young per- 



OF THE PASSIONS. 30? 

sons of great sensibility, who are delicately sus- 
ceptible of honour or disgrace, are apt to blush 
at every trifle, without violent paroxysms either 
of fear or of terror. In these cases, where the 
effectsof Shame are the least complicated, though 
they be strong, they are momentary. The heart 
is certainly agitated, sometimes with pleasure, 
sometimes with pain ; but as the suffusion chiefly 
manifests itself in the face, and in the smaller 
vessels spread over the neck and breast, the 
singular effects of Shame cannot be attributed, 
solely, to the sudden impetus given to the 
heart. The Passion itself seems to have an in- 
fluence principally local; which we know to be 
the case with some other stimulants. The modest 
blush, unmixed with guilt or fear, seems to be 
inert, respecting medical effects. Nor are there 
any instances of its having been decidedly 
beneficial or injurious. It seems most calculated 
to increase cutaneous inflammations ; but facts 
are wanting to confirm this idea. 



Attention of Mind. 

Habitual attention of mind, to any particular 
object, should it be of a pleasing nature, and 
proceed from a passionate fondness for that ob- 
ject, has proved pernicious to the constitution. 

x i 



SOS MEDICAL INFLUENCE 

The fatigue of the brain has indicated itself by 
cephalalgias, giddiness, &c. — the animal spirits 
have been exhausted ; the body has been ren- 
dered insensible to its accustomed stimuli ; wea- 
riness and universal lassitude, prostration of 
strength, loss of appetite, indigestion, flatulen- 
cies, &c. have ensued; and the whole system 
lias been rendered very susceptible of various mor- 
bid impressions. Yet salutary effects have issued 
from an eager attention to things novel, inter- 
esting, and mysterious. It has thus proved 
efficacious in diseases subjected to periodical re- 
turns. It has prevented hysteric and epileptic 
fits, and charmed away agues. By connecting 
the pernicious effects of habitual attention to 
the same object, with those accompanying fear, 
anxiety, sorrow, it is easy to perceive that the 
union of these must be peculiarly pernicious; 
that when the whole attention is employed upon 
things mournful, irritating, or calculated to in- 
spire painful apprehensions, — when it is absorbed 
by corroding cares and anxious fears, — when it 
is the prey of chagrin and disappointment, the 
body may be expected to fall a speedy victim to 
the combined influence of such deadly poisons. 

Imagination. 
The power of Imagination in inducing and 



OF THE PASSIONS. 509 

removing diseases, has been generally acknow- 
dged. But this imagination could only pro- 
duce its effects by the strong Affections which 
accompany it ; otherwise it would be as inert as 
the most abstract idea* These affections are in- 
dicated in the various passions and emotions we 
have been contemplating. It is, moreover, 
worthy of notice, that in every powerful exer- 
tion of the Imagination, some change takes place 
in the body correspondent with its nature. In 
a keen appetite, upon the thoughts of some 
favourite viand, the salivary glands are stimu- 
lated to a secretion of saliva, as preparatory to 
deglutition. We feel ourselves collected, firm, 
elevated, upon the lively representation of the 
firm, heroic, dignified conduct of another. The 
blood thrills in our veins, and the skin corru- 
gates, at the description of any thing peculiarly 
horrible; and under the strong impression of 
fictitious danger, the attitude of our bodies 
attempts to evade it ! Full confidence in the 
mystic power of another, places the whole sys- 
tem in a situation most favourable to the effects, 
which the object of his confidence undertakes 
to produce. This will explain much of what is 
genuine, in the pretensions of magnetizers ; and 
the exaggerating dispositions of both operator 



310 MEDICAL INFLUENCE, &c. 

and patient, will contribute to explain the rest. 
(See Note U.) 

The above sketch, concise and imperfect as it 
is, will be sufficient to evince, that the Passions 
and Emotions have a medical influence upon the 
body : and that each of them has its own cha- 
racteristic influence, in its general mode of 
acting, although various and opposite effects 
may sometimes be produced b}^ incidental cir- 
cumstances. This, however, is precisely the 
case with the most esteemed medicaments ; — 
with every thing which is deemed noxious or 
beneficial in the mineral, vegetable, and animal 
kingdoms ; — and with every part of nature, 
which possesses the power of acting upon the 
human frame. 

In this investigation the Author has simply 
endeavoured to be the historian of facts, without 
intending to pay any deference to theory. But 
as medical language has chiefly been formed by 
different theories, which have most rapidly suc- 
ceeded to each other, it is difficult to use terms 
which do not acknowledge some system or other 
for their parent ; or to express ideas, without 
seeming to have a predilection for one hypothe- 
sis in preference to others, where the sole object 
is to establish indisputable facts. (Sec Note W.) 



ON THOUGHT, &c. 311 



SECTION II. 

Influence of the Passio?is on Thoughts and 
Language. 

It has been remarked in our Analysis, that 
whenever any subject presents itself to the mind, 
with sufficient force to excite a passion, or a 
very strong affection, all the powers of the ima- 
gination become immediately active. The 
whole soul is engaged upon its object, and the 
whole train of ideas is turned into a channel 
correspondent with the view we entertain of 
that. The mind, with wonderful facility, col- 
lects together whatever has been laid up in the 
storehouse of the memory, or can be combined 
by the force of the imagination. Everything 
alien is totally excluded ; and it is in vain that 
others who are free from the impulse, attempt to 
suggest ideas of a contrary tendency. Reason 
becomes impotent, nor can the attention be 
directed from such circumstances as are inti- 
mately connected with the exciting cause ; and 
these are magnified and aggravated to the utmost 
extent. Subjects of joy appear, at the instant, 



312 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

to be the harbingers of essential and permanent 
bliss. The evils we fear, the injuries we suffer, 
the losses we sustain, seem to be the greatest 
that could possibly have been endured. 

This state of mind not only manifests itself 
by gestures, looks, and tones, correspondent 
with the nature of the passion; but it has a 
characteristic influence upon the language and 
expressions employed to give vent to the passion, 
as it is emphatically termed. 

Upon the first impulse, the thoughts are tu- 
multuous and confused. A thousand half- formed 
suggestions and apprehensions crowd in upon 
us, in rapid or disorderly succession ! 

Whoever contemplates the effects of the pas* 
sions, at this moment, will discover their per- 
fect correspondence with the nature of those 
introductory emotions of Surprise^ Wonder, and 
Astonishment, described in the analytical part of 
this Treatise. It is manifestly through their 
influence that the mind is thus confused, and 
that every idea is embarrassment and conjecture. 
The Wonder and Amazement, so precipitately 
excited, are accompanied by strong, abrupt, and 
indefinite language. The first impulse of Sur- 
prise deprives the subject of the power of utter- 
ance ; and the first exertions of this returning 
power consist in loud exclamations, adapted 



ON THOUGHT, &c. 313 

both to the nature of the emotion itself, and to 
its confusion and wonder, relative to the object. 

As all these introductory emotions are ob- 
viously founded on the weakness, ignorance, and 
conscious inferiority of our nature, thus do they 
prompt to Language which confesses an humi- 
liated state. Powers above ns are, as it were, 
instinctively addressed, either with exclamations 
of gratitude, of appeal, imprecation, or invoca- 
tion of aid! Incredulity itself becomes most 
credulous ; will thank the heavens for causes of 
excessive joy, — call aloud upon higher Beings 
for help in the moment of danger, — mourn its 
destiny, — or curse its stars in the hour of vexa- 
tion and disappointment ! Those who, in a 
tranquil state of mind, ridicule the idea of future 
retribution, often become the most extravagant 
in their benedictions or imprecations, at the 
instant of tumultuous passion ! 

After the first impulse of passion, we begin 
to advert to the particular state in which the 
exciting cause has placed us. As a lively ima- 
gination is always disposed to magnify, we deem 
ourselves for the instant, the most happy or the 
most wretched of mortals ; and a new train of 
thoughts is suggested to prove or illustrate the 
supposition. 

Thus as the passion approaches somewhat 



314 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

nearer to an affection, the mind recovers, In some 
degree, its power over itself; yet it is still carried 
forwards by the torrent of ideas, which this 
novel situation has inspired, and which never 
would have been suggested, with such copious- 
ness and energy, in a more tranquil state. As 
it still continues to feel strongly, so is it eager to 
do justice to its feelings, by the strength, perti- 
nency, and impetuosity of its Language. Com- 
mon terms are too cold, or too limited, to dojus- 
tice to the energy of thought; and it perceives 
no exaggerations in expressions the most exagger- 
ated ! All nature is ransacked for points of 
resemblance, to set forth the novel situation, in 
the strongest colours. Impetuosity equally de- 
spises precision or detail. It eagerly seizes upon 
tropes and figures the most concise, and the 
most suited to its new conceptions ! 

All nature is full of analogy ! Every thing 
that exists possesses certain qualities or pro- 
perties, which are not so peculiar to the in- 
dividual, as to be destitute of some resem- 
blance to other things that may be, in various 
respects, essentially different : and many of these 
properties are possessed, in an extraordinary 
degree by particular objects. To these the mind 
rapidly adverts, as descriptive of the peculiari- 
ties of its own situation ; and as in the warmth 



ON THOUGHT, &c. 315 

of our sensations we are disposed to exaggerate 
every thing, thus are we disposed to make quick 
transitions from one property to another, seat- 
ed in the object referred to, by which a peculiar 
colouring or cast of character, is given to the 
subject which interests us, and the desired 
energy is imparted to our feelings concerning it. 
To this, associated ideas and affections lend a 
very considerable aid. Thus it is that we not 
only catch the precise point of resemblance, but 
we instantaneously elevate or debase a subject, 
hold it forth to admiration or contempt, render 
it respectable or ridiculous, according to the 
sources from whence our allusions are borrowed. 
When passions and emotions have given place 
to more permanent affections, Language be- 
comes less vehement and more diffuse. Under 
the influence of a particular affection, the mind 
loves to expsrnd itself upon the circumstances 
which gave it existence, and to dwell upon such 
minutiae as have a tendency to feed its flame* 
Thus under the influence of Resentment, every 
species of aggravation is deliberately dwelt upon; 
every thing in the conduct of the aggressor 
which may augment his culpability, and every 
part of our own demeanor, are brought forwards 
to manifest the greatness of the offence, and 



316 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

how little we deserved it. In a state of fearful 
Apprehension, every possibility of danger is 
placed before us with all its horrors ; — every 
difficulty is magnified ; — and in every remedy or 
plan of security proposed, busy apprehension 
suggests reasons to evince that it will be ineffec- 
tual. In Sorrow we delight to expatiate upon 
the excellent qualities of the particular object, 
the pleasures and advantages of which we are 
now deprivecl ; and the imagination enumerates 
all the evils that will probably ensue from the 
privation. Under the influence of Love, the 
mind dwells upon the accomplishments which 
have inspired the affection, recalls the scenes of 
pleasure past, anticipates those which are to 
come ; and in the expression of these feelings, 
or in the acknowledgment of this influence, it 
purposely prolongs the phraseology, which best 
prolongs the fascinating idea. 

The address of Eve to her consort, in a state 
where the best affections alone could be indulged, 
is so beautiful an illustration of this subject, 
that a transcript of the whole passage cannot 
appear tedious. 

With thee conversing, I forget all time; 
All seasons and their change, all please alike. 
Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet, 



ON THOUGHT, &c. 817 

With charm of earliest birds j pleasant the sun* 
When first on this delightful land he spreads 
His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit and flower, 
Glist'ning with dew : fragrant the fertile earth 
After soft showers, and sweet the coming on 
Of grateful evening mild j then silent night, 
With this her solemn bird, and this fair moon, 
And these the gems of heav'n her starry train : 
But neither breath of morn, when she ascends 
With charms of earliest birds j nor rising sun 
On this delightful land ; nor herb, fruit, flower, 
Glist'ning with dew ; nor fragrance after showers : 
Nor grateful evening mild ; nor silent night, 
With this her solemn bird, nor walk by noon, 
Or glittering star light, without thee is sweet. 

PARADISE LOST. B. IV. L. 63$, 



It is observable, that when a passion or a 
strong affection is not suddenly raised, but is 
produced by deliberate meditation upon the 
subject, the process is opposite to the preced- 
ing. From Indifference, the mind begins to 
conceive an Affection of one kind or other; 
and according to the discovered nature, mag- 
nitude, or importance of the object, it may 
gradually work itself up 9 as the phrase is, into 
passion and ecstasy. In such cases, the train 
of thoughts will flow with increased velocity 
and force, according to the increased interest 
taken in the subject. Sterility of sentiment 



318 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

and of language is succeeded by a rapid flow 
of each. Pertinent thoughts and copious ex- 
pressions immediately present themselves, which 
the deepest study, and all the powers of recol- 
lection, would not have been able to produce. 
They are only to be inspired by the affections. 
In this state of mind, the Language gradually 
changes its tone ; from the cool didactic style, 
it rises into the animated and energetic ; though 
it seldom, if ever, indicates the embarrassment 
and confusion of thought, which are the offspring 
of wonder and surprise. Excess of animation 
will indeed sometimes check utterance, and 
the orator will feel a deficiency of Language, 
to do justice to the numerous ideas which 
crowd in upon :he mind. See many excellent 
observations on this subject in Elements of 
Criticism, Vol.11. Comparisons: Figures. 



It the above remarks be admitted as perti- 
nent, they will point out the difference betwixt 
the language of the Passions and Affections, 
and that of cool dispassionate reason. The 
one is the language of feeling, which attempts 
to enforce some interesting idea; the other that 
of discrimination, which carefully marks the 
distinctions and differences which subsist in 



ON THOUGHT, &c. 31$ 

things apparently analogous. The one is prone 
to substitute strong impressions for realities, 
and to mistake exaggerations for accurate state* 
ments : the other analyzes and separates truth 
from error, facts from misrepresentations. The 
language of Passion and of strong Affections is 
always employed in pleading some cause. Aiming 
to give to that, the ascendancy over every other 
consideration, it rapidly collects and sets forth, 
in glowing colours, every circumstance favour- 
able to its object, regardless of whatever may 
be advanced in opposition ; while the language 
of Reason is that of a Judge, who compares, 
balances, and decides, according to the force 
of evidence, without being deceived by the force 
of expression, or seduced by the sympathy of 
the passions. 

In these characters it is that the distinction 
between rhetoric and logic indicates itself. The 
former attempts to persuade; it is the province 
of the latter to convince. This employs it- 
self in demonstrations, respecting the truth 
and nature of things ; the other excites to feel 
and act, according to the opinion entertained of 
the good or bad properties which they possess., 
and are capable of exerting. 

In our description of the different passions 



Z20 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

and Affections, it was requisite to point out 
those external signs which wore the character- 
istic marks of each ; and to note the attitudes, 
gestures, and expressions of countenance, which 
are most correspondent to the nature of the 
emotion. We have only to subjoin upon the 
subject, that when utterance is given to thought, 
the tone of voice becomes a powerful auxiliary 
to the train of ideas suggested. Nature has 
accommodated the mode of utterance to the 
character of the passion. Thus it has rendered 

Joy loud and vociferous, producing strong ex- 
clamations, mixed with triumphant Laughter. 

Sorrow communicates a plain tiveness to the 
voice, best adapted to waitings and lamenta- 
tions. 

Anger is loud and turbulent. The voice 
rises with the passion, in order to strike terror, 
and silence opposition. 

Fear is oppressed and breathless, or screams 
aloud for help. 

Love is soft, soothing, insinuating, and gen- 
tie ; sometimes assuming the plaintiveness of 
sorrow, sometimes the vivacity of hope, and 
the transports of joy. 

The other compounds partake of mixed effects. 
(See Note X.) 



ON CHARACTER. 321 



The minute investigation of the passions in 
which we have been engaged, presents us with 
numerous observations of a moral and practical 
nature. But as the present Treatise is purposely 
confined to philosophical researches, we shall 
not enlarge upon so copious a subject. There 
are two inquiries, however, which, although 
they have an intimate relation to morals, can- 
not be refused a place in the philosophical de- 
partment. They refer to the influence of the 
passions upon character, and upon happiness % 
and with these we shall close the subjects 



SECTION III. 

Influence of the Passions and Affections on 
Character. 

The Nature of the Passions and Affections 
indulged, of the objects by which they are 
excited, and the degrees of influence and per- 
manency, which they are suffered to exert upon 
us, constitute the moral characters of men ; 



622 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

pointing out either their innocence, their excel- 
lencies, or defects. 

By Character is generally understood the kind 
of reputation acquired, by the prevalent dispo- 
sition of temper, which suggests almost every 
motive, and takes the lead in almost every 
action : and moral character refers to that pre- 
valent temper which relates to the moral duties 
respecting either ourselves or others. This 
disposition consists in the prevalence of affection, 
that is, in the habitual pleasure or displeasure 
we take in certain modes of thinking and 
acting; and our opinion of the disposition, is 
regulated by the different degrees of merit or 
demerit, which in our judgment is annexed to 
it. Mankind so far agree in their opinions, 
that they universally acknowledge some actions 
and the affections which produce them, either 
to be innocent, or to be deserving of various 
degrees of approbation or censure. They pay 
clue honours to characters, which appear to be 
formed upon the best of principles, and load 
the jsite with proportionate disgrace. 

" F e grand distinctions in moral conduct are 
ii .1 cared by the terms Virtue and Vice : and the 
Buboi <ate ones under each, are either not 
marl- d, or they are discriminated by appropriate 
appellations. 



ON CHARACTER. 323 

The cardinal affections of Love and Hatred, 
in themselves possess neither merit nor demerit. 
Founded upon the ideas of Good and Evil, 
which may render our existence a blessing or a 
curse, they are, as it were, moulded in the very 
frame and constitution of all percipient beings. 
It is, therefore, neither a duty, nor a possibility 
to divest ourselves of them. The passions, emo- 
tions, and affections, which are immediately con- 
sequent upon these, or may be deemed simple 
modifications of them, are also inseparable from 
our nature, and are both unavoidable and inno- 
cent: such as joy, satisfaction, contentment, 
hope, desire, fear, sorrow, anger, resentment, 
&c. These being derived from situations and 
circumstances, to which we are perpetually and 
necessarily exposed, are the natural result of 
impressions made upon susceptible beings. A 
virtuous or vicious Character therefore depends 
upon the nature of our choice, and the manner 
and extent to which those passions and emotions 
indulged, are permitted by the law of morals. 
Thus Virtue requires that the affections of love 
and hatred be properly placed ; that real, not ima- 
ginary good ; real, not imaginary evil, be the 
objects of them. It requires that we proportion 
the degrees of our affection to the value and 
importance of objects; that we be neither 

y2 



324 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

indifferent to essential worth, nor suffer things 
trifling and insignificant to engross the best of 
our affections. Virtue allows the first impulse 
of anger where the provocation is great ; as in- 
sensibility would invite injuries, and give to 
unreasonable and wicked men a decided superio- 
rity over the moderate and just. But Virtue 
forbids anger to exceed the magnitude of the 
offence : being in every case a species of pu- 
nishment, if it be excessive, the surplus becomes 
an injustice. Virtue requires anger to be of 
short duration, where offences are not perma- 
nent ; strictly prohibits it from seeking revenge. 
Its grand object is private or public security, 
and it abhors habitual hatred and malignity. It 
allows and requires us to cherish the feelings of 
contempt and indignation, as long as mean and 
atrocious vices continue ; but it absolutely com- 
mands us to pardon, where the character and 
conduct of the offender are changed, by repen- 
tance and reformation. Virtue stigmatizes, 
with peculiar disgrace, the want of those affec- 
tions which benefits received, and a great supe- 
riority of character ought to call forth ; such as 
ingratitude to benefactors, and want of respect 
for superiors in wisdom and goodness. As we 
experience that the possession of the good things 
of life contribute to our happiness, we cannot 



ON CHARACTER- 325 

foe insensible to the privation of them; Virtue 
accordingly permits a degree of sorrow and grief, 
correspondent to the nature of our loss; but 
it forbids the obstinate indulgence of melan- 
choly, as this forgets, or destroys, the benig- 
nant effects of every remaining blessing; and it 
is of consequence chargeable with both folly 
and ingratitude. Virtue requires repentance, as 
the medium of restoration to order and to duty ; 
for this purpose it permits remorse, but never en- 
joins despair. It allows of fear as far as this 
excites to caution; and even of terror, when 
the mind has been surprised by something tre- 
mendous ; but habitual fear it terms cowardice, 
and to terror perpetually excited by small causes, 
it gives the appellation of pusillanimity. It 
approves of the emulation which animates to 
worthy deeds, or to advancement in every species 
of excellence : nor does it forbid the ambi- 
tion which is productive of general good; but 
it execrates the wretch who wades through seas 
of blood, and tramples upon the slain, to rise 
above all those whom his baneful sword has 
spared. Envy, which is the antipode to bene- 
volence, Virtue knows not : and though it ad- 
mits of jealous alarms upon great occasions, and 
prompted by strong presumptive evidence, yet 
it is a stranger to unauthorised suspicions. It 



326 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

permits the moderate desire of wealth, as the 
means both of comfort and usefulness; but it 
lays rapaciousness and avarice under the severest 
interdict. It allows of self-defence, and we are 
occasionally inspired with strength and courage 
for the purpose ; but it disdains the use of trea- 
cherous means of security, and the acts of cruelty 
which characterize the barbarian and the coward. 

These remarks point out another distinction 
of the passions and affections, as they relate to 
the moral character, indicating a scale of com- 
parative merit and demerit. Some are innocent 
simply; as hope, joy, moderate grief. Some 
are laudable ; as contentment, satisfaction, com- 
placency. Others are deemed peculiarly noble. 
Thus the virtue of Benevolence is much more 
dignified than any of the affections which ori- 
ginate and terminate in Self. In the different 
branches of this virtue there are also degrees of 
excellence. Warm sympathetic emotions, when 
they prompt to peculiar exertions, are in higher 
estimation than the calmer feelings and offices 
of charity; and Mercy, by subduing resentment, 
is justly deemed more transcendent than either. 
Some reelings are so essential, that to be desti- 
tute of them is highly disgraceful ; as the want 
of Gratitude. The angry passions, though they 



ON CHARACTER. 327 

may be innocent, yet they stand upon the very 
brink of demerit, being so proximate to injustice 
and cruelty. Some affections and dispositions 
are contemptible ; as sordid avarice, envy, malice: 
these are despised by all who are not under their 
influence. Ingenuous shame is viewed with 
approbation, as it indicates a consciousness of 
defect, united with reverence for opinion. 
Guilty shame, though not criminal in itself, yet 
being the detection of criminality, it sometimes 
exposes the offender to the severest contempt ; 
as when it marks the countenance of a detected 
hypocrite: sometimes it will excite compassion, 
and prompt to forgiveness ; when, for example, 
an offence, highly disreputable, is proved to be 
a total deviation from the general tearour of con- 
duct. The blush indicates a- mind not inured 
to vice. It sues for compassion, and proves 
that it is not totally unworthy of it. 

Again, in our search after happiness, each 
particular desire and pursuit is either deemed 
innocent, or it assumes an honourable or igno- 
minious character, according to the nature of the 
object, the eagerness with which it is followed, 
and the means employed for its attainment. 
Some desires are discriminated by particular 
appellations, which serve to stigmatize, or do 



328 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

honour to the affections ; while others, not 
marking either excellence or culpability, have 
no terms of discrimination. 

Several instances of this nature have been 
given under the article of Desire, by which 
it appears that a prevalent love of virtue and 
detestation of vice have, in every case where 
personal interest has not perverted the judgment, 
and alienated the affections, taught all mankind, 
without previous consultation or conspiracy, to 
invent the concisest mode of testifying approba- 
tion or disapprobation, according to the apparent 
degrees of merit or demerit. Similar to the plan 
of an universal language, which some have 
deemed practicable, or to pre-concerted signals, 
and telegraphic signs, very complex ideas are 
conveyed by simple terms, which immediately 
express satire or applause, crown with honour, 
or call forth abhorrence. The numerous occa- 
sions which incessantly present themselves, of 
expressing our opinions of human actions, and 
our eagerness to approve or censure, render 
us impatient of paraphrase, or circumlocu- 
tion. 

It is also observable that our ideas of Charac- 
ter are invariably formed, according to the 
habitual tendency of disposition and conduct to 



ON CHARACTER. S29 

become beneficial or pernicious ; that is to pro- 
mote or to destroy Good! Where conduct has no 
immediate relation to these, it does not call 
forth animadversion. In proportion as it pro- 
duces and disseminates Good; as it makes exer- 
tions and consents to liberal sacrifices for this 
purpose, does it meet with our applause and ad- 
miration. In proportion as vice diffuses Misery, 
as it is the'result of mean and selfish principles, 
indicated by pre-concerted plans and propensi- 
ties, to sacrifice the felicity of others to our 
own narrow personal gratifications, it becomes 
detestable and abhorrent. Hence Compassion 
meets with warmer applause than the simple 
love of Justice, because Compassion is an actual 
participation in the sufferings of another; while 
Justice is only a due solicitude that they shall 
not suffer any unmerited injury from us. A 
merciful and forgiving disposition is still more 
noble, because it generously removes a very 
powerful impediment, which the offending party 
himself has raised, against the exercise of our 
compassion, for the distress to which his injus- 
tice towards us has exposed him. On the other 
side, Treachery and Cruelty are more detestable 
than common acts of injustice, because the one 
is a grosser abuse of that confidence without 
which society cannot subsist; and the other 



330 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

manifests not only inordinate self-love, but the 
want of that natural atfection which is due to 
every being ; substituting the affection of hatred 
in its place. 

It is further manifest from the above remarks, 
that both Virtue and Vice are the offspring of 
passions and affections in themselves inno- 
cent. The natural desires and affections im- 
planted in our very make, are void of guilt. 
Respecting these, virtue simply requires a pro- 
per choice, innocent pursuits, and moderation 
in our enjoyments. Vice consists in an impro- 
per, or forbidden choice, in the excess or per- 
version, of the natural propensity of our natures. 
Lawless ambition is the excess of a desire to dis- 
tinguish ourselves, which, under certain re- 
strictions, is a blameless incentive to useful 
actions. As every species of debauchery con- 
sists in the irregular indulgence of the appetites, 
in themselves natural and innocent, thus are the 
most disorderly and malevolent affections the 
abuse of some affections, which in certain cir- 
cumstances, may be allowable and beneficial. 
Envy is anger, unjust, and pettish, at the good 
fortune of another, mixed with a very false 
idea of our superior deserts. Cruelty is the ex- 
cess of a severity which in itself may be justifl- 



ON HAPPINESS. 331 

able; and Malice the most inveterate, is the 
cruelty of envy, attempting by words and 
actions to destroy or dimmish the good we can- 
not participates 

Thus then it appears, that Character depends 
upon the prevalent use or abuse of certain pro- 
pensities or affections of our nature. Those 
who select and cultivate the most beneficial are 
the best of characters ; those, who are habitua- 
ted to the most injurious, are the worst. 



SECTION IV. 

Influence of the Passions and Affections on 
Happiness, 

Though the desire of Good is in reality the 
efficient cause of every passion, emotion, and 
affection, yet the immediate effects of each on 
our sensations, are correspondent to its own spe- 
cific nature. To be under the influence of some, 
is productive of temporary well being; while 
others are comfortless, irksome, or productive 
of a great degree of wretchedness. 



332 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

Love considered as an affection placed upon a 
deserving object, and recompensed with recipro- 
cal affection, Joy, Ecstasy, Complacency, Sa- 
tisfaction, Contentment, lively Hope, these arc 
decidedly the sources of present enjoyment. 
The social affections of Benevolence, Sympathy, 
Compassion, and Mercy, are also other ingredi- 
ents of happiness, from a less selfish and more 
refined source than the preceding. A steady, 
uniform disposition, manifested by incessant 
endeavours to promote happiness, is invariably 
rewarded with a large portion of it. Benevo- 
lence places the mind at a remote distance from 
little jealousies and envyings : it tempers the 
irritative nature of anger, and teaches compas- 
sion to subdue it. Through Benevolence, the 
good enjoyed by another becomes our own, 
without a robbery or privation. This divine 
principle harmonizes the mind with every thing 
around, and feels itself pleasingly connected 
with every living being. It generates, commu- 
nicates, and enjoys happiness. When benevo- 
lence manifests itself by sympathy, compas- 
sion, and mercy, some portion of uneasiness, it 
is acknowledged, accompanies the sensation con- 
genial to its nature: but the exercise of these 
affections communicates a pleasing pain. The 
degree of uneasiness is more than recompensed, 



ON HAPPINESS. 533 

by the satisfaction enjoyed from the relief of 
distress; and even from the conciousness of a 
disposition to relieve. There is often a luxury 
in sympathetic sorrow ; and the tear shed over 
distress becomes a pearl of inestimable price. 
Every species of Benevolence possesses the qua- 
lity which our great dramatic Poet has ascribed 
to a merciful disposition. 

The quality of Mercy's not restrain'd : 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven, 
Upon the land beneath. It is twice blessed j 
It blesses him that gives, and him that takes, 

SHAKESFEAU. 

The mildest of the affections which belong to 
the family of Love, diffuse a pleasurable tran- 
quillity over the mind. They constitute the 
healthy state of the soul, united with a consci- 
ousness of this health. The more lively affec- 
tions invigorate the frame, exciting a delectable 
vivacity; and. the impetuous emotions, termed 
ecstasies and transports, infuse a wild tumul- 
tuous pleasure ! Immoderation leaves the helm ; 
the animal spirits uncontrouled violently agitate 
the corporeal frame, and confound the mental 
faculties in a pleasing delirium. 

Jn some of these kindlv emotions, circurn- 



334 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

stances and situations, in themselves displeasing, 
are rendered capable of communicating pleasure. 
Thus in the sudden possession of good conferred 
by a superior, Gratitude, though it is so closely 
connected with the idea of our own wants, and 
the dependency of our state, rises above these 
natural causes of depressed spirits. The atten- 
tion is arrested by the Good received, and the 
heart glozvs with Affection towards the bene- 
factor ; which is a more pleasing sensation than 
Independency itself could ensure. Thus in the 
contemplation of the unrivalled excellencies 
possessed by another, lively enjoyment becomes 
intimately connected with the deepest sense of 
inferiority : as in the emotions of admiration, 
reverence, and awe. Nor is Humility, notwith- 
standing its abject appearance, devoid of Dig- 
nity. It is accompanied with a strong Affection 
for excellencies, while it laments that it cannot 
attain them : and a conscious wish, to subdue 
remaining defects, inspires more Satisfaction 
than the self-sufficiency of arrogance can boast. 
Even Desire itself, which is an eager longing 
for gratification, — if it be not intemperate, — if 
it be united with hope, — if it be not prolonged 
to the weariness of patience, is cherished with 
a great degree of pleasure. The expectancy of 
enjoyment more than counterpoises the pain 
created by suspense. 



ON HAPPINESS. 335 

Another set of emotions and affections are 
of the unquiet and irritating class ; as the 
whole family of Anger. The exciting objects 
are unwelcome to the mind which contemplates 
them, and the sensations they produce are tur- 
bulent and painful. It is true, some degree 
of satisfaction may be inspired by the vivid 
idea entertained, at the instant, of the justice 
of our cause, as also by the gratification, or 
even the resolution to gratify, the newly-created 
desire of revenge, or by the conscious supe- 
riority which accompanies contempt and disdain; 
but these are purchased at the expence of the 
infinitely superior pleasures, infused by the 
opposite spirit of love, complacency, and bene- 
volence. The mind finds itself in bondage to 
its emotions, and feels that it is driven by their 
impetuosity, not only to the greatest: distance 
from the nobler sources of enjoyment, but to 
the verge of misery itself. Danger is appre- 
hended from the excess of passion, while it is 
indulged ; and the subject himself trembles, 
lest it should be productive of irreparable evil, 
repentance, and remorse. 

Sorrow and Grief, though they are certainly 
in the class of the most unpleasant affections, 
yet they have something so fascinating in them, 
that the mind under their influence, is arrested 



336 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

and absorbed, as it were, in the contemplation 
of their cause. The good of which we are 
deprived is now appreciated, perhaps, for the 
first time, according to its value ; perhaps beyond 
its value. This contemplation of qualities, 
which once gave delight, or which were fondly 
expected to give delight, mingles a pleasure 
with the severe pain, which privation or disap- 
pointment has occasioned. 

Even Penitence and Contrition, when they 
are inspired by ingenuous motives, — when a 
detestation of former conduct proceeds from 
a conviction of its baseness, and sorrow for 
the injury it has done, and not from the ap- 
prehension of punishment or the shame of 
detection, even penitence and contrition are 
not devoid of pleasure I The Penitent, in the 
midst of his painful self-condemnation, feels a 
latent satisfaction in the disposition and reso- 
lution to return to the paths of virtue. 

The emotions and affections, of Fear, Dread, 
Horror, Despair, are of the most horrid and tre- 
mendous class. They vary in degrees of wretch- 
edness, according to the degrees of their intense- 
ness, whether this be increased by temperament, 
bj the extreme importance, or by the complicated 
nature of the exciting cause. Excessive Jea- 
lousy, Envy, Remorse, Despair, Shame arising 
from the detection of guilt, are misery unmixed. 



ON HAPPINESS. 33? 

They render life insufferable, and tempt the 
despondent and distracted mind to venture 
upon all the horrors of an unknown state, rather 
than support the pangs of its present feelings. 

Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, principally 
receive their complexion from the subjects that 
inspire them ; and they are introductory to hap- 
piness or misery, according to the nature of the 
cause exciting them. In Surprise particularly, the 
sudden and unexpected arrival of an interesting 
event, correspondent with the nature of the 
affection already indulged, will turn hope and 
joy into ecstasy, displeasure into anger, and 
fear into terror and dismay. 



Thus, in the pleasing emotions, the idea of 
Good necessarily predominates ; and in the 
painful ones, the idea of Evil. Accordingly, 
those emotions which are produced by compli- 
cated good, or by the union of such causes, 
as separately possess the power of calling forth 
pleasing emotions and affections, contribute 
most to happiness. In the emotions of hope, 
satisfaction, and joy, when personal concerns 
are intimately connected with some common 
interest, and the blessings received have an 
extensive influence, the emotions receive addi- 

z 



338 INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS 

tional vigour, and are enjoyed with peculiar 
suavity. Social affections are now blended with 
self-love. The two torrents which so frequently 
oppose each other, fortunately unite and enlarge 
the stream of enjoyment; and the most desir- 
able branch of benevolence, rejoicing with 
those that rejoice, is super-added to the natural 
pleasure we take in our own good. 

Again, (Gratitude unites to the joy inspired 
by a benefit received, the pleasure derived from 
an affectionate sense of the obligation, and of 
love to the benefactor ; and if the magnitude 
of the benefit, or the mode of conferring it, 
be productive of surprise, wonder, admiration, 
the delectable affections of joy, gratitude, and 
love, will, by the operation of these vivid 
passions, be proportionably augmented. 

Were the imagination commanded to paint 
the highest felicity to be enjoyed by created 
beings, it would surely point out the union of 
the following emotions and affections. Ardent 
Love for an object decidedly worthy of our 
love, chastened with high Veneration ; — Astonish- 
ment inspired by the contemplation of the num- 
ber and extent of its excellencies, and at the 
unremitted exertion of these excellencies in 
the diffusion of good; — Admiration at the wise 
means adapted to the accomplishment of the 



ON HAPPINESS, 339 

interesting purpose ; — Joy and Gratitude for 
benefits already received ; — lively Hope of good 
incalculable in reserve for ourselves, conjointly 
with others whose welfare we ardentlv desire, 
accompanied with a Consciousness that we also 
have contributed a something to the general 
mass of felicity, according to the extent of our 
ability ! These are ingredients to constitute 
the perfection of bliss ! Love, Joy, Gratitude, 
Surprise, Admiration,, Complacency, Hope, and 
Benevolence unbounded, may thus occupy the 
mind in a transporting variety, or by exerting 
their united powers at the same instant, occa- 
sion inconceivable raptures ! ! ! 



END OF PART THE SECOND, 



Z <2 



I 



NOTES 



TO THE 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 



NOTES 



TO THE 



PRECEDING TREATISE, 



Note A. 

After u Whether its influence be of a pleasant or 
unpleasant nature." Page 6. 

This opinion has the support of respectable authori- 
ties. Dr. Watts remarks, that <e the word properly sig- 
" nifies receiving the action of some agent." (See 
Watts on the Passions,) Mr. Grove observes, that ee the 
" mind in certain circumstances, and within certain 
" degrees, has no dominion over itself, or the body. It 
" is in a manner passive, can neither help the agitation 
" of the blood and spirits, nor help being itself affected 
" by them." (See Sys. of Moral Phil. Vol. 1. Ch. vii.) 
Seneca also thus expresses himself : " Omnes motus 
st qui non voluntate nostra fiunt, invicti, et inevitabiles 
<c sunt : ut horror frigida aspersis ; ad quosdam ictus, 
t( aspernatio ; ad pejores nuntios subriguntur pill _; et 
" ruber ad improba verba suffunditur j sequitur vertigo 
" prserupta Cernantes. Ista ut ita dicam, patitar magis 
<f animus quam facit" (De Ira. L. 2. C. 2.) 



344 NOTES TO THE 



Note B. 

After te are the most appropriate." Page 13. 

It is acknowledged that these words are frequently 
used indiscriminately, and sometimes without manifest 
impropriety; but if they cannot be used at all times, 
with equal propriety, there must be a specific difference 
between them. Now it is observable that the word 
Emotion is not frequently applied to those passions in 
which the external signs are the least violent. We sel- 
dom say that any one is under the emotion of Fear; 
because abject fear has something oppressive in its 
nature, and is frequently silent and motionless. When 
fear is indicated by violent agitations, it acquires the 
character of terror; and we feel that the phrase emotions 
of terror is strictly proper. We never apply the epithet 
to hope, distinctly considered, because though it be 
lively and animating, it is not accompanied by external 
signs of transport. When these appear they arc always 
ascribed to the joy, which is frequently connected with 
hope ; and we perceive a peculiar propriety in the term 
joyful emotions, because joy is so frequently indicated by 
some eccentric tokens. 

Whoever attends to these circumstances, in addition 
to the principles already advanced, will be surprised at 
the assertion of Lord Kaims, that " an emotion is in its 
" nature quiescent, and merely a passive feeling." (Ele- 
ments of Criticism, 5th Edit. Vol. 1. Page 41.) Both 
the etymology of the word, and almost every connection 



PRECEDING . TREATISE. 345 

*, 
in which it is used with decided propriety, confute this 

strange position. The Author was probably led into the 
idea by the very confined view he has taken of the pas- 
sions, in his elegant Essay. He chiefly considers thera 
as connected with the fine Arts, and subjects of taste ; 
and as expressive of those agreeable or disagreeable 
effects which they produce, when first presented to our 
notice. These effects, it is allowed, are seldom so 
violent, in cultivated minds, as to occasion the emotions 
which indicate themselves by strong and characteristic 
marks. 

His Lordship having denied external signs to emotions, 
l»as transferred them to the passions. Rut in order to 
establish his hypothesis, he is obliged to give a very dif- 
ferent definition of the passions from any that his prede- 
cessors have adopted, or that either etymology or usage 
will justify. According to his system, a passion is com- 
pounded of this quiescent emotion, and a desire to obtain 
the object which occasioned it. u An internal motion 
** or agitation of the mind," says he, " when it passeth 
fi away without desire, is denominated an emotion ; when 
" desire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated 
fe a passion." Numerous objections might be opposed 
to the position. I shall only observe that according to 
this hypothesis, the external signs of the passions would 
be the strongest where desires are the strongest ; which 
is directly opposite to what we perceive in the avaricious 
man : — that joy can neither be considered as a passion 
nor an emotion ; because its visible transports would 
destroy its title to the latter, and its being excited, not 
by desire itself, but by the accomplishment of a desire, 
will exclude it from the former :— Nor can we discover 



346 NOTES TO THE 

what should, at any time, excite those transports which 
are sometimes both visible and tremendous ; for emo- 
tions being quiescent, and desires not being of them- 
selves turbulent, their union, could they possibly exist 
together, is not likely to produce those corporeal agita- 
tions so frequently observable ; unless we were to admit 
a process similar to a chemical fermentation. But they 
cannot exist together, and, consequently, an emotion 
can receive no assistance from desire, by which it may 
be transformed into a passion ; for, according to his own 
system, desire succeeds to emotion. 

His Lordship's embarassm.ent on this subject, which 
he ingenuously acknowledges, manifestly proceeds from 
his not having made a fortunate selection of terms, to 
discriminate existent differences. To every simple im- 
pression he has given the name of an emotion j and he 
has applied the term passion exclusively, to what is in 
its own nature an affection ; and whenever it is consi- 
dered as a Passion, it is merely in its secondary sense ; 
expressing the captivating influence of any particular 
object of desire, or of an irresistible attachment to it. 
By admitting these few alterations, what he has written 
on the subject may be read with much edification and 
pleasure. 



Note C. 

After u It would be to annihilate misery." Page 22. 

Dr. Hartlky, in establishing the doctrine of vibra- 
tions, and the hypothesis of associated ideas founded 
upon it, asserts that " the desire of happiness, and aver- 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 34? 

u sion to misery, are not inseparable from and essential 
" to all intelligent natures." 

Without venturing to oppose, unnecessarily, so cautious 
and conclusive a reasoner, I shall just observe, that the 
above assertion is expressed in much stronger language, 
than the principles which he attempts to enforce abso- 
lutely require. It is acknowledged that his theory opposes 
the existence of innate ideas ', and whoever admits the 
theory must allow, that there can be no desire after hap- 
piness or fear of misery, before we have been made 
acquainted, some way or other, with their natures. 
Therefore, when he asserts that the desire of happiness, 
and aversion to misery, are not inseparable from, and 
essential to all intelligent natures, he can only mean, 
that they are not co-existent with the power of intelli- 
gence, and that they are desires and aversions acquired 
by experience ; not that the reflective mind can, at any 
time, be totally indifferent about happiness and misery. 
For by whatever method we may have obtained a know- 
ledge of either, the position remains indubitable, that 
no one ever tasted of happiness, or possessed the 
smallest degree of ease or pleasure, without contracting 
an affection for them ; or experienced misery and unea- 
siness, without contracting an hatred towards them. 



Note D. 

After a The individual stock of each would render hap- 
piness universal." Page 27* 

It would not only be a severe but an absurd requisition, 
to expect that mankind should universally be more atten- 



S4S NOTES TO THE 

tive to the welfare of others than to their own. This 
would be to love our neighbours better than ourselves, 
without ascribing to them any of the qualities requisite 
to attract our love. Nor would this mode of exercising 
benevolence be so productive of good as the present con- 
stitution of our nature, as it would be impossible to 
obtain an equal knowledge of their wants and desires ; 
nor would it be so favourable to the cause of benevo- 
lence as has been imagined. No mind truly generous, 
or deserving of attention, could possibly receive the gift 
of Well-being entirely at the expence of the Donor. 
Thus, were the selfish principle totally extinguished, the 
reciprocal communication of Good would be little more 
ihan a complimentary exchange. 



Note E. 

After " Not always in our recollection." Page 30. 

Some Authors, of great respectability, have expressed 
themselves in a manner which conveys ideas very differ- 
ent from those we have attempted to establish. Dr. 
lleid speaks of loving things for their own sakes, and 
considers the class of philosophers who suppose that the 
love of every object may be resolved into its utility, to 
be in an error. Lord Kaims maintains that some affec- 
tions are neither selfish nor sodal. 

These opinions seem to receive support from the sen- 
timent oi* Cicero, who observes " Est quiddam quod sua 
" vi nos illieiat ad se 3 Don emolumcnto eaptans aliquo, 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 349 

u sed trahens sua dignitate : quod genus, virtus, scien- 
" tia, Veritas" 

It is so presumptuous to differ from such authorities, 
that I am reluctant to expose myself to the suspicion. 
Their doctrine is expressed in very ambiguous language. 
It is possible that a proper investigation of the subject 
will indicate that it does not, in its tenour, oppose the 
sentiments advanced in the text. If I fail in this 
attempt, it may still appear that it has not confuted 
them. 

When it is said that we love things for their own 
sakes, let us examine what signification can be attached 
to the expression ? We could not possibly love any 
thing totally void of qualities, were it possible for such 
a thing to exist ; because there would be nothing to love. 
But the things specified by these authors, as being 
attractive by their dignity alone, manifestly possess qua- 
lities of the highest utility : for their dignity itself con- 
sists in the superiority of their usefulness. When, 
therefore, it is alleged that such things are loved for 
their own sakes, the only consistent ideas we can annex 
to the phrase must be, that we love them from their 
capacity of producing, in certain circumstances, some 
great and extensive good ; though we should not expe- 
rience the good, or observe the application of this power, 
in particular instances, either in ourselves or others. 
For example, it is as certain that virtue, science, truth, 
are of infinite importance to the welfare of the whole 
intelligent creation, as that they possess the powerful 
attractions ascribed to them by Cicero. A society of 
liars would create greater confusion than that of Babel ; 
nor could it exist for a day. Science dispels pernicious 



350 NOTES TO THE 

ignorance ; it makes us acquainted with the choicest 
qualities existent \ and universal Virtue would be pro- 
ductive of universal happiness. Every man, therefore, 
whose mind is not upon a level with the brute creation, 
and who has perceived, in a single instance, the benefi- 
cial effects, flowing from these excellencies, or the 
baneful consequences engendered by their contraries, 
must respect them. This respect, howevtr, will be 
founded either upon his own experience, or upon his 
observation of their influence on others, In the first 
case, they are the result of personal love of good 5 and 
in the second, of the benevolent principle. For it is 
very obvious that the class of objects, of which it is 
asserted that they are loved for their own sakes, alone 
attract the attention of the cultivated mind, or of such 
as possess a considerable share of natural benevo- 
lence. 

Innumerable are the proofs that the very capacity of 
being useful, will inspire an affection for many things, 
which are permitted to remain in a dormant state. The 
miser loves his gold so intensely, that he will not part 
with it, in exchange for the choicest blessing it is able 
to purchase. The man of science loves his library, 
though it may contain many hundred volumes which he 
h?s never consulted. The good housewife delights in the 
plate or porcelain, which is perpetually locked up in her 
cabinet : and the eastern monarch is watchful over a 
seraglio infinitely too extensive for his enjoyment. 

The above i] point out the sense in which we 

be said to Love any thing for its own sake. These 
different objects are loved, as powers of utility or gra- 

ti n in reserve, that is, we are so constituted that we 



PRECEDING TREATISE. *51 

cannot avoid approving, admiring, or loving, whatever 
possesses in a great degree, either the capacity or the 
disposition to promote, what we deem to be good for us, 
or what is pleasing to us. 



Note F. 

After " threaten to endanger our well-being." Page 39* 

Mr. Hume commences his Dissertation on the Passions 
in the following manner: "Some objects produce an 
" agreeable sensation, by the original structure of our 
iS organs - } and are thence denominated Good \ as others, 
" from immediate disagreeable sensations, acquire the 
" appellation of Evil. Thus moderate warmth is agree- 
sc able and good ; excessive heat, painful and evil. 

Some objects again, by being naturally conformable 
or contrary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful 
sensation, and are thence called good or evil. The 
punishment of an adversary by gratifying revenge is 
(i Good ; the sickness of a companion, by affecting 
*' friendship, is evil" 

Will it be necessary to point out to any of my readers 
the pernicious sophistry of this statement ? Is it not a 
wanton introduction of a chaos, I will not say in morals, 
but in the nature and character of human motives and 
human conduct ? It gives the important appellation of 
Good;, to the greatest opposites, without discriminating 
the specific natures of each ; merely because, in some 
circumstances, and in some characters, they may produce 
pleasing or painful sensations. Thus is moderate warmth 



ft 

ft 

6i 



352 NOTES TO THE 

placed upon a level with sentiments and dispositions, cal- 
culated to produce the most exalted felicity ; and to the 
gratification of revenge, is given the same colouring as 
to the pardon of an injury, or alleviating distress ! 

This studied confusion of ideas may, in some connec- 
tions, be productive of wit. It is always " such stuff as 
" conundrums are made of" but it is directly opposite to 
the genius of true philosophy ! 

If my ideas of a conundrum be accurate, it consists in 
an attempt to make two things appear closely to resemble 
each other, which are the most opposite in their natures. 
This is done by directing the attention to some medium 
thought or middle term, which may, in one sense or other, 
be applicable to each. For example, if it be asked why 
is a person in the upper part of a house committing theft, 
like a man of the strictest virtue f The answer is, because 
he is above, doing a bad action. The word above being 
in certain senses applicable to each subject, we are sur- 
prised and amused at the unexpected points of resem- 
blance. Thus again if it be asked, In what does a per- 
son, who attempts to kill another in a fit of anger, re- 
semble the man who protects his life ? The answer of 
Mr. Hume will be, both actions excite agreeable sensar 
tions, and are therefore good ! The first conundrum is 
allowed to be better than the second ; but this will only 
prove that there are degrees of excellence in this kind of 
writing, as well as in every other; and that it is much 
better adapted to subjects of amusement, than to phi- 
losopby. 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 353 



Note G. 

After " the passions and affections could not have been 
excited." Page 42. 

Perhaps there is no branch of philosophy more diffi- 
cult, than that of distinguishing between real and appa- 
rent qualities in objects. Since all that we know of qua- 
lities is derived from the impression made upon us, a 
previous question presents itself, whether our suscepti- 
bility of impressions be always accurate, or perfectly cor- 
respondent with the real nature of the object ? Until this 
point be settled, our ideas of qualities must be vague and 
indeterminate. Lord Kaims has, in one instance, made 
the attempt ; but his observations are so unsatisfactory, 
and his mode of reasoning so inconclusive, that I feel 
myself much relieved in not being obliged to imitate his 
example. 

In a chapter where he treats of Emotions and Passions 
as pleasant and painful, agreeable and disagreeable, he 
attempts to prove that agreeable and disagreeable are qua- 
lities in the Object perceived, pleasant and unpleasant 
are descriptive of the Emotions we feel. The former are 
perceived as adhering to the object, the latter are felt as 
existing in us. At first view, these distinctions appear 
specious, but, upon critical examination, apprehensions 
maybe justly entertained, whether they be not instances 
of that inaccuracy which he considers to be " not at all 
" venial in the science of Ethics/' 

Si Viewing a garden," says he, " I perceive it to be 
a a 



354 NOTES TO THE 

;; beautiful or agreeable ; and I consider the beauty or 
*' agreeableness as belonging to tbe object, or as one of 
" its qualities. When I turn my attention from the gar- 

* den to what passes in my mind, I am conscious of a 
'* pleasant emotion, of which the garden is the cause : 
" the pleasure here is felt as a quality, not of the garden, 

* but of the emotion produced by it. I give another 
ie example. A rotten carcase is disagreeable, and raises 
" in the spectator a painful emotion : the disagreeable- 
" ness is a quality of the Object ; the pain is a quality of 
" the Emotion produced by it." (Elements of Criti- 
cism, vol. i. chap. ii. part 11.) 

With deference to so respectable an authority, this 
distinction does not appear to be just. Agreeable, accord- 
ing to its etymology, manifestly relates to the effects pro- 
duced upon us, as much as the word pleasant. The dif- 
ference is in degree, not in nature. Agreeable expresses 
something that appears suitable or correspondent with 
our nature, dispositions, and tastes ; something that per- 
fectly agrees with us ; exciting the idea of comfort, and 
inspiring contentment and satisfaction. What is pleasant 
goes farther. It excites a sensation within us, more 
nearly approaching to an emotion. That agreeableness 
cannot be allowed to exist in the subject itself, is plain, 
from the diversity of opinions concerning it, without the 
possibility of discovering a standard, by which to mark a 
deviation from the law of nature. Were it resident in 
Objects, the effects must be uniform and absolute, in 
every one whose powers of perception arc not disordered. 
Rut this is not the case. Numberless causes conspire to 
change our ideas of the qualities of Objects, and may 
render some objects i or disagreeable, pleasant 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 355 

or unpleasant to the same person at different times. To 
give a familar instance. Sweet things are most agreeable 
to children ; but when they become adults the taste is 
changed. It is possible that the smoke of tobacco, and 
the taste of porter may become agreeable to the man, 
who detested them when a child. Can we say, therefore, 
that there is an inherent agreeableness in tobacco which 
pleases the adult, and an inherent disagreeableness which 
disgusts the infant ? Or to admit his Lordship's example 
of a garden. It is acknowledged that the idea of a gar- 
den excites pleasant sensations, in most persons. Plenty 
of the delicate luxuries of nature, beauty, verdure, varie- 
gated flowers, &c. elegant retirement from the noise and 
bustle of the world, crowd in upon the imagination. 
But are we agreed in every circumstance respecting a 
garden ? Was not the stiffest formality once deemed an 
essential beauty ? Has not this taste given way to irre- 
gular clumps and clusters ? Are not these of late 
become the subject of ridicule, and a style more corres- 
pondent with the wild beauties of nature preferred? 
And when these have been enjoyed for some time, a 
future race may possibly observe that the distinction be- 
tween a garden and afield is not sufficiently marked, and 
may again place their ideas of beauty in that formal regu- 
larity, which is at present so much despised. 



Not© H. 

After "Either taste or address, &e." Page 71* 

Dr. Watts does not seem to have expressed himself 
with sufficient accuracy^ when he observes, that " If 

A ay 2 



35C NOTES TO THE 

" any object appear pleasing and fit to do us good, it 
ee raises the love of complacency." These two expres- 
sions are not synonymous. Many things may be pleas- 
ing to us, from which we apprehend mischief; and in 
these we cannot take complacency. 

Again he says, 6i Complacency dwells upon its object 
" with delight : We gaze upon a figure, we listen to 
cc music, we dwell long in a fine garden, we dwell in 
" the company of our friends.'* All these instances con- 
tain attributes calculated to inspire complacency, as 
ingenuity and taste may be manifested in the three first, 
and worth moral or mental, may be possessed by the last. 
Yet it may be justly doubted, whether precision of lan- 
guage will permit us to apply the word Complacency to 
these cases, unless there be some kind or degree of 
appropriation. We may approve 5 we may enjoy great 
pleasure and delight in inanimate objects, when we view 
them as belonging to strangers : but it has never been 
sai-1 of a connoisseur, that he took complacency in the 
Apollo de Belvedere, or in the Venus de Medicis, in 
Stowe Gardens, or the Leasowes of Shenstone, however 
lie may have been delighted by these objects. Some 
kind of relation, however slight, appears necessary, to 
enable even such objects to inspire complacency. If we 
take complacency in garments, or flowers, or gardens, 
it is when they belong either to ourselves or to our 
friend ; or when they manifest our own taste or skill, or 
that of another for whom we are interested. Nor will 
the most perfect Concert excite complacency in the 
audience at large, though it may in the composers, 
performers, directors, or any of their particular acquain- 
tances. 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 357 



Note I, 

After ic Pride;' Page 74. 

The above definition and descriptions of Pride, are 
founded upon the various acceptations of that word in 
common language, and supported by the authority of 
our best Writers. But Mr. Hume, in defiance of each, 
has given a very different definition of pride, which I 
believe to be totally his own, and ought of consequence 
to possess great internal merit to justify its boldness, in 
opposing those ideas which have hitherto been received 
universally. Let us examine it. 

He defines pride to be a u certain satisfaction in our- 
" selves, on account of some accomplishment or posses- 
" sion which we enjoy." Again. " The object of 
" pride is self, the cause, some excellence." Again. 
" Our merit raises pride, and it is essential to pride to 
" turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satis- 
" faction." (See Dissertation on the Passions, passim.) 

As Mr. Hume has made no distinction between real 
and supposed merit, he necessarily directs our thoughts 
to absolute merit; nor can there, according to this 
statement, be any place for a vitious pride, or an ill- 
founded confidence in our own superiority. This is ex- 
cluded, by his definition, from the character of pride. 

Our Philosopher has also advanced, in another place, 
that " Self-satisfaction, in some degree at least, is an 
" advantage which equally attends the Fool and the 
" Wise." (On Qualities necessary to ourselves. §6.) 
Now what is the cause of this self-satisfaction, in the 



858 NOTES TO THE 

fool? According to the above position it must be 
Merit, And in the wise man ? Merit, Thus the wise 
man and the fool are made to resemble each other so 
closely, in the most interesting of all desirable qualities, 
merit, and self-satisfaction, that there is no material dif- 
ference between them. What there is, will probably be 
to the advantage of the fool. As he will be much more 
liable to be pleased with himself our Author's hypo- 
thesis leads us to suspect that he may possess the most 
merit. 

Should it be alleged that the above statement is a mis- 
representation ; I would answer, that such an allegation 
can alone be supported by explanations which will mili- 
tate against the sentiments, so repeatedly and assiduously 
advanced. Recourse must be had to a distinction between 
real and supposed merit. This will demonstrate that there 
must be two species of pride included in the definition; and 
that these are as opposite to each other as light and dark- 
ness, knowledge and ignorance ; and, consequently, that 
it is not only very unphilosophical to comprise the most 
opposite qualities under the same genus, but very wige- 
nerous to confound the good principle with the evil one, 
by giving indiscriminately the same appellations to 
both. 



Note K. 

After " the ambitious passions is a familiar expression." 
Page 82. 

Dr. Reid places Desires among the animal principles ; 
but he distinguishes them u from the Appetites by this, 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 359 

?' that there is not a sensation proper to each, and always 
H accompanying it ; and that they are not periodical but 
" constant, not being satiated with their object for a 
" time as the appetites are." He adds, ct the desires 
" I have in view are chiefly these three, the desire of 
" power, the desire of esteem, and the desire of know- 
" ledge." 

This is not the place to enquire whether the desires, 
here specified, deserve to be ranked among the animal 
principles ; but as the above description of a particular 
class of desires, appears to oppose the sentiments we 
have advanced, it demands a few observations. 

We may first remark that the distinction made be- 
tween appetites and desires is inaccurate, for the appe- 
tites are doubtless one class of desires ; nor is there a 
sensual appetite totally separate from the mental affec- 
tions and desires ; if there were, the grossest appetites 
might be indulged without culpability. 

2dly. The doctrine itself is very obscurely expressed. 
Does the doctor mean that one sensation is common to 
them all ? Then must the desire of power be similar to that 
of knowledge. If he means that desires are not uneasy 
sensations, and adduces those specified as proofs, we 
may observe that they are here considered in their mildest 
state, and we are taught to imagine, from the de- 
scription given of them, that this was their permanent 
character : whereas it is well known that the desire of 
Power is frequently as rampant as the strongest appetites, 
degenerating into insatiable ambition ; that the desire of 
Esteem may become so excessive as to stir up painful 
emulation, and still more painful envy ; and that the 
desire of Knowledge is frequently so restless as to induce 



360 NOTES TO THE 

the possessor to forego his ease, and encounter dangers 
and difficulties innumerable in order to gratify it. 

But although, in their mildest state, they may not 
equal the appetites, they are attended with a degree of 
uneasiness which impels to actiye endeavours after the 
desired objects. If no uneasy sensation accompanied 
either, there could be no motive to counteract the love 
of ease and indolence, so natural toman. The prospect 
of success may indeed inspire the pleasure of hope, 
and the benefits promised by each pursuit, may be so 
powerfully anticipated by the imagination, that the 
pleasing sensations, from these adventitious causes, shall 
greatly preponderate ; but if no uneasy sensation were 
excited, by the comparison of our actual situation 
with tbat we may possibly attain, our endeavours after 
the attainment could never have been excited. 

The Professor's subsequent observations perfectly cor- 
respond with these remarks. He says that " the pur- 
" suits of Power, of Fame, and of Knowledge, require 
" a self-command no less than virtue does :" which is 
an acknowledgment that they are not always so pacific 
as was represented.* And when he observes that " the 
u desire of Esteem and of Knowledge are highly useful 
u to society, as well as Power, and at the same time 
" are less dangerous in their excesses," he tacitly allows 
that they are not totally exempt. 

In support of another argument he asserts, that *' in- 
€i numerable instances occur in life, of men who sacri- 
11 ficc case, pleasure, and every thing else to the lust 



• This expression is also inaccurate, since it is the province of 
virtue to correct these as well as every other desire, when they ar« 
in danger of becoming inordinate. 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 361 

H of power, of fame, or even of knowledge." A de- 
monstration this, that the sensations they sometimes 
excite, are not only uneasy but ungovernable. 

If by the expression, " there is not a sensation proper 
to <e each," we are to understand that one particular 
sensation is common to them all, the proposition is still 
more extravagant. Our sensations, in every species of 
desire, are as different as the objects desired. Nor is 
there a greater difference between hunger and thirst, 
than there is between the desire of wealth and the 
desire of power. The desire of knowledge is also dis- 
tinct from, and superior to both. 



Note L. 

After u feelings of humanity." Page 88. 

Dr. Reid remarks, that " it seems to be false reli- 
<f gion alone, which is able to check the tear of com- 
*' passion." " We are told," he adds, " that in Por- 
ci tugal and Spain, a man condemned to be burned as 
" an obstinate heretic, meets with no compassion even 
" from the multitude ;" observing that 6l they are taught 
a to look upon him as the enemy of God, and doomed 
*' to hell-fire. But should not this very circumstance 
" move compassion ? Surely it would if they were not 
" taught that, in this case, it is a crime to shew com- 
passion, or even to feel it." (See Essay on Active 
Powers, Page 156.) 

In addition to the motive assigned, we may mention 
the influence of custom, in rendering the heart insensible 
to the sufferings of these devoted objects. I was once 



362 NOTES TO THE 

passing through Moorfields with a young Lady aged 
about nine or ten years, born and educated in Portugal, 
but in the Protestant Faith, and observing a large con- 
course of people assembled around a pile of faggots on 
fire, I expressed a curiosity to know the cause. She 
very composedly answered, I suppose that it is nothing 
more than that they are going to burn a Jew. Fortunately 
it was no other than roasting an ox, upon some joyful 
occasion. What rendered this singularity the more 
striking, were the natural mildness and compassion of 
the young person's disposition. 

Another instance of the influence of perverted prin- 
ciples, occurs to my remembrance in the conduct of a 
pious Mother, towards a most excellent and dutiful Son ; 
who from a principle of conscience, in opposition to his 
interest, renounced the religious system in which he 
had been educated, for another, which he deemed more 
consonant to truth. She told him that " she found it 
" her duty, however severe the struggle, to alienate her 
" affections from him. now he had rendered himself an 
" enemy to God, by embracing such erroneous senti- 
sc ments." My Friend added, that she was completely 
successful in these pious endeavours ; and that the duty 
she enjoined upon herself, was scrupulously performed 
during the remainder of her days. 



Note M. 

After " past, present, and future." Page 90. 

It is singular, with what precision common language 
marks the difference between to wish and to desire. 



PRECEDING TREATISE. S6S 

According to our power to obtain the object of our wishes, 
or our influence over the means. Thus we never say to 
any one, I desire you to be well ; but I wish you well ; 
because, generally speaking, we have no influence over 
another's health ; but a sick man not only wishes but 
desires to be well, because he possesses the power of 
applying the means ; and if he rejects the means, we 
conclude that he does not desire to be well. If we are 
solicitous that some kind office should be performed by 
any one, we may either wish or desire, according to our 
claims upon his aid. As we may sometimes desire where 
we cannot command, thus we may wish, where it would 
be presumptuous to desire : and sometimes we manifest 
our desires by expressing our wishes, from a principle of 
delicacy, leaving it to the party, from whom we expect 
the kind office, to increase the obligation by conforming 
to our wish, rather than complying with our desires. 
These distinctions being founded in nature, are common 
to every language. 



Note N. 

After " to impede our progress." Page 100. 

This seems to be the genuine sense of the substantive 
Humility, But its verb, and participles, are not equally 
confined in their significations. They relate to states of 
debasement, in which the spirits are peculiarly depressed, 
and the mind deeply chagrined and mortified, but to 
which the term humility has never yet been applied. 
There are situations, in which persons may feel them- 



364 NOTES TO THE 

selves very much humbled, and they may be exposed to 
many humiliating circumstances, without their being pos- 
sessed of the disposition denoted by humility. Such 
expressions never relate to the prevailing habit of the 
mind, but to certain incidents which check pride, vanity, 
ambition, emulation ; or deprive us of the reputation 
we had enjoyed. They all relate to some degree of 
elevation, to which the mind had in vain aspired, and 
has felt mortified by the disappointment -, or to some 
particular state from which the subject has fallen, and 
in consequence of which he suffers a degradation. He 
may thus be in a state of humiliation, without being in a 
state of humility. This word refers alone to mental 
excellence, either intellectual or moral ; concerning 
which, the subject himself entertains painful apprehen- 
sions, that he is or shall remain deficient. The adjective 
humble has the same signification. When we say of a 
person that he has an humble mind, we mean that he is 
modest, unassuming, diffident of himself. These dis- 
tinctions are very obvious, and though they may Indicate 
the caprices of language, they are nevertheless highly 
important ; for they serve to discriminate things which 
differ very essentially' in their natures. The humble 
mind is neither mean nor abject, which may be the case 
with the proud, who by being detected in his baseness, 
or disappointed in his vain presumptuous hopes, may be 
luuuhlcd to the dust. To the man who is clothed with 
Humility, may possibly belong all those excellencies 
which Mr. Hume has ascribed to pride. He may in 
reality possess more merit than he dares to imagine. 
The disposition is inspired by the contemplation of excel- 
lencies which he loves, and which he almost despairs. to 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 365 

obtain. How different is this from the humiliation any 
one may suffer, from disappointed ambition, from a per- 
ception of involuntary blemishes and accidental defects, 
from the mortification that self-love may experience, by 
being defective in beauty, elegance, or wealth ? or laden 
with corporeal infirmities ! All of which Mr. Hume has 
arbitrarily chosen to comprehend under Humility. For 
example. " If beauty or deformity belong to our own 
" face, shape, or person, this pleasure or uneasiness is 
" converted into pride or humility. — Pride and humility 
" have the qualities of our mind and body, that is, of 
<c self, for their natural and more immediate causes. — 
" Bodily pain and sickness are in themselves proper 
" causes of humility. Concerning all other bodily ac- 
" complishments, we may observe in general, that what- 
" ever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or sur- 
" prising, is an object of pride, and the contrary of 
" humility." 

Mr. Hume must have known that whimsical deviations 
from etymology, constitute an essential part of the 
idioms of a language ; which render it not only so diffi- 
cult to be acquired, but occasion ludicrous effects in the 
attempt. Would he not have been the first to smile at 
the mistakes of a foreigner, who should suppose that all 
persons, labouring every day at their particular occupa- 
tions, were equally Day-labourers ? — that to possess an 
elegant or lively fancy, was to be very fanciful f— that a 
man was insane, because he had ill health f — and that 
every child of nature, was a natural child f — -But are 
these blunders more inconsistent with the idioms of our 
language, which custom has universally established, than 
the assertion that bodily pain or sickness are in them- 



S66 NOTES TO THE 

selves proper causes of Humility ? or placing a the 
" Epilepsy;' ¥ the Itch," " the King's-Evil" in the 
catalogue ? (See Dissertations on the Passions, passim.) 

It is easy to collect, from the above passages, and 
from the amiable character he has given of Pride, as 
remarked in a preceding note, that Mr. Hume, *' de- 
" lighted to exalt the proud, and give disgrace to the 
humble" Had it been his province to translate the 
Bible, how would he have rendered the following pas- 
sages ? 

Eveiij one proud in heart, is an abomination to the Lo9'd. 
An high look and a proud heart is sin. He that is of a 
proud Jieart stirreth up strife. Pride was not made for 
man, tyc. fyc. fyc. 

Before honour is humility. By humility and the fear of 
the Lord, are riches, honour, and life. God giveth grace 
to the humble, §c. fyc. §c. 

It is not intended by these quotations, to confute his 
notions by divine authority ; but by that of common phra- 
seology. They indicate what were the ideas universally 
annexed to the terms Pride and Humility, at the period 
when this book was translated ; and these continue pre- 
cisely the same every time such passages are read, either 
in public or private. To the universal usage of expres- 
sions every author must conform, who means to be 
intelligible. Nor is the misrepresentation of facts more 
injurious to the credit of an historian, than the perversion 
of language to that of a philosopher. 

The singularity of Mr. Hume in his definitions of 
both these words, will appear still more assuming, when 
wc consider that it opposes the phraseology, not only of 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 36? 

the English language, but of most, perhaps all, the 
European languages, which always employ an appro- 
priate word, to distinguish that amiable consciousness, 
or apprehension of inferiority in mental excellence, from 
other painful imperfections ; and that word is perfectly 
synonymous to the explanation we have given of humir 
lity. 



Note O. 

After " dread of their arrival." Page 108. 

The Author once attended a prisoner of some distinc- 
tion in one of the prisons of the metropolis, ill of a 
typhus fever ; whose apartments were gloomy in the 
extreme, and surrounded with horrors : yet this prisoner 
assured him afterwards, that, upon his release, he 
quitted them with a degree of reluctance. Custom had 
reconciled him to the twilight, admitted through the 
thick-barred grate, to the filthy spots and patches of his 
plastered walls, to the hardness of his bed, and even to 
confinement. He had his books, was visited by his 
friends, and was greatly amused and interested in the 
anecdotes of the place. 

An Officer of the municipality at Leyden also inform- 
ed the Author of an instance, which marks yet more 
strongly the force of habit. A poor woman, who had 
for some misdemeanour been sentenced to confinement 
for a certain number of years, upon the expiration of 
the term, immediately applied to him for re-admission* 
She urged that all her worldly comforts were fled; and 



268 NOTES TO THE 

her only wish was to be indulged in those imparted by 
habit. She moreover threatened, that, if this could not 
be granted as a favour, she would commit some offence 
which might give her a title to be re-instated in the ac- 
customed lodgings. 



Note P. 

After c: may possibly follow." Page 108. 

As these distinctions may appear too refined to some of 
my Readers, it will be proper to shew that they actually 
exist ; and that there are situations, in which a discri- 
mination is both obvious and necessary. Take the fol- 
lowing instances. 

When a young and inexperienced soldier is first order- 
ed to march to battle, his legs will tremble under him, 
and the presaging colour of death will be in his face, 
notwithstanding his strongest resolutions, aided by the 
power of drums and trumpets, and the apparent gaiety 
of his associates. These mark his fear. Should he, 
during the engagement, meet with a single foe, and be 
provoked to single combat, from which he cannot pos- 
sibly or honourably escape, the emotion of terror will 
subdue the listlessness of fear, and arouse every power 
of action. If the army to which he belongs should ex- 
perience a total defeat, the province, whose safety might 
depend upon its success, will be thrown into the utmost 
Consternation j because this commencement of evil may 
be productive of horrors, which the liveliest imagination 
oannot fully represent : and it was the apprehension of a 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 369 

possible defeat, with its consequences, that had inspired 
their minds with Dread, long before the engagement 
took place. 

These ideas are in themselves very distinct, and al- 
though some of the terms used to express them may be 
used indiscriminately, where nice precision is not so 
requisite, yet the arrangement given them evidently 
shews the place destined for each. Thus we may say 
that the young soldier dreads to go into battle, as he is 
marching forwards ; but strictly speaking, this dread may 
have been indulged immediately after he had enlisted, 
when the object of Fear was remote j it will be increased 
into that passion as he approaches the enemy. 



Note Q. 

After " though a degree of hope is still indulged.** 
Page 110. 

The embarrassed and fluctuating state of the mindj 
under the influence of doubt, has seduced Mr. Hume 
into a singular hypothesis, which not only opposes the 
universal opinion of mankind, but confounds the future 
with the present and the past. Could he establish his 
hypothesis, it would follow that the mind is first op-* 
pressed with grief concerning a particular object, and 
then torn with fear and anxiety concerning its arrival ; 
for he makes grief to be the parent of fear, instead of 
considering the accomplishment of fearful apprehensions 
as a cause of grief, 

B b 



370 NOTES TO THE 

" Suppose," says he, " that the Object concerning 
" which we are doubtful, produces either desire or aver- 
u sion ; it is evident, that according as the mind turns 
(i itself to one side or the other, it must feel a momen- 
" tary impression of joy or sorrow. An object, whose 
" existence we desire, gives satisfaction, when we 
" think of those causes which produce it ; and for the 
u same reason, excites grief or uneasiness, from the 
" opposite consideration. So that as the understanding, 
" in probable questions, is divided between the contrary 
cc points of view, the heart must in the same manner 
" be divided between opposite emotions. — According ass 
u the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of 
" grief or joy predominates in the composition ; and 
" these passions being intermingled, by means of the 
w contrary views of the imagination, produce by the 
" union, the passions of hope and fear. Again : 

u The passions of fear and hope may arise, when the 
" chances are equal on both sides, and no superiority 
u can be discovered, in one above the other. Nay, in 
t( this situation the passions are rather the strongest $ 
u as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, 
" and is tost with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a 
" superior degree of probability to the side of grief , you 
" immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the com- 
f* position and tincture it into fear. Increase the proba- 
" bility, by that means the grief, the fear prevails still 
<( more and more ; till at last it runs insensibly, as the 
" joy continually diminishes into pure grief. After you 
" have brought it to this situation, diminish the grief, 
" by a contrary operation to that which increased it, to 



PRECEDING TREATISE, 3?i 

u wit, by diminishing the probability on the melancholy 
ic side ' 9 and } r ou will see the passion cheer every mo- 
" ment, till it changes insensibly into hope 5 which 
" again runs by slow degrees into joy, as you increase 
" the part of the composition by the increase of the 
u probability." He adds, i6 Are not these as plain 
" proofs that the passions of fear and hope are mixtures 
Si of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a 
s( coloured ray of the sun, passing through a prism, is 
S€ a composition of two others, when, as you diminish 
si or increase the quantity of either, you find it prevail 
" proportionably more or less in the composition/' (See 
Dissertation on the Passions, Sect. I.) 

The mistake which runs through the whole of this la- 
boured argument, manifestly arises from Mr. Hume's not 
having sufficiently attended to the complication which 
exists in an uncertain and en^barrassed state of mind. 
The Object both of hope and fear must, according to 
his own hypothesis, be future, or problematical, other- 
wise no uncertainty concerning it could have place. It 
cannot* therefore* in itself be the eause either of grief 
or joy, trut, as we usually express the particular state of 
mind* of hope or fear. In the observation made by Mr. 
Hume, that " an object whose existence we desire gives 
(i satisfaction, lohenever we think of those causes which 
" produce it, 3 * his own ideas are manifestly entangled in 
the inaccuracy of the statement. It cannot possibly he 
the object we desire that gives the satisfaction he men- 
tions, for then the desire would be accomplished ; but 
it is thinking of those causes 3 which produce, or are cal- 
culated to produce it. Thus has he inadvertently ascribed 
b b 2 



372 NOTES TO THE 

an influence to the Object, primarily and solely, which 
ought to be ascribed simply to the state of our minds 
concerning it. The object itself, instead of giving this 
satisfaction, will remain the subject of our hopes and 
fears, as long as we remain in a state of uncertainty 
concerning it. When we advert to the probabilities of 
its existence, the mind may derive both hope and joy, 
from the predominant influence of these probabilities 
upon us, and when improbabilities gain an Ascendant in- 
fluence, our fear will prevail, and this will be accompa- 
nied with a certain degree of grief at the disappointment 
of the hopes we had indulged. Thus by being agitated 
by the U pro and con " of probabilities and improbabi- 
lities, we feel a pleasing expectation at one moment, 
and a painful reverse at another. Here are of conse- 
quence two temporary sensations, alternately excited 
respecting this desired object ; but they are immediately 
excited by the detached evidences on the side of an 
happy or an unhappy issue. Without hope we should 
sink into the extreme of fear; without fear, our joy 
would be complete : and when the grand result shall be 
known, these temporary sensations will cease, and the 
mind will be under the influence of unmixed joy or grief, 
according to the event. The joy and grief accompa- 
nying hope and fear, therefore, retain their own cha- 
racteristic natures, without any transmutation having 
taken place. After we have indulged hopes, by con- 
templating the promising side of the question, we are 
grieved and chagrined at the disappointment of these 
hopes, as often as improbabilities alarm our fears. Oa 
the contrary, when probabilities appear strongly in favour 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 3?3 

of what we ardently desire, we rejoice that our hopes are 
encouraged. 

Thus the passions of fear and hope are not mixtures of 
grief and joy, in the same manner as a coloured ray of 
the sun, passing through a prism, is a composition of 
two others ; but they are all distinct passions, and have 
their own distinct causes of excitement. Hope and fear 
respect the grand issue ; grief and joy, the encourage- 
ments or discouragements which may alternately present 
themselves respecting it. 



Note R. 

After u our understandings cannot fully reach and 
comprehend." Page 154. 

From Mr. Grove it was natural to expect precision; 
and, although this is manifest in most parts of his 
Treatise on the Passions, yet in his description of Ad- 
miration, he has not only deviated from the best autho- 
rities, but also from himself. 

That admiration is not excited by novelty alone is 
plain, because there are many novelties which no one 
can admire; such as are indifferent, insipid, or dis- 
pleasing. That it cannot be synonymous with surprise, 
is plain, because were we to tell any one that we were 
surprised at his excellencies, he would probably be sur- 
prised at our ill manners. Nor is it the same with wonder ; 
for when a lover admires the charms of his mistress, it 



374 NOTES TO THE 

is a different sensation from that of wondering that she 
possesses them. 

But that the term Admiration, cannot be confined to 
the impressions which simple novelty is able to make, 
is obvious from the subsequent remarks of Mr. Grove, 
and the more pertinent phraseology employed in other 
parts of his works. He acknowledges that greatness or 
excellency, is the most general and most proper object of 
admiration. But neither of these are necessarily novel. 
He further observes, that fc admiration, according to 
6i the different character of its object is called esteem or 
contempt." But his definition has confined our ideas to 
the simple character of novelty ; nor can admiration be 
applied to opposite characters, without a destruction of 
the simplicity he ascribes to it; and I may add without 
exciting a degree of surprise at the versatility of its 
nature. He has also remarked, that even littleness may 
excite admiration ; but he allows that the works of nature 
or art, which are of an unusual smallness, are admired, 
not so much for their smallness, as for the greatness of 
the wisdom and skill conspicuous in them. For (i we can 
u behold a particle of mere undiversified matter," says 
he, (( though incomparably smaller, without such won- 
(( der." In another passage, speaking of the advan- 
tages of sleep, lie says, " we shall discern one reason 
" more to admire the wisdom of the Creator, in appoint- 
" ing so great a portion of our time for sleep." 

Thus it appears that Mr. Grove feels the necessity of 
opposing his own definition ; and also the peculiar pro- 
priety of applying the term to indubitable marks of ex- 
cellency. 

The extreme confusion and contrarieties, which run 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 375 

through the chapter from whence the above extracts are 
made, proceed from his considering admiration as syno- 
nymous with surprise ; and they fully indicate the great 
importance of affixing distinct ideas to each expression. 
Every author admits that the terms to admire, admiration, 
admirable, may always be applied to some kind of excel- 
lency, without the shadow of an impropriety ; and the 
above observations manifest that they cannot, at all 
times, be used synonymously with either surprise or won- 
der. This circumstance fully indicates their proper place 
in the accurate arrangement of our ideas. 



Note S. 

After " or which has a preponderancy of excellence." 
Page 236. 

To enter deeply into this delicate subject, would not be 
consistent with my plan, but the following queries are 
proposed to those who are more disposed. Since the 
Female Sex complain, with apparent anguish of heart, 
that men have taken the lead, in directing the wheels of 
government, in the establishment of the arts, and prose- 
cution of the sciences, by usurpation, how came they to 
be such general and extensive usurpers, without possess • 
ing a superiority of correspondent qualifications ?— Can 
any other example be produced of predilections being 
rendered so universal and so permanent, by circum- 
stances merely incidental ? — Again, excepting we have 
recourse to the constitution of nature, who can explain 
the reason why each sex should regard the qualities in the 



$7<i NOTES TO THE 

opposite sex, most similar to its own, with such marks 
of disgust cr contempt ; and delight in qualities directly 
opposite ? This is contrary to all the laws of the social 
affections in every other instance ; for similarity of dispo- 
sitions and manners is considered, in every other case, as 
the foundation of love, and the cement of affection and 
friendship. 

May we not safely assert that there is, generally speak- 
ing, an original diversity in tastes and dispositions, liable 
however to some exceptions ? If this be admitted, a 
correspondent diversity of pursuits will naturally follow. 
We may also subjoin that these tastes and dispositions 
are in most instances, remarkably correspondent with the 
corporeal powers of obtaining or accomplishing their 
objects, 



Note T. 

After " by a cautious manner of communicating the 
tidings." Page 297. 

Historians present us tvith many instances of fatal 
effects, from the excess of joy ; but it plainly appears 
from their narratives, that the subjects were, at the 
instant preceding, under the pressure of extreme anguish 
of mind. 

Pliny informs us that Chilo, the Lacedemonian, died 
upon hearing that his son had gained a prize in the 
Olympic Games. " Cum victore filio Olympic expi- 
cc rasset guadio." We may consider the excess of joy 
In this case, as an indication of his previous solicitude 



PRECEDING TREATISE. W 

concerning the issue. (Plin. Maj. Lib. vii. Sect. 70 
But the following instances are more express. 

Valerius Maximus tells us that Sophocles the tragic 
Writer, in a contest of honour, died in consequence of a 
decision being pronounced in his favour. " Sophocles 
" ultimae jam senectutis, cum in certamine tragaediam 
" dixisset, ancipiti sententiarum eventu diu solicitus, 
" aliquando tarn en una sententia. victor, causam mortis 
" gaudium habuit." (Val. Max. Lib. ix. Cap. 12.) 

Aulius Gellius mentions a remarkable instance of what 
may be termed, accumulated joy, in Diagoras, whose 
three sons were crowned in the same day as victors ; the 
one as a pugilist, the other as a wrestler, and the third 
in both capacities. " Diagoras, tres filios habuit, unum 
i6 pugilem, alterum lutorem, tertium Pancrastiasten ; 
cc eosque omnes videt vincere coronarique eodem Olym- 
*' piae die ; et cum coronis suis in caput patris positis 
€f suaviarentur ; cumque populus gratulabundus flores 
u undique in eum jaceret, ibi in stadio, inspectante 
** populo, in osculis, atque in manibus filiorum animam 
" efflavit." (Aul. Gell. noct. Attic. Lib. III. Cap. 15.) 

Livy also mentions the instance of an aged Matron, 
who while she was in the depth of distress, from the tid- 
ings of her son's having been slain in battle, died in his 
arms in the excess of joy upon his safe return. (Liw 
Lib. xxu. Cap. 7-) 

Not to enumerate more instances ; we are told by the 
Italian historian Guicciardini, that Leo the Tenth died 
of a fever, occasioned by the agitation of his spirits, on 
his receiving the joyful news of the capture of Milan, 
concerning which he had entertained much anxiety. 
(Istoria de Guicciardini, Lib. xiv.) 



3?8 NOTES TO THE 

In all these instances the previous state of mind, with 
its pathological effects upon the body, made the im- 
pulse of joy the stronger , and contributed to render it 
fatal. 



Note U, 

After " will contribute to explain the rest/' 
Page 310. 

Dr. Haygarth, in his late Publication on the Tmagi- 
nation as a Cause, and as a Cure of the Disorders of the 
Body, has presented us with many curious and interesting 
facts relative to its influence ; to which I beg leave to 
refer the Reader. Such incontestible proofs of the power 
of the imagination in medical cases, may vindicate some 
of the strenuous advocates for Animal Magnetism, from 
the charge of intentional fraud, brought against them by 
the totally incredulous ; while they demonstrate the ab- 
surdity of all their theories. 

I have, in the text, attributed the power of the imagi- 
nation to produce certain changes in the corporeal system, 
to the Passions or strong Affections, which in such cases 
always accompany it ; and the experiments made by 
Doctor Haygarth and his medical friends, abundantly 
corroborate the sentiment. In some of the Patients, the 
salutary influence of hope, and afterwards of joy, was 
evidently very great : to others, the mind was obviously 
in ft state of surj)rise and astonishment, at the mysterious 
powers supposed to be seated in the instruments ; — in 
others, it was agitated by alternate hopes and fears ; — and 



PRECEDING TREATISE, 3?i> 

In others, it was under the strong impressions of terror. 
The directions given to the Tractors served to point out 
as it were, the influence of this pre-disposition of mind 
to the parts particularly affected, by a law not more 
inexplicable, though more uncommon, than the operation 
of the will in producing voluntary motion. Nor is the 
process dissimilar to that of conveying the electric fluid 
to various parts of the body, as practised in medical 
electricity. Since every passion is frequently excited by 
the Imagination alone, without any real or just cause, and 
since these passions are in their appearances and effects, 
perfectly the same as those produced by realities, the 
medical influence of the Imagination is obviously reduced 
to the same principle. The remaining difficulties there^ 
fore, attending the subject, are not greater than those 
which belong to the influence of the passions in general* 
When it shall be explained in what manner each Passion 
instantaneously produces its own specific change, whether 
it be of an exhilarating, irritating, depressive, or languid 
nature, we shall be able to explain the medical Power of 
the Imagination, which is able to excite passions and 
affections, from ideal causes. 



Note W, 

After (< where the sole object is to establish indisputable 
facts." Page 310. 

The Section to which this Note refers is an abridged 
translation of some parts of the Author's Inaugural 
Dissertation, De Animi pathamatum vi, et modo agendi in 



380 NOTES TO THE 

inducendis et curandis Morbis ; published at Leydon iri 
the year 1767« In which his professed object was to 
theorize ; and by adducing numerous proofs of the influ- 
ence of the passions, both in inducing and removing 
disorders, to demonstrate the fallacy of the Boerhaavian 
system, which attributes the proximate causes of dis- 
eases to certain changes in the fluids. He attempted in 
that Dissertation to explain the modus operandi of the 
passions and affections, upon principles equally adapted 
to the influence of every other cause of morbid or salu- 
tary change. It was his intention to have considered 
the subject more amply ; and to have presented it to the 
world in another form ; but in the earlier part of life he 
was deprived of the requisite leisure 5 and in subsequent 
years the gradual rejection of the Boerhaavian doctrine, 
and the very learned dissertation of Dr. Falconer on the 
same subject, to which the Fothergillian Medal was 
adjudged, conspired to render the execution of his design 
the less necessary. The Reader will find in the Doctor's 
Treatise, numerous instances given illustrative of the 
doctrine and principles now advanced, and such autho- 
rities quoted as will remove every doubt. 

See also Sir George Baker's Observations, in the Me- 
dical Transactions. T. ill. XI. 



Note X. 

After " The other compounds partake of mixed 
effects." Page 320. 

These Observations on the influence of the passions 
and affections upon thought and language, united with 



PRECEDING TREATISE. 381 

those repeatedly advanced on the power of sympathy^ 
point out to us the reason of an axiom universally ad- 
mitted, that the orator must feel his subject to insure his 
power over the feeling of others. As the warm feelings 
of a mind duly cultivated, will always suggest a train 
of ideas and expressions, correspondent with its peculiar 
state, thus in some degree of feeling highly necessary 
for a successful imitation. If the rhetorician or orator 
be totally destitute of sensibility, there will be such an 
artifice in his style and manner, as can alone deceive 
those who are ignorant that artifice exists. It is, however, 
acknowledged, that by constant practice, or in other 
words, by being hackneyed in their profession, both lan- 
guage and manner may become the result of habit, and 
may be employed with effect, when the Feelings which 
gave them their original energy are obtundei. Veteran 
actors have been known to imitate various emotions, in 
a just and forcible manner, long after they had lost their 
sensibility. The retained Counsellor has been known to 
imitate that pathos in a bad cause, which a good cause 
alone could have at first inspired : and the corrupt Sena- 
tor may, in his degenerate state, counterfeit all that 
zeal and energy, which was genuine at the commence- 
ment of his political career. But so true is nature to 
itself, that it absolutely demands the passions and emo- 
tions to be perfectly represented. Defect diffuses a 
languor, excess produces disgust. The eloquence dic- 
tated by an unfeeling heart, mistakes bombast for sub- 
limity, rant for strong feelings, the cant and whine of a 
mendicant for the pathetic. It confounds or misapplies 
every trope and figure which it has collected from 
systems of rhetoric. It Is loquacious where it ought to 



382 NOTES, &c. 

be concise ; amuses itself with drawing of pictures and 
gathering of flowers, when it should have been borne 
down with a torrent of rapid thought and diction * In a 
word, it presents us with every indication that the author 
has been merely employing his head, and playing with 
his imagination, without making any attempts to warm 
his own heart. It is, therefore, impossible that he should 
succeed in warming the hearts of others. He may excite 
the admiration of some, the contempt of many, but the 
genuine feelings of none. 



False eloquence, like the prismatic glass, 
Its gaudy colours spreads on every place : 
The face of Nature we no more survey ; 
All glares alike without distinction gay. 

Pope, 



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